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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree M.ComCAg) 
RISK MANAGEMENT IN AGRICULTURE: 
ARGENTINE EVIDENCE OF PERCEIVED SOURCES OF RISK, RISK 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, AND RISK EFFI~IENCY IN RICE FARMING 
by J. M. Pellegrino 
Rice production, as with any other production activity in agriculture, is risky. Rice 
producers in Argentina apply several risk management strategies to decrease the impact 
of risk. However, the effects of these strategies on reducing risk have not yet been 
quantified. This investigation aims to provide a [mner basis for analysing the risky 
agricultural environment, farmers' risk perceptions, and management responses to 
control risk. The specific objectives are to: 1) ascertain the rice farmers' perceptions 
about the relative importance of different sources of risk; 2) establish the risk responses 
~~I.~:,~.~~;:: 
~:2~~~~ 
~, .• ~.< 
that rice farmers implement; 3) determine the influence of the size of farms on farmers' rcc"_,: 
perceptions of the risk sources and on the nature of their risk responses; and 4) evaluate 
the risk reducing effects of the farmers' responses on the gross margins of the rice 
enterprise. 
In this research, 12 rice farmers in the counties of Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia in the 
province of Corrientes were interviewed to ascertain their perceptions of the sources of 
risk affecting their businesses and their responses to risks. The second part of the 
interview sought to establish the costs of production, prices, and yields possibly obtained 
iii 
by implementing five marketing and production strategies in order to develop a gross '.,-c.,.:. 
I ,-', .- • -.~: 
~:~:~:~::~: 
margin stochastic model. 
Gross margin stochastic models for each strategy and for each farm were simulated. The 
outputs of the simulations comprised two cumulative probability distributions for each 
strategy, one representing the cumulative probability of obtaining different gross ~gins 
using a specific risk management strategy and the other representing the cumulative 
probability of obtaining different gross margins not using that specific strategy. Each pair 
of these cumulative probability distributions was compared by using visual stochastic 
dominance analysis, thus determining which cumulative probability distributions were 
more efficient in reducing risk. Efficient cumulative probability distributions were then 
i"·-
compared, obtaining the efficient set of cumulative distributions for each fann. 
This research demonstrated that 'changes in the econonnc and political situation in 
Brazil' is the most important source of risk for farmers in the study area and that the 
importance of this source holds regardless the size of the rice farms. This research also 
suggested that farmers' perceptions of the sources of risk differ according to the size of 
the farms. For example, rice farmers' level of concern with production risks increases as 
the farm size decreases. Farmer's responses to risks also vary according to farm size; for 
instance, the number of strategies used by rice farmers decreases as the area of the farms 
;. ~ ~. , 
falls. This research indicated that many strategic responses reduced risk, some of these 
; __ ::-.-.T'_;. 
responses reduced risk effects more than others. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND NATURE OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 
Risk and uncertainty in agriculture cause potential losses to both fanners and the 
economy. These risk-related costs include the values of the resources consumed in 
managing risk, such as cash outlays and management time, the premium required by the 
decision-maker as recompense for the acceptance of risk, and the costs associated with 
the difficulty added to long-range planning where the planner cannot predict the results 
of the strategies implemented. Incorrect predictions about prices and yields can also 
result in indirect costs to both producers and society and result in misallocation of 
r'"··"'-·'-' 
resources among finns (Fleisher, 1990). It follows that, in the case of the Argentine rice 
crop, strategies implemented to ameliorate such risks are not costless and result in 
uncertain fmancial outcomes. 
Rice producers' perceptions of the relevance of both risks and potential risk management 
strategies, together with the costs of such strategic management responses and the 
fmancial benefits occurring to the producer, are critical to the well-being of both the 
producer and society as a whole. 
1.1.1 The Nature of Agricultural Risk and Risk Management 
There are many reasons for the unpredictability of yields and prices in agriculture. For 
example, yields depend on factors such as biological processes and weather that are 
beyond the fanner's control. In addition, agricultural prices are determined in markets 
commonly dominated by perfect competition (Fleisher, 1990). In perfectly competitive 
2 
markets, there is no differentiation among products and there are many small suppliers. 
I'~> ",-" 
Consequently, farmers do not have any influence on prices, which are affected by 
I ' ,_.~,~. 
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fluctuations in demand and market instability. Moreover, because the price elasticity of 
the demand curve for agricultural products is quite flat in comparison with other non-
agricultural products, any variation in the quantity demanded significantly affects the 
output price (Barry, 1984). Another consequence of the fragmentation of the agricultural 
supply is that fanners do not have power in negotiating input prices (Fleisher, 1990). 
Fluctuations in input prices introduce variability in costs of production, thus representing 
a further source of risk. 
V ariationin the valut( of farm assets represents another source of risk. Farms are capital 
intensive because they use large quantities of valuable assets such as land, livestock, and 
machinery. Fluctuations in conditions of the general economy may alter the values of 
such assets (Fleisher, 1990), and thereby imposing risk on the fanners' equity 
independently of production or market risks. 
On another dimension, the risks affecting agriculture can be classified into business risks 
and fmancial risks (Gabriel and Baker, 1980). This classification allows the researcher to 
evaluate the impact of each of these sources by observing their influence on yields, 
output prices, input costs and equity capital (Martin, 1996). 
Individual farmers do not perceive the various sources of risk as being equally important. 
The perceived importance of a risk source may vary according to the characteristics of 
the environment and the farmer's socio-economic characteristics, such as farm size 
(Boggess et al., 1985). With particular respect to the issue of farm size, and with the 
3 
exception of Boggess et al.,(1985) who found that the size of the farm was positively 
.--:-'~:""~::f'~ 
related to six sources of risk, there has been little empirical evidence that relates the ~~_:~r;~:~~;:~ .-:.;,:-.:-; ... " 
farmer's perceptions of sources of risk with farm size (Martin and McLeay, 1998). 
Risk management is essential if the adverse effects of risk are to be reduced. The 
implementation of risk management responses/strategies is one feature of the process of 
risk management, with Patrick and Musser (1996) concluding that farmer and farm 
characteristics influence the implementation of different risk management strategies. With 
respect to farm size, there are few studies which empirically relate risk management 
responses and farm size, although Boggess et al., (1985) found that there was a 
relationship between the use of financial responses and the size of the fann 
1.1.2 Agricultural Risk and Rice Producers 
Rice production, as with any other production activity in agriculture, is risky. Firstly, rice 
production is a biological process, so its output cannot be predicted with certainty. 
Secondly, its yield depends in part on the weather. Thirdly, the producer neither knows 
the product price in advance nor is able to affect the price. The rice market has all the 
characteristics of being perfectly competitive in that there are many rice sellers with no 
single seller having a significant influence on the market. In addition, the product is not 
differentiated, so it can be perfectly substituted for the product of any other rice 
producer. Fourthly, the fragmentation of rice supply weakens the rice farmer's power for 
negotiating better prices for petrol, irrigation, machinery, pesticides, seeds, and fertiliser, 
thereby increasing the unpredictability of input prices (Kay and Edwards, 1994). 
4 
With particular reference to the Argentine rice industry, rice production is a capital-
intensive activity. This capital intensity results in the Argentine rice industry being very 
sensitive to any economic volatility which affects the rice producers' asset values. 
Rice producers in Argentina apply several risk management strategies to decrease the 
impact of risk. These include the introduction of new varieties that have incorporated 
resistance to pests and diseases or are drought resistant, and diversification (Begenisic, 
1998). With particular respect to diversification, many farmers complement rice 
production with cattle breeding, thus decreasing income variability, or by planting 
different rice varieties to· diminish yield variability (Begenisic, 1998). However, the 
effects of these strategies on reducing risk have not yet been quantified. 
Overall, it is evident from the above discussion that the evaluation of the efficiency of the 
farmers' responses to risk in order to make the rice enterprise more efficient is a topic 
worthy of further consideration. Its importance is supported by its originality and 
usefulness. This investigation, which will be outlined in the following sections of this 
chapter, aims to provide a finner basis for analysing the risky agricultural environment 
and farmers' risk perceptions and management responses to control it. This investigative 
need forms the foundation of the problem that will be defmed in the next section. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
There have been several studies concerned with farmers' risk perceptions and 
management responses. Martin (1996), Patrick and Musser (1996), Boggess et ai., 
(1985), Patrick et ai., (1985), and Harris et ai., (1991) surveyed farmers to establish 
their risk perceptions and responses in different contexts, and Nartea and Barry (1994a) 
5 
elicited fanners' perceptions of the cost and benefits of a specific risk response. A 
number of studies have evaluated the economic and fmancial effects of different risk 
responses. For example, Mapp et al.,(l979), Prentis et al.,(l996), Nartea and Barry 
(1994b), and Bosch and Johnson (1992) quantified the effects of risk management 
strategies by measuring the variability of economic and fmancial outcomes. 
However, there has not been any study that has surveyed farmers to ascertain their 
perceptions about risk and their responses to risk that has also evaluated the economic 
effects of the risk-reducing strategies used by them In addition, there is no published 
evidence· to suggest that there has been prior research undertaken in relation to rice 
fanners' perceptions of risk sources and management responses in Argentina. . -
i:· . 
It follows that the problem fundamental to this study is that, for farms of different sizes, 
the risk reducing effects of the application of a set of risk management strategies to 
control sources of risk perceived as important by rice producers in Argentina are as yet 
unknown. The next section of this chapter will devolve this problem into a number of 
objectives which will form the basis for the empirical component of this thesis. 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
It follows from the above specification of the problem fundamental to this research that 
the objective of this study is to cast light on the fmancial effects of the implementation of 
rice producers' risk responses. This overall objective can be framed as four specific aims 
which comprise the need to: 
1. ascertain the rice fanners' perceptions about the relative importance of different 
sources of risk for the rice enterprise; 
6 
2. establish the risk management responses that rice fanners might implement to 
manage the different sources of risk; 
3. detennine the influence of the size of operations on fanners' perceptions of the 
relative importance of the risk sources and on the nature of their responses to these 
risks; and 
4. evaluate the risk efficiency of the farmers' responses to perceived sources of risk. 
The analytical methods that will be used to address these objectives are presented in the 
following section. 
1.4 Proposed Analytical Methods 
In line with the objectives outlined in the preceding section of this chapter, this study will 
approach the research problem by analysing farmers' risk perceptions and management 
responses, by examining the influence of farm size on these perceptions and responses, 
and by simulating the economic outcomes from the use of production and marketing 
strategies. This research will focus on rice producers in the counties of Mercedes and 
Curuzu Cuatia (Province of Corrientes) in Argentina and will address the problem in four 
parts, according to the objectives presented above. Firstly, fanners' perceptions of the 
relevant importance of a number of sources of risk presented in the literature and 
adapted for the rice enterprise will be examined. Secondly, the implementation and 
relative importance of rice farmers' risk management responses will be detennined. Both 
the farmers' perceptions and responses will be established by an interviewing process. 
Thirdly, these perceptions of sources of risk and risk management strategies will be 
grouped and compared to analyse the influence that fann size has on them 
i·'A.' ","-"':' 
".".,';., ,-', 
~ ,J ;' •. , - .':', ..r 
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The final part of this study will detennine the risk efficiency of the most important risk 
E''';,.' ... · :r'.~', 
responses implemented. To achieve this, a gross margin stochastic model for each fanner ~-~~r~~~~~i~~~ 
will be developed to simulate the economic outcomes resulting from the adoption of the 
selected strategies. The probability distributions used in the stochastic models will be 
obtained by asking the producers' opinions on the effects of the strategies. After the 
simulations are effected for each case, the results will be compared using stochastic 
dominance efficiency analysis, thereby establishing the risk efficient management 
responses. The following section will more fully describe the chapter layout of this study. 
1.5 Chapter Layout . 
Chapter 2 will describe. rice production in Argentina, the markets for rice, and the 
. '\. -
characteristics of producers and producing regions, in particular the area selected for the 
focus of this study. Chapter 3 will review the academic literature concerning risk and 
uncertainty, sources of risk and risk management strategies. It will present the three 
different approaches to decision-making under uncertainty, evaluate the efficiency 
analysis criteria, and outline the methods for risk planning for fann businesses. Chapter 4 
will describe the design of the research and the methods used, including a description of 
the interview process, data analysis, processing methods, the gross margin model, the 
simulation method, and the method followed for risk efficiency analysis of the responses. 
Chapter 5 will present and discuss the results of the research Finally, Chapter 6 will 
summarise the conclusions, implications, and limitations of this study and will give some 
suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RICE PRODUCTION IN ARGENTINA 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 introduced the problem under scrutiny, the objectives of this research, and the 
analytical methods that will be used to address these objectives. This chapter will present 
the characteristics of rice production and rice producing areas in Argentina, the subjects 
of this investigation. 
The production of rice in Argentina is located in the north-eastern region. It is 
concentrated mainly·.in the provinces of Entre Rios, Corrientes and Santa Fe which 
together produced 93% of the total production of the country in the period 1990-19971. 
The provinces of Chaco, Formosa and Misiones produced the remaining 7% in the same 
period (Begenisic, 1998). Argentina has a rice production surplus, which is exported 
since the consumption per capita is stable and the rate of increase of the population is 
much lower than the rate of increase of rice production (Begenisic, 1998). As a 
consequence, any increase in production is reflected in an increase in exports. 
This chapter will provide the context in which the results, discussion and conclusions 
drawn from this research must be considered. In the following sections, the development 
of rice production, reflected by volume of output, area, and yield, the uses of rice output, 
the rice producer characteristics, and the features of the producing regions will be 
described. 
1 The most important cereal for Argentina is maize with 47.5% of the total grain production (tonnes) in 
the season 1997/98, second wheat with 36.3% of the total grain production, third sorghum with 9.2% of 
the total grain production, and fourth rice with 2.5% of the total grain production (SAGPyA-SIIAP, 
1999). 
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2.2 Rice Area and Production 
Since the 1992/93 season, rice production in Argentina has increased steadily as a result 
of the signing of the MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South) agreement and the 
increasing d~ficit in rice production in Brazil (Table 2.1). This growth has been enabled 
by an increase in both hectares planted and yields per hectare. Table 2.2 exhibits the 
reported planted area, showing, in 1997/98, a record of 247,500 hectares (Secretarfa de 
Agricultura, Ganaderfa, Pesca y Alimentaci6n - Sistema Informatico de Informaci6n 
Agropecuaria y Pesquera, 1999). Rice yields also increased, although, due to different 
weather conditions, not as steadily as the planted area did (Figure 2.1). This increase in 
yields is the result of higher and better use of pesticides, herbicides and fertilisers, use of 
high yield varieties, and increase in the irrigation efficiency (Begenisic, 1998). The effect 
of the increase of yields on the expansion in production can be observed by comparing 
the rate of growth «year2 - yearl)/yearl * 100) in production (22.8%) and in area 
(15.3%) for the period 1990/91-1997/98. This difference was due to the increase in 
yields. 
Figure 2.1 Rice yields per province 
IV 
~ 
Iii 
CI) 
§ Misiones 
o 
I-
90/91 91/92 92193 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 
Table 2.1 Ri d ·A 
·1990/91 1991192 . 1992193 . 1993/94 • <1994/951995196 19961971997/98 
Province. tonnes % tonnes'}"o< ·tC)nh~~>.% tonnes % •..... «OhneS .. <% .···.torth~s%· totlnes.% . ton ties < ,.~> 
Entre Rios 209,700 60% 442,300 60% 319,000 54% 308,900 51% 537,500 58% 544,350 55% 709,400 59% 667,800 66% 
Corrientes 92,600 27% 214,400 29% 168,900 28% 221,900 37% 290,300 31% 321,860 33% 354,660 30% 235,470 23% 
Santa Fe 17,400 5% 32,000 4% 33,800 6% 29,800 5% 45,500 5% 56,850 6% 76,200 6% 53,600 5% 
Formosa 19,700 6% 33,300 5% 35,100 6% 35,900 6% 38,600 4% 44,100 4% 42,500 4% 30,000 3% 
Chaco 7,000 2% 8,800 1% 9,200 2% 10,300 2% 12,700 1% 18,000 2% 21,300 2% 24,100 2% 
Misiones 1,300 0% 2,000 0% 1,200 0% 800 0% 1,600 ·0% 2,000 0% 900 0% 165 0% 
Total 347,700 100% 732,800 100% 592,800 100% 607,600 100% 930,200 100% 986,000 100% 1,200,514 100% 1,011,135 100% 
Table 2.2 Ri 1: d -- ------ - -- --- ·A 
1990/91 1991/92 1993/94. . 1995/96« .. .. .···.1996197> 
Province ha % ha % ha ha % I-ia ·<h~H% ·ill~"o 
Entre Rios 52,200 53% 78,650 53% 75,800 73,100 49% 104,180 111,500 53% 122,300 54% 134,200 
Corrientes 30,300 31% 51,100 35% 46,430 52,650 36% 62,251 33% 73,202 35% 73,713 33% 82,200 33% 
Santa Fe 7,800 8% 8,800 6% 8,800 6% 9,650 7% 10,530 6% 13,900 7% 15,600 7% 16,000 6% 
Formosa 5,300 5% 7,000 5% 8,000 6% 10,000 7% 8,700 5% 8,500 4% 9,500 4% 8,500 3% 
Chaco 1,800 2% 1,800 1% 2,000 1% 2,500 2% 3,000 2% 4,000 2% 4,100 2% 6,300 3% 
Misiones 600 1% 600 0% 300 0% 300 0% 240 0% 300 0% 300 0% 300 0% 
Total 98,000 100% 147,950 100% 141,330 100% 148,200 100% 188,901 100% 211,402 100% 225,513 100% 247,500 100% 
'r: ,. 
. ~ ': ' 
";",J" 
mr .. .,. 
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The pattern of this expansion in production differed in the two most important producing 
provinces. Corrientes had the largest planted area until 1986/87. However, from 1987/88 
until today, the increase in the rice planted area in Entre Rios exceeded the increase in 
Corrientes. In contrast, Entre Rios has led the production ranking from 1982/83 
onwards. These trends are unlikely to change in the near future. 
Rice yields were extremely variable during the period 1990/91-1997/98 (Figure 2.1 and 
Table 2.3). The coefficient of variation for the total yield variability over this period is 
18%. Misiones, Formosa and Corrientes were the provinces with higher coefficient of 
variation, but weighting these coefficient of variations by their proportional share to the 
total production makes Corrientesthe province with the most variable yield. The reason 
for this variability was that several critical weather events occurred. For example, in 
1997/98 a flood resulted in large production losses. Corrientes was the province mostly 
affected with a loss in production of approximately 107,300 tonnes. 
Table 2.3 Rice yields in Argentina 
· .. ~r9ti·~C:~· ••• · 1j~~:' .•.••••.. j1~6a·.· •• ·.·······9~:h~.··.·· •••..•• ··.~;i.~~~ •.••.•••.••• 9.;~~~ •••••.•••.. j0~~j ..... • ••• ·••· ~~Z~~·.··· ........ ~!~~~ ••••..•.. 
Entre Rios 4.017 5.624 
Corrientes 3.056 4.196 
Santa Fe 2.231 3.636 
Formosa 3.717 4.757 
Chaco 3.889 4.889 
Misiones 2.167 3.333 
Average 3.179 4.406 
2.3 Uses of Output 
4.208 
3.638 
3.841 
4.388 
4.600 
4.000 
4.112 
4.226 5.159 4.882 5.800 4.976 
4.215 4.663 4.397 4.811 2.865 
3.088 4.321 4.090 4.885 3.350 
3.590 4.437 5.188 4.474 3.529 
4.120 4.233 4.500 5.195 3.825 
2.667 6.667 6.667 3.000 0.550 
3.651 4.913 4.954 4.694 3.183 
The grain produced is mainly polished for internal consumption or for exports. The rest 
is used as seed (4%) or exported to Brazil without being further manufactured (very low 
%) (Begenisic, 1998). The internal consumption in Argentina is one of the lowest in the 
I , , 
I . 
I. 
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world at 5.5 to 6 kilograms per person per year (polished rice), especially when 
compared to other Latin-American countries such as Brazil (42 kg/person) and Uruguay 
(10-12 kg/person). The reason for this is that the immigrants who settled in Argentina 
were mainly European who used wheat as a source of protein and carbohydrates. As a 
response to the relatively low internal consumption, a large proportion of the crop is 
exported. 
Changing trade patterns in Argentine rice exports over time can be observed. During the 
1980s, rice was exported to the countries within the high quality market, such as the 
European Community and middle-eastern countries. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
these markets were lost. due to low prices and high costs of transportation. In 1990, 
Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina created the MERCOSUR common market. 
This allowed Argentina and Uruguay to export their surpluses to Brazil, a low quality 
market. This change in regulation enabled many producers who could not export 
previously, due to their low grain quality, to export to Brazil. Since then, a very high 
proportion of the total exports has been exported to Brazil, as Figure 2.2 shows. This 
trend changed in 1997 with a decrease in the exports to Brazil and the development of 
exports to other countries such as Iran (Figure 2.3) (Begenisic, 1998). This 
diversification of exports should expand, given Brazil's reduction in rice imports 
following its economic crisis in late 1998 which has produced a crisis to Argentinean rice 
producers who cannot sell their output (La Nacion, 1999). 
Figure 2.2 Export shares, 1996 
3% 3% 8% 
76% 
ort shares, 1997 
11% 
53% 
2.4 Rice Producer Characteristics 
• Chile 
• Brazil 
o Bolivia 
o Otros 
• Nicaragua 
• Senegal 
• Iran 
.00ile 
o Costa Rica 
o Brazil 
• Otros 
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In general, rice farmers plant only rice on their farms. This crop can neither substitute 
for, nor be substituted by, other crops, since it is produced on marginal lands, although it 
is complemented with livestock production in many regions (Begenisic, 1998). 
Nevertheless, rice is rotated with other crops, such as maize, in some fertile and higher 
altitude areas. 
There are three predominant tenancy situations applying to rice farmers in Argentina: 
owners, lessees, and the owner-lessees. The lessee is the predominant figure in rice 
farming in Argentina and performs a very important function in the production system. 
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Due to the distinctive characteristics of rice, it is necessary to rotate rice fields bi- or 
triennially. As a consequence, the fanner needs to incorporate new land, whether it is 
virgin or fallow land, and the rice producer needs to lease to continue planting 
(Begenisic, 1998). There are two methods of paying rent, with the lessees paying either 
an accorded percentage (8-16%) or a fixed amount of production (350-750 kg 11m) , 
although the latter is less frequent than the fonner. 
Ahnost all lessees produce mainly rice. Owners, in contrast, are generally livestock and 
rice producers. Finally, owner-lessees own some land where they crop rice and at the 
same time lease another section that they use for rotating rice. 
2.5 The Rice Producing Regions 
The rice-producing region is located in the northeast of Argentina between the 25° and 
35° parallels. In this region, all the necessary agricultural and ecological factors to 
produce rice exist. The rice-producing provinces are Entre Rios, Corrientes, Santa Fe, 
Fonnosa, Chaco and Misiones (Figure 2.4). However, Entre Rios, Corrientes and Santa 
Fe provided 95% of the total production in 1997/98. 
Rice is the most important crop for the province of Corrientes. It represented between 
34% and 40% of the gross value agricultural product for the 1997/98 and 1996/97 
seasons respectively (Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Pesca y Alimentaci6n -
Sistema Infonnatico de Informaci6n Agropecuaria y Pesquera, 1999). This decrease in 
the share was due to the loss of grain already harvested and area ready to be harvested 
due to river flooding. The planted area has increased steadily. For instance, in 1990/91 
the planted area was 30,300 hectares, while in 1997/98 it was 82,200 hectares, a 171% 
15 
increase (Begenisic, 1998), and the relationship between the area not harvested and the 
planted area has decreased from 10% in 1990/91 to 5% in 1996/97. 
In the last six years (1992/93-1996/97), yields in Corrientes province have increased 
32% (Table 2.3). This increase in productivity has been due to the adoption of improved 
teclmologies, such as the use of new varieties, better timing of operations and 
improvement in control of pests and diseases, and an increase in use of fertilisers, direct 
planting, and rotations (Codutti, 1998). The land tenure for rice production in Corrientes 
comprises approximately 50% lessees, 45% owners, and 5% of sharecroppers. 
The increase in use· of dams for irrigation is another teclmological change that has 
affected the production of rice in Corrientes province. In 1992/93, 48% of the rice area 
... 
was irrigated using dams as source of water, while in 1993/94 this percentage rose to 
50%. The rest of the rice area uses, as a source of water, rivers and other water courses 
(31 %), lagoons (16%), and wells (5%), in 1992/93 (Secretaria General de la 
Gobernaci6n de la Provincia de Corrientes, 1993). The increase in irrigation using dams 
has encouraged other regions to begin producing rice. This has occurred in the counties 
of Mercedes, Paso de los Libres, and Curuzu Cuatia (Centre-South region) where there 
were not alternative sources of water but where soils were fertile enough and had 
adequate drainage to produce rice. 
Rice is produced in four regions of Corrientes, each with different environmental and 
teclmological characteristics, the effects of which are reflected in yields and production 
systems. 
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1. Centre-South: includes the counties of Mercedes, Curuzu Cuatia, Sauce, Monte 
Caseros and part of Paso de los Libres. 
2. Uruguay River: includes the counties of Santo Tome, Alvear, San Martin, and part of 
Paso de los Libres. 
3. Sandy Hills: includes the counties Saladas, part of Goya, San Roque, Esquina, 
Lavalle, Mburucuya, and Bella Vista. 
4. Parana River: includes the strip next to the Parana River from the province of 
Misiones to the Itati county, and from Empedrado county to part of Goya. 
The Centre-South zone is the most important rice-producing region in the province, due 
to' its favourable climate and the' adoption of improved technologies. In this region, 
lessees predominate and dams are the main source of water. In the counties of Mercedes 
and Curuzu Cuatia, however, there are some rice farmers who irrigate the crop by 
pumping water from the Corrientes River. 
The Centre-South region together with the Uruguay River region are heavily influenced 
by Brazil's technology and input use due to their geographical proximity and the 
functioning of MERCOSUR agreement. There are many Brazilian owners and lessees in 
the area and many partnerships between Brazilian and Argentine investors. 
The counties of Mercedes and Paso de los Libres in the Centre-South region in 
Corrientes Province provide the highest yields. In addition, in these two counties, most 
of the farmers plant more than three varieties of rice and use fertilisers. In contrast, only 
50% of the area is fertilised, since a proportion of the planted area is virgin, having been 
previously used for pastures. These two counties are also characterised by having the 
i 
I 
i 
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largest farm sizes in the province. This creates greater economies of size, allowing the 
~:::... .. ~-. ~:,; .-
fanners to better adopt new technology to increase the productivity. ~~~~£~~~:;ii 
! J '.~.",\ ~ ... r 
The Uruguay River region is particularly influenced by Brazilian agronomic practices. 
For example, fanners apply fertiliser at rates applicable in Brazil. Dams are mainly used 
as source of water, and the use of herbicides is not very connnon since there are not high 
weed infestations. 
The Sandy Hills region is characterised by having soils with very low fertility. As a 
consequence, yields are generally lower than the average. The main sources of water are 
-',.',-, .... _--
the lagoons and swamps that are spread across the region. 
The Parana River region presents a very important limitation for rice production since its 
soils are not well drained. It constitutes the historic producing region in the province. 
Currently, the adoption of new technologies has improved the yields, however, the 
number of producers has been decreasing, and the average farm area has been increasing. 
Water is obtained mainly from rivers. 
, .. 
'~ " .. - - . 
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The Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia counties of Conientes Province, while contributing 
heavily to the rice industry in Argentina, are also amongst the most risky for rice 
production. For example, the coefficient of variation for the average national price for 
the monthly period January 1990 to March 1996 was 25%, while the coefficient of 
variation for the Corrientes province was 17% for the same period and the coefficient of 
variation for the yield in Mercedes County was 26% for the period 83-84 to 95-96 
(Pellegrino, J. M. and Bulman, J. M. (1996). In 199617, Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia 
counties, together with the counties of San Martin and Santo Tome, comprised 
approximately 60% of the total planted area in Corrientes (Codutti, 1998). 
This study will examine the perceived risks and risk management strategies in the 
Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia counties of the Corrientes province in the north-east region 
of Argentina. The reasons for their selection are that, as outlined above, these two 
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counties have higher yield variabilities than other counties, and there are cost constraints 
imposed on a study of this type. 
2.6 Summary 
Rice production in Argentina is geographically widespread and has increased steadily due 
to the expansion in the planted area and the rise in yields. The raw product is mainly 
polished for export or for domestic consumption. An increasing percentage of rice has 
been exported, since the domestic consumption remains very low and the total 
production has risen. The main importer of Argentinian rice is Brazil; however, during 
March and Apri11999, its imports declined due to an economic downturn. 
Rice is one of the most important crops in the north-eastern region of Argentina. It is the 
most important crop in the province of Corrientes, providing between 34% and 40% of 
the gross value agricultural product. Corrientes is the second largest rice-producing 
j . 
province in Argentina and at the same time has the highest yield variability among the 
rice-producing provinces. The other producing provinces are Entre Rios, Santa Fe; 
Formosa; Chaco and Misiones. This study will examine the risks and risk responses of 
rice producers the Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia counties of Corrientes province. The 
next chapter of this thesis will review the literature related to the theoretical background 
to this research 
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CHAPTER 3 
RISK ANALYSIS AND RISK PLANNING IN AGRICULTURE 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 described rice production in Argentina and the rice-producing region. This 
chapter will discuss the theory and evidence in the relevant literature underpinning this 
study. Agricultural producers exist in a risky environment. As stated in Chapter 1, there 
are different sources of risk that can affect fann businesses and establishing a risk 
management process may control the impact of risk and reduce its effects. This 
management process requires that decisions be made in the risky environment. Scholars 
have explained decision-making under uncertainty using three different decision models, 
namely the behavioural, lexicographic, and expected utility models. Of these models, 
expected utility, whereby alternative decisions are ranked using different efficiency 
criteria, is the more widely accepted. The efficiency criteria applied in the ranking 
process are used, together with planning methods, to obtain optimal risk efficient fann 
plans. 
This chapter will examine the literature relevant to risk analysis and risk planning in 
agriculture. Firstly, risk and uncertainty will be defmed. Secondly, sources of risk for 
farms, the reasons for their existence, and their impacts will be described. Thirdly, the 
process of risk management will be presented and the strategic management responses to 
risk described in the literature will be reviewed. Fourthly, three models for decision-
making under uncertainty will be described. Fifthly, efficiency analysis, a method used in 
decision analysis to order choices will be presented and the most important efficiency 
criteria will be explained and evaluated. Sixthly, three main methods of risk planning will 
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be described and their advantages and disadvantages will be discussed. This chapter will 
;.,.. .~-. -",;: -'-
conclude with a sunnnary of its contents. 
3.2 Risk and Uncertainty 
There are many different defInitions of risk and uncertainty. According to Knight (1921), 
a situation with more than one possible outcome is risky if there is previous information 
available to the decision-maker about the probability of outcomes of the decision made. 
In contrast, a situation is uncertain if the decision maker does not have previous 
information that allows himlher to assign probabilities to the possible outcomes (Knight, 
1921). Some researchers, for example Fleisher (1990), consider risk and uncertainty to 
be different concepts. She states that risk is a situation that will affect the well-being of 
the decision-maker and that involves the chance of gain or loss, whereas uncertainty 
exists when the decision-maker does not know the outcome of every action because at 
least one action has more than one possible consequence. However, the appearance of 
subjective probabilities in decision making theory, which allows the subjective 
detennination of the probability of any outcome, this difference has become 
indistinguishable; as a consequence, both tenns are sometimes substitutable for each 
other. 
Risk is also defIned as a ''piece of information" about a frequency distribution 
(Roumasset, 1979a). This "piece of information", together with the expected value of the 
probability distribution, will serve to detennine the risk involved in an action choice 
(Roumasset, 1979a). For some authors, this "piece of information" is a measure of 
variability of outcomes and it can be expressed as variance, standard deviation or 
coefficient of variation of the probability distribution. In this study, risk will be defIned as 
,,' 
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variability of possible outcomes. In addition, following Nartea (1994), the tenns risk and 
I. _;_ . -. -~ ~ ft -_," 
uncertainty will be used interchangeably. 
f. __ ,. ____ _ 
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3.3 Sources of Risk 
Risks can be categorised as being either business risks or financial risks (Gabriel and 
Baker, 1980). The sources of business risk for agriculture can be identified from an 
analysis of each of the major dimensions of the external environment. The four major 
environmental dimensions commonly identified are climatic, social, political and 
economic (Eidman, 1994). Each of these dimensions includes one or more important 
. source of risk for an agricultural producer. These risks can be classified as production, 
market, institutional, human or personal, and technological risks (Hardaker et ai., 1997; 
and Sonka and Patrick, 1984). 
1. Production risks are those caused by variations in weather and climate and by 
diseases and pests (Lee et al., 1988). Fire, flood, wind and casualties, which can also 
be classified as casualty risks, comprise other sources of production risk (Sonka and 
Patrick, 1984). These variables impact on crop yields and livestock production 
indices. Yield variability is greatly influenced by weather and other uncontrollable 
factors. The yield variability of a specific commodity can differ widely over a 
geographic area and over time. 
2. Market risks arise from the high volatility and competitiveness of agricultural markets 
which affect input and output prices. Commodity prices, which are determined by 
supply and demand, vary constantly due to reasons beyond the control of an 
individual farmer (Kay and Edwards, 1994). Aggregate production decisions and 
climatic conditions affect the supply of a commodity. Consumer incomes, exchange 
rates, export policies, other countries' import policies, the strength of the domestic 
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and foreign economies, and the supply of competing products affect the demand for a 
:.~.":'><-;"---' .. ~ 
corrnnodity and the variability of its price. Input prices represent another source of f~f~~=:f\~~ 
risk and result in volatility in the cost of production (Kay and Edwards, 1994). 
3. Institutional risks (also known as legal and social risks) are mainly related to 
government policies, which impact on the fann's environment. Government policies 
include price and income support programmes, as well as tax, trade, credit and 
environment policies. Unanticipated changes in these policies are important sources 
of risk for agricultural producers (Sonka and Patrick, 1984). 
4. Human or personal risks are those related to the labour and management function. 
These risks are related to major life crises, health problems of the fann manager 
and/or. his family, or carelessness by the fanner or fannworkers (Hardaker et ai., 
1997). Changing objectives of individuals and family members also form a source of 
risk. The existence of these types of risks have contributed to the mechanisation of 
agriCUlture, since machine inputs are considered more reliable than labour inputs 
(Sonka and Patrick, 1984). 
5. Technological risks comprise those associated with technical improvements and are 
generally greater for equipment, buildings, and other fIxed structures that are less 
mobile than fann machinery (Sonka and Patrick, 1984). New technologies that may 
not perform as expected can both cause concern and lead to changes in production 
practices (Sonka and Patrick, 1984). 
These risks may have a short or long run effect on fann businesses. In aggregate, they 
comprise the business risk that is independent of the way the fann is fInanced. Business ! 
I:. 
risks affect measures of fann business performance such as the net cash flow generated 
by the farming activities or the net fann income earned (Hardaker et ai., 1997), and may 
i ' ..•.. 
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also cause variations in the net worth or equity and other long-run performance measures 
of the farm business (Sonka and Patrick, 1984). 
The second type of risk faced by farmers is known as fmancial risk. If the farmer uses 
borrowed funds to provide capital to fund fanning activities, he/she will have to allocate 
a proportion of the farm profit to meet the interest charge on the debt capital before the 
equity owners can take their reward (Hardaker et ai., 1997). Increasing the proportion of 
debt in the capital structure increases the risk faced by the equity holders through a 
leverage effect. In addition to risk associated with fmancialleverage, unexpected rises in 
interest rates on borrowed funds, credit availability, changes in loan or leasing terms, and 
the ability of the business to generate cash flows necessary for debt payments also 
represent sources of fmancial risk. 
Business and fmancial risks are interrelated. For instance, the ability to repay debt 
depends on production levels and prices received for the production, while fmancing the 
production and storage of output depends on the ability to borrow the necessary capital. 
Consequently, it is necessary to consider these risks together, particularly when 
developing a whole farm plan (Kay and Edwards, 1994). Business and fmancial risks 
intensify potential decreases in farmers' net income and equity capital. Furthermore, they 
create inefficiencies in resource use by ilnpeding farm planning (Hardaker et ai., 1997). 
To control or decrease the downside effects of risks, be they business or fmancial, the 
decision-maker should ilnplement a risk management strategy. 
25 
3.4 Risk Management 
k. -.~ ,_-'- -
Risk management is an approach that anticipates accidental losses, and designs and i1:.;::t:~:~:t:; 
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implements methods for minimising the occurrence of loss or the fmancial impact of the 
losses that do occur (Vaughan, 1997). It can also be defined as a systematic application 
of management policies, strategies, procedures, and practices to the tasks of identifying, 
analysing, assessing, treating, and monitoring risk (Hardaker et aI., 1997). Risk 
management is a continuous and adaptive process that needs to be integrated into all the 
relevant aspects of the farm decision-making process to control risk successfully 
(Hardaker et aI., 1997). Its objective is to reduce the possibilities of losses while gaining 
the highest possible returns to the owners of equity consistent with their risk preferences 
(Martin, 1996). 
The steps in risk management can be arranged in a cycle: 1) establish the context, i.e., set 
the scenario and identify the parameters which risks are going to be considered; 2) 
identify the risks to be managed using a systematic approach; 3) analyse the risks, i.e., 
evaluate the chances of occurrence and consequences of the risks; 4) assess the risks, 
i.e., identify the risks for which current risk-management practices are not appropriate; 
5) manage the risks; and (6) implement the monitoring and reviewing necessary to 
establish that the risk management plan is working and to identify aspects that need to be 
adjusted (Joint AustralianlNew Zealand Standard on Risk Management, in Hardaker et 
al., 1997). 
Risk management (step 5) can itself be divided into phases: the fIrst phase is to design 
strategies to cope with risks; the second phase is to evaluate the most suitable strategies; 
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and the third phase is to implement those risk responses to control risks (Hardaker et ai., 
, 
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1997). 
3.4.1 Risk Management Strategies/Responses 
Risk management strategies or responses can produce two effects. Some strategies may 
control or reduce risk exposure; others may control the impact of risk on the farm 
business (Jolly, 1983). Business risk exposure is controlled by reducing the variability or 
increasing the mean of the probability distribution of the income. 'This can be achieved by 
reducing the variability of prices and yields, increasing their expected values, changing 
their shape, or cutting off or truncating one end of their distributions (Fleisher, 1990). 
Strategies that control risk exposure include enterprise selection and diversification, 
which affect prices and yields, and marketing responses, which affect only prices, (Jolly, 
1983). Insurance, government progrannnes, or volume of business or scale of operation 
are also strategies that can modify the underlying distributions of prices and yields (Jolly, 
1983). 
Strategies that control the impact of risk do not have direct impacts on the underlying 
probability distributions of prices and yields faced by the farm business. In fact, these 
responses impact on the ability of the farm business to assimilate downturns or exploit 
favourable events (Martin, 1996, and Jolly, 1983). For example, they may include 
increasing productivity and efficiency so that the level of operating income is higher; 
diminishing financial risks by managing financial leverage, matching debt repayment to 
income generation, and maintaining cash or credit reserves (Martin, 1996). These 
responses strongly influence the fmn's resilience and its capability to respond to 
opportunities and crises that affect the farm business (Jolly, 1983). 
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In general, risk management strategies or responses are categorised according to the risk ~~:~':~-§%~~, 
that they are designed and implemented to cope with. Thus, there are production, 
marketing, and financial strategies. Flexibility is another type of response that can be 
implemented to simultaneously manage several risks (Martin, 1996). In this study, 
flexibility will be categorised as general response. 
Production responses to control yield variability include the following (Barry and Baker, 
1984; Sonka and Patrick, 1984; Martin and Anderson, 1992; Kay and Edwards, 1994): 
1. selecting enterprises with low variability of yields so that yields remain stable; 
2. enterprise diversification, which combines activities with correlation coefficient less 
than one; 
3. geographic diversification, which involves producing in different regions so that 
losses associated with local hazards are minimised; 
4. maintaining feed reserves to offset droughts, floods, or other weather hazards; 
5. monitoring pest and disease infestations levels in order to control potential losses; 
6. applying precautionary animal and crop health measures routinely so that dangerous 
diseases and pests are avoided; 
7. planting several crop varieties that incorporate resistance to different pests and 
diseases so they complement and stabilise yields (a type of diversification); 
8. irrigating to offset droughts; 
9. ~t' tuting capital for labour so human risks are reduced; 
; -
! .' -
10. share f ..... u.1.l.l.I£i or leasing, which reduces the risk of poor production, low selling 
prices, or high in ut costs by sharing between the tenant and the owner (this may 
also be considered as a fmancial response); 
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11. using crop, hail or multiple-peril (all risk) crop insurance so that the risk of losses due 
to hailstorms or any other weather event is eliminated; 
.'':.'.' •• '.'.'-'.< 
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12. using an incentive and reward structure for labour also reduce human risk and may 
increase yields; 
13. not producing to full capacity; and 
14. having excess machinery or labour capacity so that farmers can catch up when poor 
weather delays planting or harvesting of crops. 
Marketing responses are implemented to offset output and input price variability. The 
. most important are (Barry and Baker, 1984; Sonka and Patrick, 1984; Martin and 
Anderson, 1992; Kay and Edwards, ·1994): 
1. selecting enterprises with low expected price variability, thus reducing farm income 
variability; 
2. sequential marketing of storable crops or livestock, resulting in price averaging over 
the marketing periods, and thus providing greater certainty in price expectations; 
3. forward contracting so farmers can price their products prior to delivery and thus 
assure their income; 
4. contracting for purchasing inputs, so input prices are stabilised; 
5. hedging on the futures and options markets, so the products are priced before 
delivery and risk is reduced; 
6. improving quality of information on price forecasts and t ends and market 
requirements; and 
7. participating in government commodity programs if they are available. 
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Financial strategies reflect the finn's capacity to bear risks in production and marketing 
or to spread these risks among those with fmancial claims on the fInn (Barry and Fraser, 
1976). Reducing financial risks requires the implementation of strategies to maintain 
liquidity and solvency. Liquidity is necessary to provide the cash to repay debt 
obligations and to meet unexpected financial needs in the short run. Solvency is related 
to long-run business survival, or having enough assets to adequately secure the debts of 
the business (Kay and Edwards, 1994). Examples of fmancial responses are (Barry and 
Baker, 1984; Sorum and Patrick, 1984; Martin and Anderson, 1992; Kay and Edwards, 
1994): 
·1. holding assets for sale to meet cash demands, thereby enabling fmancial obligations 
to be met by selling liquid assets; 
2. maintaining flexibility in the pace of farm investments and withdrawals to enable 
expenditures on asset replacement to be postponed and withdrawals of family 
members and others to be controlled in line with other fmancial obligations; 
3. matching the debt repayment structure with the income generating pattern of any 
asset; 
4. leasing assets rather than owning them, so that liquidity can be improved; 
5. increasing business net worth to provide solvency and liquidity; 
6. holding liquid credit reserves by establishing sound and lasting credit relationships 
with commercial lenders to enhance the capacity to carryover loans, vary payments, 
refmance high debt loads, or utilise credit reserves; 
7. using formal insurance to indemnify assets or flows of income against the occurrence 
of unexpected events; 
8. managing debt; i.e., monitoring debt and working with lenders to ease debt burden; 
9. keeping a low debt level; 
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10. arranging overdraft reserves with banks; 
11. arranging for main fann operator working off property; 
12. arranging for other family members working off property; and 
13. investing off fann. 
General responses involve maintaining the flexibility of the fann business so that the finn 
can adjust to changed circumstances. The risk-management strategies that can be 
implemented by farmers to enhance flexibility include (Hardaker et aI., 1997): 
1. asset flexibility that involves investing in assets that have more than one use; 
2. product flexibility that exists when an enterprise produces a product that has more 
than one end use, or when the· enterprise yields more than one end product; 
3. market flexibility that exists when a product can be sold in different markets which 
may not be subject to the same risks; 
4. cost flexibility that involves organising production by keeping fixed costs low or 
incurring higher variable costs as necessary; and 
5. time flexibility that relates to the speed with which adjustments to farming operations 
can be made. 
The general responses outlined above can be divided into short-run flexibility or long-run 
flexibility categories. 
All of the risk ameliorating responses listed above represent the potential decisions that 
fanners should make to control risks. The next section of this chapter will introduce 
what the literature has to say about the decision-making process under uncertainty. 
I'''''::''',:'' 
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3.5 Decision-Making in a Risky Environment 
Fanners are continually confronted by the need to make decisions. However, a decision 
problem only exists when the decision-maker feels that the possible consequences are 
important and yet does not know what is the best thing to do. If the decision-maker is 
uncertain about the consequences of the decision, it can be said that the decision-maker 
faces a risky choice (Anderson et al., 1977). 
There are three approaches or models that purport to explain decision-making under 
uncertainty. These include models grounded in the behavioural approach, models based 
on the lexicographic safety-fIrst approach (a combination of the behavioural and 
expected utility models) and models grounded in the expected utility model, also called 
decision analysis (Nartea, 1994). The next three sub-sections describe these models and 
their assumptions. 
3.5.1 Behavioural Model 
The behavioural approach assumes that the decision-maker is led by a decision rule to 
select the best decision. The choice of the decision rule is arbitrary and can be developed 
almost at will. Safety-fIrst and cautious optimising are two of these decision rules, both 
of which are based on the principle of bounded rationality (Roumasset, 1979b). 
The safety-fIrst rule assumes that a decision-maker endeavours to maximise expected 
profIts subject to the constraint that the risk of earnings falling below some critical 
minimum must not exceed a given level (Kunreuther, 1974). The cautious optimising rule 
implies that the decision-maker moves each period in what seems to be the right 
direction but not more than a maximum distance which, for example, can be defmed as 
.. -' 
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the quantity of land that is shifted to a new crop or technology (Roumasset, 1979b). 
Other decision rules are maximin, rninllnax regret, and the Laplace criterion; these are 
usually used in game-theoretic approaches to risk analysis (Nartea, 1994). 
3.5.2 Lexicograpbic Safety-First 
The lexicographic safety-frrst model integrates the behavioural and expected utility 
model approaches into a single model. While this model is more appropriately applied to 
decisions where the consequences have multiple attributes, it can also be applied to 
decisions with single attribute outcomes with multiple characteristics (Anderson et ai., 
.1977). 
This model ranks the attributes or features of the decision outcomes according to 
priorities or hierarchies of wants (Maslow, 1943). No trade-offs between attributes or 
characteristics are allowed (Anderson et al., 1977). As a result, an outcome that does not 
satisfy the first priority attribute, for instance, is discarded even if it does satisfy the 
second attribute and has the highest level amongst all other outcomes (Roumasset, 
1979b). 
The lexicographic safety-frrst approach implies that safety or survival comprises the first 
priority. The decision-maker frrst ftlters out all acts which do not satisfy the survival 
constraint and then uses the criterion of expected profits or expected utility to choose the 
best action (Roumasset, 1979b). This approach has been criticised for its assumption of 
non-substitutability of attributes as well as the fact that its orderings cannot be 
represented by real valued utility functions (Anderson, 1979). 
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3.5.3 Expected Utility Model 
The expected utility model involves characterising a rational choice under risk. It seeks 
to determine an optimal choice consistent with the decision-maker's beliefs about the 
chances of occurrence of alternative uncertain consequences and the relative preferences 
for those consequences (Hardaker et al., 1997). The decision-maker's beliefs about the 
chances of occurrence of the risky event are presented in the probabilities assigned to 
uncertain states of nature. Meanwhile, the decision-maker's preferences for the outcomes 
are reflected in an expected utility function. The expected utility model suggests that a 
decision-maker who follows certain axioms acts as if expected utility is being maximised. 
These axioms (Von Neumanil and Morgenstern, 1947) describe how people behave, and 
constitute a general assumption that people are rational and consistent in choosing 
among risky alternatives (Robison et al., 1984). Anderson et al., (1977) set out the 
axioms as: 
1. ordering and transitivity of choices. A person either prefers one of two risky prospects 
al and a2 or is indifferent between them The logical extension of ordering is the 
transitivity of orderings of more than two prospects, e.g., ab a2, and a3. This implies 
that a person preferring al to a2 (or being indifferent between them) and preferring a2 
to a3 (or being indifferent between them), will prefer al to a3 (or will be indifferent 
between them); 
2. continuity. If a person prefers al to a2 to a3, a subjective probability exists (P(al»O) 
such that the person is indifferent between a2 and a lottery yielding al with a 
probability peal) and a3 with probability 1- peal). This implies that faced with a risky 
prospect involving a good and bad outcome, a person will accept the risk if the 
probability of getting the bad outcome is low enough; and 
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3. independence. If al is preferred to a2, and a3 is any other risky prospect, a lottery with 
i··--···,c,: ... 
al and a3 as its outcomes will be preferred to a lottery with a2 and a3 as outcomes V':ii~;:;:;::~ 
when peal) = P(a2). This suggests that preference between al and a2 is independent of 
Bernoulli's principle may be deduced from these axioms and may be stated as follows: a 
utility function exists for a decision-maker whose preferences are consistent with the 
axioms of ordering, transitivity, continuity, and independence. This function associates a 
single real utility value with any risky prospect and has the following properties 
(Anderson et al., 1977): 
1. if al is preferred toa2, then V(al) > V(a2), and vice versa 
where al, a2 and aj are risky prospects and we denote the utility values of aj by V(aj); 
2. the utility of a risky prospect is its expected utility value, 
3. the scale on which utility is defined is arbitrary. 
Bernoulli's principle provides the means for ranking risky prospects in order of 
preference, the most preferred being the one with the highest (expected) utility 
(Anderson et al., 1977). It brings together the decision-maker's beliefs and preferences, 
the important inputs in a decision analysis. 
According to the relevant literature, there are two ways of generating the probability 
distributions that the decision-maker assigns to the outcomes of risky events. One way is 
to use past data obtained from studying the production process to generate the 
probability distribution, i.e., to use data obtained from production-function yield-
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response based experiments together with infonnation on stochastic variables affecting 
production. Due to its basis in actual outcomes, this method is said to generate an 
objective probability distribution (Nartea, 1987). The second way is to generate the 
probability distribution of the outcome by direct elicitation from the decision-maker. This 
applies the personal assessments of the decision-maker to the generation of a subjective 
probability distribution of the outcome. According to Anderson et at., (1977), subjective 
probability is the only valid basis for decision making and the probabilities used in the 
decision process should be those of the person who bears responsibility for the decision. 
The most direct way of measuring the degrees of preference is to estimate a decision-
maker's utility function: In a utility function, the possible outcomes of an action choice .. :):' 
are related to a single real utility value (Kin.g and Robison, 1984). However, it is difficult 
to accurately measure a decision-maker's preferences because of the shortcomings in 
interview procedures, problems in statistical estimation, and individuals' lack of 
knowledge about their preferences (Kin.g and Robison, 1984). The next section will 
describe how these shortcomings are overcome by applying efficiency analysis. 
3.6 Efficiency Analysis 
Some of the limitations to the direct elicitation of utility functions used in the expected 
utility model may be overcome by using an efficiency criterion to order choices. 
Efficiency analysis involves making assumptions about the nature of the utility function, 
in some cases as to the probability distributions of feasible alternatives, so that the need 
to elicit a specific utility function is avoided (Hardaker et at., 1997). These assumptions 
constitute the efficiency criteria and divide the alternative action choices into two 
mutually exclusive sets: an efficient set and non-efficient set (Kin.g and Robison, 1984). 
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The efficient set contains the action choices that are preferred or not dominated, while 
the inefficient set contains the action choices that are less preferred or dominated by the 
actions in the efficient set. The optimal action for a decision-maker will be amongst the 
alternatives in the efficient set. This remains true if the preferences are consistent with 
the assumptions made about the utility function in deriving the stochastically efficient set 
and if the subjective probability distributions for outcomes are the same as those assumed 
for the analysis (Hardaker et ai., 1997). 
The possible trade-off between their discriminatory power and general applicability 
presents a possible deficiency in the application of efficiency criteria. In cases where 
there are few restrictions on preferences, which apply to most decision-makers, many 
alternatives may not be eliminated from consideration (King and Robison, 1984). 
Conversely, criteria that place several restrictions on preferences usually identify small 
efficient sets. 
The five most common efficiency criteria used in efficiency analysis are mean-variance 
efficiency, mean-absolute deviation efficiency, first-degree stochastic dominance, second-
degree stochastic dominance, and stochastic dominance with respect to a function. They 
will be described in the following subsections. 
3.6.1 Mean-Variance Efficiency 
Mean-variance (E-V) efficiency (Markowitz, 1959) is the most commonly used 
efficiency criterion (King and Robison, 1984). E-V efficiency requires that the decision-
maker be risk averse and that the outcome distributions be normal or that the decision- I ~ . _ . k:::::~:>:;; 
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maker's utility function be quadratic. If these requirements are satisfied, the E-V efficient 
. . 
set will be identical to the second-degree stochastic dominance efficient set. 
h···;~';';·:·· 
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When the outcome distributions are normal and the utility functions are quadratic, all 
information related to the probability distributions of alternative choices is conveyed by 
means and variances (King and Robison, 1984). Therefore, the E-V criterion is stated in 
terms of these two moments. Outcome distribution A is preferred to B, if the expected 
value of A is greater than or equal to the expected value of B, and the variance of A is 
less than or equal to the variance of B and if one of these two inequalities is strict 
(Hardaker et al., 1997). In" the above case, distribution A dominates distribution B. 
However, if A has a greater expected value and variance than B, the distributions cannot 
be ordered. 
The use of the E-V criterion has several advantages in that the means and variances of 
probability distributions are easy to work with and familiar to most analysts, much work 
has been done using the E-V criterion for analytical convenience, and it is often applied 
in mathematical (quadratic) programming (King and Robison, 1984). However, this 
criterion does present some problems. When the probability distributions are not normal, 
as commonly occurs in agriculture, E-V analysis may not give the correct efficient set 
(King and Robison, 1984). In addition, the decision-maker is assumed to be risk averse, 
but when this does not hold the preferred choice may be excluded from the E-V efficient 
set. As a consequence, the E-V approach is usually best considered as an approximate 
rule only (Hardaker et al., 1997). 
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3.6.2 Mean-absolute Deviation Efficiency 
The mean-absolute deviation (MAD) criterion is an approximation of E-V efficiency. 
The advantage of this criterion is that linear programming algorithms are more widely 
i':·-·;>-"·-:·;~··') 
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used and less difficult than are the quadratic algorithms required for E-V analysis. With ! 
i. 
MAD, as with E-V efficiency, it is generally assumed that the decision-maker is risk 
averse and that the outcome distribution is approximately normal. The MAD criterion 
applies a decision rule in which the measure of risk is based on the absolute deviation of 
income from the mean (King and Robison, 1984). 
The principles underpinning MAD are that outcome distribution A is preferred to B, if 
the mean of A is greater tban or equal to the mean of B, and if the absolute deviation of 
A is less than or equal to the variance of B, and if one of these two inequalities is strict. 
However, if A has a greater mean and absolute deviation than B, the distributions cannot 
be ordered (King and Robison, 1984). 
MAD has similar limitations to E-V efficiency. When distributions are not nonna!, the 
ordering by MAD may not defme a correct efficient set. In addition, this criterion is also 
sometimes limited by its requirement of risk aversion and its low discriminatory power 
(King and Robison, 1984). In spite of these shortcomings, MAD is frequently used in 
risk programming, as will be argued in Section 3.7.2 (MOTAD). 
While the E-V efficient set of farm plans can be determined with the help of quadratic 
progrannning, the MAD can be determined using minimisation of total absolute deviation 
(MOTAD). These and other techniques for farm planning will be discussed in Section 
3.7. 
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3.6.3 First-degree Stochastic Dominance 
Unlike the E-V efficiency criterion, stochastic dominance methods are strongly based on 
the idea of direct expected utility maximisation (Hardaker et al., 1997). These methods 
compare alternatives in terms of complete distribution of outcomes, not only the first two 
moments of the distribution. Consequently, the outcome distributions compared do not 
need to be normal. 
First-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) (Quirk and Saposnik, 1962; Hadar and Russell, 
1969; Hanoch and Levy, 1969) is the simplest and most universally applicable efficiency 
criterion (King and Robison, 1984). FSD assumes that decision-makers prefer more to 
less; i.e., that they have a positive marginal utility for a performance measure such as 
expected return (Hardaker et al., 1997). This concept needs to be stated in terms of 
cumulative distribution functions (CDFs). Under FSD an alternative with outcome 
distribution defmed by its CDF F(y) is preferred to another outcome distribution defmed 
by its CDF F(g) if: 
F(y)::; G(y) 
for all possible values of y and if the inequality is strict for at least one value of y. 
Graphically, this rule means that a first-degree stochastically dominant CDF curve must 
never lie above or to the left of a dominated curve. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1 where 
F(y) dominates G(y) 
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Figure 3.1 IDustration ofFSD and SSD. 
Uncertain variable 
Distributions that are dominated are said to be stochastically inefficient and conversely, 
those that are not dominated are said to be stochastically efficient in fIrst degree. 
Bemoullian utility Irniximisers would never prefer inefficient distributions when 
confronted with the efficient set (Anderson et ai., 1977). 
As mentioned above, the FSD criterion holds for all decision-makers who prefer more to 
less. This requirement limits the usefulness of FSD, since this criterion often eliminates 
choices from consideration (King and Robison, 1984). For example, in Figure 3.1, if F(y) 
and H(y) are compared, there is no dominance in terms of FSD since they cross. For 
lower values of y, F(y) is better of the two, but for high values (higher than the crossing 
point) H(y) is better. This can be resolved using second-degree stochastic dominance. 
3.6.4 Second-degree Stochastic Dominance 
Second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD) (Hadar and Russell, 1969; Hanoch and levy, 
1969) is more discriminating than fIrst-degree stochastic dominance. This efficiency 
criterion is applicable to the decision-makers whose utility function has positive, non-
increasing slopes at all outcome levels. This implies that the decision-maker has to be 
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risk averse (King and Robison, 1984). SSD assumes that an alternative with the 
cumulative distribution function F(y) is preferred to other alternative with cumulative 
distribution function G(y) if: 
y y f F(y)dy ~ f G(y)dy 
for all values of y, and if the inequality is strict for at least one value of y. 
Comparisons of cumulative distributions are based on the accumulated area under each 
distribution. Graphically, as exhibited in Figure 3.1, F(y) is preferred to G(y) and H(y), 
because the accumulated area under F(y) is less than or equal to that under either G(y) or 
H(y). Thus, F(y) is only inthe SSD efficient set for these three alternatives. When G(Y) 
and H(y) are compared, neither dominates the other by SSD, since the accumulated area 
under G(y) is less than the area under H(y) for low values of y, while the opposite 
condition occurs at high values ofy (King and Robison, 1984). 
SSD has some disadvantages. Decision-makers are not always risk averse (King and 
Robison, 1984). Empirical and theoretical work by Conklin et al., (1977) and Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974), respectively, showed that decision-makers do, at times, exhibit 
preferences for risk. In addition, SSD may not effectively reduce the number of 
alternatives, as inferred above. In spite of these limitations, SSD is extensively used as an 
efficiency criterion, since it has more discriminatory power than FSD, and the risk 
aversity assumption seems reasonable for many situations (King and Robison, 1984). To 
overcome these limitations, a third-order stochastic dominance (TSD) has been 
developed. TSD depends on the same assumptions than FSD and SSD plus the further 
assumption that the coefficient of risk aversion is decreasing with income. This additional 
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condition, together with the fact that empirical work suggests that the extra 
discriminating power of TSD over SSD is often unimportant (Anderson et ai., 1977), ....... -.'.-- .... '~ -.. F~~~·~~i:::::~:.:.:: 
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makes it relatively less useful than stochastic dominance with respect to a function 
(Hardaker et ai., 1997), which will be discussed in the next subsection. 
3.6.5 Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function 
Stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF) has stronger discriminatory 
power than the three stochastic dominance criteria discussed above, since it introduces 
bounds on the absolute risk-aversion coefficient within a second-degree stochastic 
dominance analysis (Hardaker et ai., 1997). Thus, the analysis applies to decision-makers 
who have adegree of risk aversion that lies within specified lower and upper bounds. 
The fIrst step in applying SDRF is to determine bounds on the absolute risk-version 
coefficient, such as r1~ ra;::: r2, where r1 and r2 are two usually positive numbers. Then, it 
is necessary to sequentially select utility functions U, which have risk-aversion 
coefficients within the bounds, and ascertain for which of these distributions the 
following expression is minimised (Hardaker et ai., 1997): 
+- (1) 
f[F(y) - G(y)] U y(dy) 
where F and G are two alternative action choices and y is the perfonnance 
criterion (expected return). F is preferred to G if the minimum of the above 
expression is positive. If the minimum of the expression is zero, the alternatives 
cannot be ordered; if the minimum is negative, then G could be preferred to F. In i . 
I. 
the last case, the difference G(y)-F(y) is introduced into the square brackets term 
and the evaluation procedure is repeated (Hardaker et ai., 1997). 
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SDRF is a powerful analytical technique that has been used, together with simulation 
methods, to evaluate the effects of risk management strategies (Bosch and Johnson, 
1992, and Lee et al., 1987). However, the technique requires specific information, which 
sometimes cannot be obtained, on the lower and upper bounds for a decision-maker's 
absolute risk-aversion function. In addition, like FSD and SSD, SDRF cannot be 
introduced into a standard mathematical progrannning model, although it can be 
incorporated into a Monte Carlo progrannning model such as that developed by King 
(King and Robison, 1984). 
King and Robison (1984) applied SSD and SDRF to evaluate ten marketing strategies 
for two decision-makers with different risk preferences. They found that for decision-
maker B, whose risk aversion interval slopes upward and then downward, the efficient 
set contained eight of the nine strategies in the SSD efficient set. Consequently, they 
concluded that despite the increased informational requirements of SDRF, this criterion 
does not always reduce the efficient set to a minimal number of strategies. 
Mean-variance, mean-absolute deviation, and the various types of stochastic dominance 
efficiency analyses comprise the efficiency criteria used to overcome the difficulties of 
direct elicitation of utility functions required to define. the efficient set of the possible 
alternative choices. The next section will describe the use of these efficiency criteria for 
optimal risk planning. 
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3.7 Methods for Optimal Risk Planning for Farm Finns 
Whole fann planning and budgeting, gross margin analysis, and standard linear 
programming methods are based on the simplifying assumptions of certainty about the 
environment and an objective of profit maximisation. The introduction of risk extends 
these concepts to include the decision-maker's perceptions of risk and attitudes towards 
risk (Mapp and Helmers, 1984). Researchers have developed several approaches to risk 
analysis at the fann level. 
In the following sections, the more important fann-planning techniques that incorporate 
risk and can be used for decision-making are described and their limitations evaluated. 
The three most commonly used methods that are reviewed in this section are quadratic 
risk programming, minimisation of total absolute deviation programming, and simulation 
models. 
3.7.1 Quadratic Risk Programming 
Quadratic risk programming (QRP) is based on mean-variance (E-V) efficiency analysis. 
QRP has been implemented to generate the set of fann plans lying on the E-V efficient 
frontier (Hardaker et al., 1997). The model as outlined by Hardaker et ai., (1997) is as 
follows: 
maximise 
subject to: 
E = (ex) - f 
Ax~b 
x' Qx = V, V varied 
andx~O 
where: E = expected profit, 
c = 1 by n vector of activity expected net revenues, 
x = n by 1 vector of activity levels, 
f = fixed or overhead costs, 
A = m by n matrix of technical coefficients, 
b = m by 1 vector of resource stocks, 
Q = n by n activity net revenue variance-covariance matrix, and 
V = the variance of the income of the farm plan. 
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The assumptions necessary in using of QRP for farm planning under risk are that the 
distribution of total net income is normal or the fanner's utility function is quadratic. One 
problem with the application of this technique is that the assumption that quadratic utility 
functions are not increasing at all points and that absolute risk aversion increases with the 
relevant variable do not always hold, and the distribution of total net income in 
agriculture varies and may be not normal (Hardaker et al., 1997). Another shortcoming 
of this technique is that the estimation of the variance-covariance matrix presents several 
methodological pitfalls, such as the manner of evaluation (subjective or objective) and 
the distinction between patterns of variation and random variation (King and Robison, 
1984). 
Despite its limitations, QRP has been widely used in empirical analysis, such as in the 
evaluation of risk management strategies. For example, Robison and Brake (1979) 
reviewed applications of portfolio theory to farms and observed a tendency to describe 
portfolio choices along E-V frontiers. Barry and Willmann (1976) developed a multi-
period risk -programming model to evaluate forward contracting and other fmancial 
choices. The model derived groups of E-V efficient farm growth plans that reflected the 
influence of the different strategies evaluated. Whitson et al., (1976) modelled a ranch 
operation with multi-period quadratic programming in order to analyse the risk-return 
effects of production and marketing strategies. The results indicated that the strategies 
evaluated could significantly influence both the level and variability of income growth 
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3.7.2 Minimisation of Total Absolute Deviation 
The minimisation of total absolute deviation model (MOTAD) (Hazell, 1971) is a 
technique that provides a linear alternative to quadratic prograrnrnmg in deriving a 
efficient set. According to Hazell (1971), the aim of the technique is to minimise total (or 
negative) absolute deviation about expected income subject to constraints on expected 
income and other resources. The model as outlined by Hardaker et al., (1997) is as 
follows: 
maximise 
subject to: 
E = (cx)- f 
Ax~b 
-Dx-/y ~uo 
py ~ M,M .. varied 
and x,y ~O 
where E == expected profit' 
c = 1 by n vector of activity expected net revenues, 
x = n by 1 vector of activity levels, 
f = fixed or overhead costs, 
A = m by n matrix of technical coefficients, 
b = m by 1 vector of resource stocks, 
D = C- (u c) with u an s by 1 vector of ones, 
I = s by s identity matrix, 
y = s by 1 vector of activity levels measuring negative income deviations 
by state, 
p = 1 by s vector of probabilities of states, and 
M = mean absolute of deviation of total net revenue. 
Unlike quadratic progrannning, the MOT AD approach does not require a variance-
covariance matrix. However, MOTAD does consider the covariance relationships among 
activities. The problem with the use of MOTAD is that it has some theoretical limitations 
in that it is limited in its estimation of the variance, and therefore cannot be regarded as a 
good alternative to quadratic progrannning. However, it can be used as a proxy unbiased 
estimator (Turvey, 1985). In spite of its drawbacks, MOTAD has been widely used due 
to the relative ease of solving the linear programming formulation. 
h·······:-· 
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The MOT AD approach has been used in several relevant studies. Mapp et al., (1979) 
developed a MOT AD model for a typical farm situation. The risk efficient farm plans 
generated were then used in a simulation model to analyse the effects of alternative 
economic futures. They found that the probability of farm failure increased when the 
initial ratio to equity assets was below 45% and land values increased 4% annually. 
Persaud and Mapp (1980) developed a MOTAD model to evaluate risk management 
strategies for farmers in Oklahoma. The model included marketing strategies such as 
forward contracting and subsequent period sales, which appeared in several of the risk 
efficient farm plans generated. 
3.7.3 Simulation Models 
The third type of risk planning approach involves simulation, an analytical method used 
to represent the reality of a system of relationships (Mapp and Helmers, 1984). 
Simulation models have been regularly applied to agricultural situations. For example, 
simulation models have been used to model plant and animal growth processes, growth 
and intergenerational transfers of the farm fIrm, risk and survival prospects, supply and 
demand relationships, multi-objective decision processes, and others (Anderson, 1974). 
Simulation models may be deterministic or stochastic, may involve single or multi-period 
events, may be programmed to maximise or minimise an objective function, may 
represent part or all of a complex process, or may be behavioural or mathematical (Mapp 
and Helmers, 1984). In addition, simulation models are very flexible, as they do not have 
a predetermined structure such as that of quadratic and linear programming models. 
Simulation evaluates the problem via a unique model that can be adapted to solve other 
problems (Mapp and Helmers, 1984). 
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Building simulation models involves a staged process: model fonnulation, synthesis, 
model testing, and model analysis (Mapp and Hehners, 1984; Anderson, 1974). These 
stages and their sub-stages are outlined as follows: 
1. Model fonnulation. The first step in fonnulating the model involves clearly 
identifying the problem and the goals to be addressed. The second step consists of 
analysing the system to be studied and determining its characteristics, components 
and their interrelationships. The model structure must include information flows, 
decision rules, feedback loops, and input-output requirements. In addition, the 
stochastic variables must be identified and incorporated for risk analysis. 
2. Synthesis .. The first st~p in this stage is to define the model in detail. This includes the 
specifications of the stochastic variables, the choice of distributions, the collection of 
data, the examination of serial dependence, and the estimation of the co-variances 
between stochastic variables. The [mal step is to select the appropriate computer 
programme on which to construct the model. 
3. Model testing. This stage involves considering the model's technical accuracy and its 
realistic portrayal of stochastic events. The [rrst step is the verification of the model, 
which includes debugging the model of apparent inconsistencies and determining if 
subroutines are acting properly. Once the model is verified, the researcher has to 
validate it by determining how well the model mimics reality. One way of validating 
the model is by comparing its results with observed behaviour; for example, by 
comparing the prices and yields' maximum, minimum, mean, and standard deviation 
generated by the model comparable with the observed ones. 
4. Model Analysis. This stage involves learning about the behaviour of the validated 
model. The first step is to undertake a sensitivity analysis of the model using a range 
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of values of the key variables. After the model's sensitivity has been tested, the 
researcher has to experiment with it in order to observe the effects of the stochastic 
variables on the model outcomes. Experimentation may explore the model's response 
to changes in qualitative and quantitative factors (input variables or decision rules). 
The last step of the model analysis is the interpretation of how the stochastic 
variables affect the model outcome. This step can be assisted by a statistical and 
graphical analysis. 
An important component of the modelling process is the specification of stochastic 
variables (Mapp and Helmers, 1984). Each input variable will have a probability 
distribution that will depend on the characteristics of the variable and the knowledge of 
the researcher. If the variable is normally distributed, which is generally the case with 
crop yields, the distribution will be totally specified by the mean and variance. However, 
not all variables are normally distributed; prices, for example, are not likely to follow a 
nonnal distribution (Hardaker et al., 1997). 
When the stochastic variable is not normally distributed, many other probability 
distributions are possible; for example, beta, binomial, cauchy, chi-squared, exponential, 
extreme value, gamma, geometric, general, hypergeometric, inverse gaussian, logistic, 
lognonnal, poisson, student's t, triangular, uniform, weibull, and others. BetaPERT, a 
variation of beta, and triangular distributions are two of the more commonly used 
distributions for simulation in risk analysis because they are very reliable and flexible for 
determining probability distributions from expert opinion. These two probability 
distributions allow the expert to generate the variable's distribution by providing only 
i" :,:' ,', 
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estimates of the minimum, most likely, and maximum value for the variable (Vose, 
i_.: ..... 
:.~_ .. ,_ :,r~:.~;;.;_ 
1996). 
Simulation is not an optimising technique, since it is generally used to simulate a series of 
outcomes without specifically maximising or minimising an objective function. However, 
in risk analysis, researchers are interested in identifying actions that will be efficient 
according to some criteria. To resolve this problem, Mapp and Helmers (1984) 
suggested that, since researchers have little knowledge about the risk preferences of the 
decision makers, stochastic dominance can be used to order the simulation results into 
efficient and inefficient sets for a more orderly selection of an optimal solution by the 
decision-maker. 
Simulation models have been used to analyse fIrm performance under conditions of risk. 
In the United States, three simulation models have been developed to evaluate the effects 
of the initial resource situation, fInancial situation, and various risk management 
strategies on farm growth and survival under risk. Johnson and Rausser (1977) 
developed a farm simulation programme for Oklahoma. This study reflected one 
approach to defming and designing model components, developing stochastic and other 
data, using the model experimentally, and analysing results of experimental runs. Held 
and Helmers (1980) developed another model for farms in Nebraska which analysed the 
effects of equity, expansion and borrowing limit on the survival of the fann Patrick 
(1979) simulated a representative Indiana farm under conditions of price and yield 
variability in order to determine the effects of loan arrangements and debt to equity levels 
on farm expansion and survival. The results obtained in these studies demonstrate the 
usefulness of simulation as a tool in farm analysis (Walker and Helmers, 1984) 
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Simulation models have also been used to evaluate the risk reducing effects of risk f;+;(~H::, 
management. Bosch and Johnson (1992) simulated a representative dairy farm to 
evaluate crop insurance and hedging as risk responses and then stochastic dominance 
was used to determine the risk efficient strategies. Lee et ai., (1987) analysed the effects 
of transition from irrigated to dry-land crop production on net returns and owner equity. 
They achieved this by simulating crop growth and evaluating the efficiency of the 
different alternatives using stochastic dominance. The results of this analysis indicated 
that financial risk increases faster than production risk as the financial leverage increases. 
There are a number of techniques that can be applied to the simulation approach Method 
of moments, exact algebraic solutions, and Monte Carlo simulation are all techniques 
that are used to determine the probability distribution of the possible model outcomes. 
Since Monte Carlo simulation is the technique predominantly used in the simulation 
software progrannnes available, this review will be restricted to a discussion of this 
technique. Monte Carlo simulation involves the random sampling of the probability 
distribution of each uncertain variable to calculate a possible model outcome (Vose, 
1996). This sampling is repeated many times, thereby generating the level of outcome for 
different scenarios and its probability distribution. The random sampling replicates the 
shape of the distribution of the uncertain variables, so that the distribution of the values 
that were calculated for the model outcome reflects the probability of the values that 
could occur (Vose, 1996). 
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As mentioned above, there are several techniques which can be used to detennine the 
outcome distribution. According to Vose (1996), the Monte Carlo simulation method 
presents the following advantages over the others: 
1. the distributions of the model's variables do not have to be approximated in any way; 
2. correlations and other inter-dependencies can be modelled; 
3. the level of mathematics required to perfonn a Monte Carlo simulation is quite basic; 
4. the computer does all the work required in detennining the outcome distribution; 
5. there is commercial software available to automate the tasks involved in the 
simulation; 
6. increasing the number of iterations that are calculated can attain greater levels of 
precision; 
7. the analyst can include complex mathematics with no extra complication; 
8. Monte Carlo simulation is extensively recognised as a valid technique so its results 
are more likely to be accepted; 
9. the performance of the model can be easily investigated; and 
10. the researcher can make changes very quickly and compare the results with previous 
models. 
This section discussed simulation as a method of optimal risk planning and Monte Carlo 
simulation as the most important technique to obtain the outcome distribution. The next 
section will present a summary of this literature review. 
3.8 Summary 
Farmers permanently face risks in their operations. These risks can be classified into 
production risk, market risk, institutional risk, human or personal risk, and technological 
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risk, which are cumulatively regarded as business risks, and fmancial risks. Farmers' 
responses to risk may be in production, marketing, or the financial organisation of the 
fann business. In evaluating the effects of these responses on reducing risk, decision 
analysis, one of the approaches to explaining decision-making under uncertainty, 
indicates that it is necessary to determine both the probabilities that the decision-maker 
assigns to the occurrence of the risky events and the decision-makers' utility function. 
However, it is difficult to measure a decision-maker's preferences due to several 
limitations associated with elicitation problems. 
To overcome these limitations, scholars have developed efficiency criteria. The most 
important efficiency criteria applied in agricultural decision-making are mean-variance 
efficiency (E-V), mean-absolute deviation efficiency (MAD), flfst-degree stochastic 
dominance (FSD), second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD), and stochastic 
dominance with respect to a function (SDRF). These criteria are characterised by their 
inherent assumptions about preferences and their discriminatory power. These two 
attributes are closely related; thus the greater the restrictions imposed on decision-
makers' preferences, the more discriminatory power the criterion has. For example, FSD 
places no restrictions on preferences, yet it has low discriminatory power. SSD, E-V, and 
MAD are similar in their restrictions on preferences and discriminatory power. In 
contrast, SDRF may be more discriminating, but it requires more specific information 
about the decision-maker's preferences than other techniques. 
E-V and MAD have been widely applied to fann planning under risk when the situation 
can be modelled by mathematical programming. However, quadratic and linear risk 
programming are less applicable for problems with non-linear relations, as often occurs 
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in agriculture. Simulation models based on search procedures have been used to resolve 
such problems. Monte Carlo simulation is the predominant technique used and samples 
the probability distributions to generate the simulation outcomes. Stochastic dominance 
can be used to order the simulation results into an efficient and inefficient set, thus 
obtaining an optimal solution for the decision-maker. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DESIGN AND METHODS 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 reviewed the existing literature related to the subject of this study. This 
chapter will describe the design framework of this research and the analytical methods to 
be used. The conceptual and design frameworks underpinning this research will be 
outlined in sections 4.2 and 4.3. The geographic area under study will be described in 
section 4.4. Section 4.5 will specify the data necessary to meet the specific objectives of 
this study. Section 4.6 will present the interview process and will outline the different 
parts and content of the questionnaire, while section 4.7 will describe the analytical 
methodology to be applied to the data. Sub-section 4.7.1 will outline the process and 
analysis of the data related to sources of risk and risk responses, sub-section 4.7.2 will 
describe the development of the gross margin stochastic model, sub-section 4.7.3 will 
describe the simulation process, and lastly, sub-section 4.7.4 will describe the stochastic 
dominance efficiency analysis that will be used to compare the outcome distributions 
obtained from the simulation. 
4.2 Conceptual Framework 
According to the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, sources of risk can be categorised' into 
business and financial risks (Gabriel and Baker, 1980) and business risks can be 
subdivided into production, market, institutional, human, and technological risks 
(Hardaker, et al., 1997). These risks create extra costs for farmers, produce 
misallocation of resources, and make planning more difficult (Fleisher, 1990). Producers 
perceive sources of risk differently, according to their specific circumstances, for 
r:~ 
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example, their socio-economic characteristics (Boggess et ai., 1985). In order to control 
... 
risk exposure and impact, the fanner uses risk management strategies (Jolly, 1983). 
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These strategies, which may be classified as production, marketing, and financial 
strategies, are aimed at controlling risks at its source (Sonka and Patrick, 1984). The 
strategy that is implemented depends on the fanner and the fann's characteristics 
(Patrick and Musser, 1996). 
Figure 4.1 depicts a schematic framework of the empirical component of this research 
based on the perceived sources of risks, the potential risk management strategies, and the 
fmancial effects generating from the adoption of these strategies. The perceived sources 
of risks induce rice producers to implement risk management strategies to control them 
The strategies implemented produce fmancial effects. Production strategies affect the 
probability distribution of yields, while marketing strategies affect the probability 
distributions of output and input prices. The combination of production and marketing 
strategies in turn affect the enterprise gross margin and the distribution of the net fann 
income (Martin, 1996). Financial strategies have an impact on the probability distribution 
of net cash flows of equity capital (Martin, 1996). Institutional, human, and technological 
risks are controlled by other strategies that have impacts on net fann income. The effects 
on yield, prices, net fann income, and equity capital will depend on the efficiency with 
which the strategies control the risk impact and exposure, which can be evaluated by 
carrying out efficiency analysis (Hardaker et ai., 1997). 
In this study and congruent with the objectives described in Chapter 1, the analysis will 
focus on evaluating the effects of production and marketing strategies on gross margin 
probability distributions. To fulfil this requirement, interviews with selected fanners 
Figure 4.1 Diagram of the conceptual framework 
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will identify their perceptions of sources of risk and their responses to control the 
perceived risks. The effects of production and marketing responses on yields and prices 
will be detennined by ascertaining the fanners' opinions about the minimum, maximum, 
and most likely values that the probability distributions can take on under each strategy. 
The yield and price probability distributions will be then introduced in gross margin 
models to evaluate the strategies' efficiency in risk reduction for the rice enterprise. 
4.3 Analytical Framework 
As proposed in Chapter 3, the expected utility model (BUM) will provide the foundation 
for the analytical component of this study. The EUM assumes that the rice fanner will 
act in such a way as to maximise its expected utility. The person's utility function 
detennines the producers' risk preference which is necessary to establish the risk 
efficiency of a risk management strategy. However, determining the utility function is 
difficult (King and Robison, 1984). Instead of using the decision-maker's utility function 
and following Hardaker et al., (1997), this research will use efficiency criteria to 
compare alternative choices. More specifically, first- and second-degree stochastic 
dominance will be used to assess the risk efficiency of various risk-reducing strategies by 
comparing the probability distribution of the gross margin outcomes. 
The literature referred to in Chapter 3 described how simulation models could be applied 
to the evaluation of risk management strategies. In this study, simulation will be used to 
generate probability distributions of the gross margins resulting from the implementation 
of risk management responses. 
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For the purposes of this analysis, the probability distributions of yields and prices, the 
perceived consequences of the alternative production and marketing strategies 
respectively, will be detennined from the responses of the decision-makers to a 
questionnaire which will be more fully described in Section 4.6 of this chapter. 
According to Anderson et al., (1977), the probabilities used in such models should be 
those of the person who bears responsibility for the decision. Vose (1996) adds that 
when one or more of the following situations appears, probability distributions should be 
defmed from expert opinion: when the data has never been collected in the past; when 
the data is too expensive to obtain; when past data is no longer relevant; when the data is 
sparse; or when the area being modelled is new. 
4.4 Study Area 
Section 2.5 of Chapter 2 noted that this research would be carried out in the counties of 
Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia, which are located in the Centre-South region of the 
i 
i 
province of Corrientes. The area under study is shown in Figure 4.2 as the shaded area. 
These two counties have an average annual temperature between 19.5° and 20.5° Celsius 
and an average annual rainfall between 11 00 rnm and 1300 mm. The relief is 
characterised by rolling plains. Two rivers, Corrientes and Mirifiay, surround the area. 
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4.2 Location of the area under study. 
According to the 'Comision Mixta Provincial del Arroz' , an organisation fonned by 
public and private institutions involved in the rice industry in the province of Corrientes, 
there are 15 rice producers in these two counties. The sizes of the rice farms range from 
120 hectares to 5000 hectares (Table 4.1). All fifteen rice producers or their farm 
managers will be interviewed to obtain the necessary infonnation. 
Table 4.1 Rice producers in Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia counties 
Rice Farm Size (hectares) 
Mercedes County 
A 4503 
B 600 
C 4000 
D 3000 
E 600 
Curuzu County 
F 1300 
G 4500 
H 1000 
I 900 
J 800 
K 500 
L 1600 
M 170 
N 120 
Total 23593 
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4.5 Data 
Section 1.3 of Chapter 1 outlined the objectives of this research. They are: 1) to 
ascertain the rice fanners' perceptions of the relative importance of a series of risk 
sources, 2) to establish the fanners' risk responses and the relative importance of the 
responses they implement, 3) to determine the influence of fann size on perceptions of 
sources of risk and risk responses, and to 4) evaluate the risk efficiency of the farmers' 
responses to perceived sources of risk for the rice enterprise. 
To fulfil the first objective, it will be necessary to determine the farmers' perceptions of 
the relative importance of different sources of risk through interviews of rice producers. 
. -
For the second objective, it will be necessary to obtain data, also through interviews with 
the producers, relating to the relative importance of the risk management strategies that 
they implement. To meet the needs of the third objective, these data will need to be 
related to the size of rice farms. 
The fourth objective will necessitate the collection of the data for the development of a 
stochastic gross margin model for each rice fann. Firstly, the variable costs for each rice 
enterprise must be established. Secondly, the yield per hectare and price per tonne are 
necessary to determine the total output value. In this study, the yield per hectare and 
price per tonne will be the stochastic variables. Their probability distributions will be 
subjectively determined by ascertaining the producers' perceptions of the maximum, 
minimum, and most likely value of each variable for each strategy. The reason for using 
subjective probabilities is that there is no past information about the effects of farmers' 
risk responses on these variables. All the information described above will be obtained 
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from two interviews with each of the fifteen rice producers in the counties of Mercedes 
and Curuzu Cuatia. 
4.6 Questionnaire Development and Interview Process 
The interview process will be carried out in two stages. The ftrst interview will comprise 
four sections: general infonnation, characteristics of the rice enterprise, sources of risk, 
and risk management. The fIrst section includes questions about ownership, the 
enterprises carried out in the farm, the hectares occupied by each enterprise, the 
economic importance of each enterprise and the risks involved in carrying on each 
enterprise. The second section will seek to obtain infonnation about the six most 
important production and marketing practiCes and associated expenses. 
In the third section the farmers will be asked about the sources of risk listed in Table 4.2. 
These sources were drawn from a New Zealand risk survey carried out by Martin and 
Anderson (1992) and from the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, and applied to the 
situation of the rice farmers in the area under study. 
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Table 4.2 Sources of risk 
·Bu.sinessr~sks •..••.... . ... 
Production risks 
1. Rainfall at the wrong time of the season 
2. Risk from other weather factors 
3. Deficit of rainfall 
4. Excess of rainfall 
5. Diseases and pests 
Market risks 
1. Changes in the economic and political situation in Brazil 
2. Changes in the world economic and political situation 
3. Changes in the economic and political situation in Argentina 
4. Unexpected variability of product prices 
5. Unexpected variability of input prices 
6. Inability to meet contracting obligations 
Institutional risks 
1. Changes in national government laws and policies 
2. Changes in provincial government laws and policies 
Human or social risks 
1. Problems with hired labour and contractors 
2. Accidents or problems with health 
3. Changes in family situation (partnership goals, marital status, etc.) 
Technological risks 
1. Changes in technology 
Miscellaneous risks 
1. Theft . 
. ·Fih~nCial.risks« •.. . 
1. Changes in interest rates 
2. Changes in land prices 
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In addition to these 20 questions on sources of risk, fanners will be also asked about 
other sources of risk. They will be asked about the comparative amount of risk related to 
the variability of yields and prices, and about the riskiness of their fanner's level of debt. 
Following the approaches of Martin (1996), Barry and Fraser (1976), and Boggess et al., 
(1985), each source of risk will be rated by the interviewee on a 1 to 5 Likert scale, 
where one is not important and five is extremely important. 
The fourth section of the interview will seek to ascertain the strategic risk management 
responses selected by rice fanners and their relative importance. In the Tables 4.3, 4.4, 
4.5 and 4.6, the applicability of the various risk management strategies reviewed in 
Chapter 3 is noted and the consequential strategies that will be used in the interviews to 
rice fanners specified. In these tables the first column describes the strategy as reviewed 
. "." 
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m the literature, the second column describes the applicability or non-applicability 
(AlNA) of the reviewed strategies, and the third column describes the strategies as stated 
in the interviews. 
Table 4.3 Comparison of production risk management strategies 
1. Selection of yield-stable enterprises. 
2. Enterprise diversification. 
3. Geographic diversification. 
4. Maintenance of feed reserves to offset 
droughts, floods, etc. 
5. Monitoring of pest and diseases. 
6. Application of precautionary health 
measures. 
7. Planting of several crop varieties. 
8. Irrigation to offsetdroughts. 
9. Substitution of capital for labour. 
10. Share farming. 
11. Use of crop, hail or multiple peril crop 
insurance. 
12. Use of incentive and reward structure 
for labour. 
13. Not producing to full capacity. 
14. Having excess machinery or excess 
labour. 
1 Considered as a financial strategy. 
2 Considered as a financial strategy 
NA 
A 
A 
NA 
A 
A 
A 
NA 
A 
NA 
NA 
1. Combination of other enterprises in 
your operation. 
2. Production of rice in other regions. 
3. Application of monitoring 
programmes for pests & diseases. 
4. Application of precautionary crop 
health measures. 
5. Planting more than one variety of 
rice with different characteristics. 
6. Use of more than one source of 
water. 
7. Use of more than one irrigation 
systems. 
8. Buy machinery to substitute labour. 
9. Use of system of incentive and 
reward structures. 
:.:.:: ... -.. :. ... - .. 
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Table 4.4 Comparison of marketing risk management strategies 
1. Selection of enterprises with lower price 
variability . 
2. Sequential marketing. 
3. Use of forward contracting. 
4. Contracting for input purchases. 
5. Hedging on the futures and options 
markets. 
6. Improving quality of information on price 
forecasts and trends. 
7. Participation in government commodity 
programmes. 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
NA 
1. Selection of varieties with lower 
price variability. 
2. Spreading sales over time. 
3. Use of forward contracting. 
4. Contracting for input purchases. 
5. Use of futures and options 
markets. 
6. Gathering market data, such as 
price forecasts & trends. 
Table 4.5 Comparison of financial risk management strategies 
.• ·.·.firl~·rI¢l~t~ll'~t~gi~.~ •••••• · •• ·· •......•.•.•......•.•.•... > •••.•..•••••...• » ..••••..••.••• ?< •• •· •••• ~~~}r~f!~tl~)J>str~~~QiE!$ •.•••••••• iO •. · .• ·tl1e •• · 
1. Holding assets for sale to meet cash A 1. Hold assets for sale to meet cash 
demands. demands. 
2. Maintenance of flexibility in the pace of A 2. Maintenance of flexibility in the 
investments and withdrawals. pace of investments and 
3. Matching debt repayment structure with 
the income-generating pattern of any 
asset. 
4. Leasing assets rather than owing them. 
5. Increase of bUsiness net worth. 
6. Holding liquid credit reserves. 
7. Use of formal insurance. 
8. Management of debt. 
9. Keeping a low debt level. 
10. Arrangement of overdraft reserves. 
11. Main farm operator working off 
property. 
12. Other family members working off 
property. 
13. Off-farm investments. 
A 
A 
NA 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
withdrawals. 
3. Matching debt repayment 
structure with the income-
generating pattern of any asset. 
4. Leasing assets rather than owing 
them. 
5. Holding liquid credit reserves. 
6. Use of formal insurance. 
7. Management of debt. 
8. Keeping debt low. 
9. Arrangement of overdraft 
reserves. 
10. Main farm operator working off 
property. 
11. Other family members working 
off property. 
12. Investing off farm. 
Table 4.6 Comparison miscellaneous risk management strategies 
MisceUaneousslralegies . .. AlNA·· ··Financ::iahsti'alegiesintn~iriterview 
1. Asset flexibility. A3 1. Having long-term flexibility. 
2. Product flexibility. 2. Having short-term flexibility. 
3. Market flexibility. 
4. Cost flexibility. 
5. Time flexibility. 
3 The five flexibility strategies were condensed into the two questions shown in Table 4.7. 
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For each strategy, the interviewee will be asked whether or not the strategy is 
implemented and the relative importance of the strategy. As considered for sources of 
risk, the relative importance of the strategies will be rated on a 1 to 5 Likert scale. 
After interviewing all of the rice producers, the six most important production and 
marketing strategies will be detennined. These strategies will be established according to 
the rating given by the interviewees. The six most important responses will be those with 
the highest rating. The effects of these strategies on yields and prices will then be 
ascertained by seeking the rice producers' opinions in the second interview. 
The second .interview will comprise two parts. In part one, the interviewees will be 
presented with a gross margin where the expenses for their respective rice enterprises 
have been calculated from the information they gave in the first interview so that they 
can check and correct them The second part will comprise four questions for each of the 
six strategies, the outcomes deriving from which are to be analysed. These questions will 
only be asked of those producers who implement each of the production and marketing 
strategies since only these rice producers can know how each strategy will affect the 
values of stochastic variables. The fIrst of the four questions will evaluate the cost of 
implementing each strategy. In the next question, the interviewees will be asked to 
detennine which one of the stochastic variables, yield or price, is affected by 
implementing each of the strategies. The third question will aim to obtain from the 
interviewees their assessment of the parameters of the probability distributions of yields 
or prices that result from not applying the strategy. 
I. 
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The fourth question will aim to obtain the respondents' assessments of the parameters of 
the probability distributions of yield or price resulting from the application of each of the 
six strategic responses designated as being most important. According to Vose (1996), 
triangular and betaPERT distributions are more reliable and flexible for modelling from 
expert opinion. The parameters for these two distributions are the minimum, most likely, 
and maximum value of the stochastic variable. For example, if the strategy has an impact 
on yield, the maximum, nllnimum and most likely value of the yield resulting from not 
implementing the strategy will be asked in the third question. Then, in the fourth 
question, the maximum, nllnimum and most likely value of the yield resulting from 
implementing the strategy willbe asked. Conversely, if the strategy affects the price, the 
maximum, nllnimum and most likely value of the price resulting from implementing and 
not implementing the strategy will be asked in these two questions. The information 
obtained by interviewing the rice producers will then be used to determine the farmers' 
perceptions of sources of risk and their responses to these risks and to develop and then 
simulate the gross margin stochastic models. 
4.7 Data Processing and Analysis 
In this section, the processing and analysis of the data obtained through the interviews 
will be described as follows. Firstly, the processing and analysis of the producers' 
perceptions of the relative importance of sources of risk affecting their businesses and the 
implementation and relative importance of the risk management strategies will be 
outlined. Secondly, the processing and analysis of the information necessary to develop 
the gross margin stochastic models will be described. Thirdly, the simulation process of 
the stochastic model will be specified. Fourthly, the stochastic dominance efficiency 
analysis will be discussed. 
,., '. ~ , ' .. ' . 
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4.7.1 Sources of Risk and Risk Management Responses 
The data, which will be obtained from the interviews relating to rice producers' 
perceptions of the sources of risk and the risk responses, will be initially analysed as two 
sets: one set for sources of risk, the other set for risk management strategies. Then, each 
of these two sets will be broken down into large farm size (4000-5000 ha), medium farm 
size (1000-1600 ha), and small farm size (500-900 ha) producers. These farm-size 
subsets sets will be analysed separately, and then compared with each other to detennme 
the existence of any association between the size of the rice farms and the farmers' 
" ..... -:.~ ... ~ .'. 
perceptions about the sources of risk and the strategies that they implement. Each source 
of risk will be defined by four variables: the type of risk, the average of the ratings given 
by the interviewees, the standard deviations of the ratings, and the position in the ranking 
of importance. Each risk management strategy will be characterised by the following four 
variables: the number of rice producers using that specific strategy, average rating, total 
rating, and standard deviation. 
It is necessary to note that no statistical analysis will be carried out to test the 
significance of the differences between groups. In addition, the results obtained in this 
research will not represent inferences for the population from a sample, since all of the 
rice producers will be interviewed, rather than a selected sample. 
4.7.2 Gross Margin Stochastic Model 
Following Kay (1986), the gross margin of the rice enterprise is the value of the rice 
output less the variable costs attributable to the rice enterprise. The variable costs of rice 
production in this region consist of cultivation, sowing, harvesting, seeds, fertiliser, 
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pesticides, contract work and casual labour hired specifically for that enterprise, 
irrigation fuel, application of pesticides, apportioned repairs and maintenance, grain 
drying, and other expenses (Pellegrino, J. M. and Buhnan, J. M., 1996). The total rice 
output is calculated by multiplying the rice price by the rice yield per unit of output. 
Finally, the total output less the total variable cost totals the gross margin. This is 
expressed in dollars per hectare. Table 4.7 schematically depicts the gross margin model 
that will be used in the research 
Table 4.7 Model example of gross margin for the rice enterprise 
Variable Costs 
Seeds 
Cultivation 
Sowing 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides 
Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation Fuel 
Spraying 
Harvesting 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Total Variable Cost 
Output 
Total Output Value 
GROSS MARGIN 
Yield/ha 
A1 
A2 
A3 
A4 
AS 
A6 
A7 
AB 
A9 
A10 
A11 
A12 
A14 (Prob. 
Distribution) 
VC 
A1S=C12 
$/ton 
B1 
B2 
B3 
B4 
BS 
B6 
B7 
BB 
B9 
B10 
B11 
B12 
814 (Prob. 
distribution) 
TO 
81S=C14 
C1=A1*81 
C2=A2*82 
C3=A3*83 
C4=A4*84 
CS=AS*8S 
C6=A6*86 
C7=A7*87 
CB=AB*8B 
C9=A9*89 
C1 0=A1 0*81 0 
C11=A11*811 
C12=A12*812 
C12=Sum(C11 : 
C1) 
$/ha 
C14=A14*814 
C1S=A1S+81S 
The uncertain variables in the model are the rice yield anrl price. Through their variation, 
the effects of the risk management strategies will be accounted for. For example, the risk 
reducing effect of planting different varieties will be represented in the yield and the risk 
reducing effect of spreading sales over time, while forward contracting output will be 
accounted for in the price. As noted in Chapter 2, the rice price and yield are considered 
the major sources of risk for this crop because of their variability. For each of these two 
variables, risk will be introduced in the model through subjective probability 
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distributions. The yield and price probability distributions will not be correlated in this 
model, because in Argentina rice yield and price fonnation processes are independent, 
given that most of Argentina's production is exported. 
For the purposes of the analysis required in this study, gross margin stochastic models 
will be developed for each rice fann. Each gross margin will based on the specific 
expenses for that rice enterprise, which will be deterministic, and the parameters for 
triangular andlor betaPERT probability distributions for yield and price. The parameters 
for each risk response for each rice producer interviewed are presented in Appendix 4. 
The models will be constructed in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. 
To evaluate the effects of the implementation of the six strategies, two models will be 
developed for each strategy. The fIrst model will include all of the expenses incurred to 
produce the rice and the specific expenses (if there are any) incurred by implementing the 
risk management strategy analysed. The specifIc expenses for each strategy and farm are 
presented in Appendix 3. In the case of a production strategy, it will also include the 
yield probability distribution obtained asking the interviewee the maximum, minimum, 
and most likely value that the yield can take on using that strategy. This model will also 
include the average price probability distribution obtained by asking the maximum, 
minimum, and most likely values that the price can take when none of the three 
marketing strategies are utilised. In this way, the effects of the production risk response 
on the gross margin distribution will be isolated from the effects of any marketing 
strategy. The second model will include the yield probability distributions derived from 
not using that production risk response and the average price probability distributions 
'r' -' 
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derived from not using any marketing strategy. In addition, only the general expenses 
will be included, since there are no specific costs if no risk strategy is implemented. 
For each model, two gross margin probability distributions will therefore be obtained 
after running the simulations for each strategy. One of the distributions will account for 
the effect of the production risk response, while the other gross margin distribution will 
evaluate the perceived result of not using that strategy. 
When a marketing strategy is evaluated for a specific fann, the two gross margin models 
will differ in the probability distributions and the specific expenses incurred by using that 
marketing strategy by the specific farmer. In the gross margin which models the 
,----.-.-
implementation of the marketing response, the price probability distribution obtained by 
asking the interviewee the maximum, minimum, and most likely price using that strategy 
will be included. Meanwhile, the yield will have the average probability distribution 
derived from not implementing any of the three production risk responses by that rice 
producer. The second model will include the price probability distributions derived from 
not using that marketing risk response and the average yield probability distributions 
derived from not using any production strategy. This process will be repeated for each of 
the 15 rice farmers, the farm sizes for whom were specified in Table 4.1, and for each of 
the strategies implemented by them After all of the models have been developed their 
simulations will be run. 
4.7.3 Simulation Process 
The gross margin models with the yield and price probability distributions will be 
simulated using @Risk software developed by Palisade Corporation. This software has 
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the most sophisticated features of all the risk analysis software, but remains easy to use 
(Vose, 1996). The @Risk software runs as an add-in to Excel. 
The models will be created in an Excel worksheet and the parameters of the probability 
distributions of the stochastic variables, called input variables in @Risk, will be entered, 
specifying the type of distribution that characterised each variable. The distributions for 
the stochastic variables will be triangular or betaPERT since, as specified in Chapter 3, 
these distributions are better suited to defmed distributions from expert opinions (Vose, 
1996). The reason for this is that only three parameters, maximum, minimum, and most 
likely value of the variable, define these distributions. These parameters can easily be 
obtained from an expert. When all of these distributions are loaded, the simulation will be 
run. 
Following the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, Monte Carlo will be used as the 
simulation method. Within the general concept of Monte Carlo simulation, two different 
sampling methods, Monte Carlo and Latin Hypercube, have been developed. The latter 
method was derived from the former and is more precise than Monte Carlo (Vose, 
1996). Thus, Latin Hypercube will be applied in this study for the simulations. This 
method uses a teclmique called 'stratified sampling without replacement' and proceeds as 
follows (after Vose, 1996): 
1. the probability distribution is split into n intervals of equal probability according to 
the number of iterations to be performed for the simulation; 
2. in the fIrst iteration, one of these intervals is selected using a random number; 
3. a second random number is then generated to determine where, within that interval, 
the cumulative probability should lie; 
4. the value of the variable for that value of cumulative probability is calculated; 
-,'- . 
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5. the process is repeated for the second iteration but the interval used in the first 
" , . ~.;- , ~'. -,- .' 
iteration is marked as having already been used and therefore will not be selected l~: ~~~:~~~~ ~ ~~ 3'~~ ~~ ~_ - •• ' .' ,.-... - "." "0' _ .0" 
again; and 
6. this process is repeated for all the iterations. 
After selecting the sampling method and before running the simulation, the number of 
iterations has to be chosen. In this study, the number of iterations selected will be 2000 
since the result of increasing the number of iterations beyond this number will not greatly 
modify the results. During an iteration, each of the price and yield distributions will be 
sampled using the Latin Hypercube method and the price and yield value obtained from 
the sampling will be used .to obtain a gross margin value. The result is a probability 
distribution for the gross margin that reflects the characteristics of both price and yield 
distributions. These gross margin probability distributions will be compared using the 
stochastic dominance efficiency analysis that will be discussed in the following section. 
4.7.4 Stochastic Dominance Efficiency Analysis 
As referred to in the literature outlined in Chapter 3, there are three main methods of 
undertaking efficiency analysis: mean-variance, mean-absolute deviation, and stochastic 
dominance. Instead of using mean-variance or mean-absolute deviation as a criterion to 
determine the efficient strategies, this research will apply stochastic dominance. The 
reason for the selection of stochastic dominance is that the two former techniques 
consider only two moments of the distribution for comparing risk responses. This is only 
valid when the variables are distributed normally. However, the gross margin 
distributions obtained through the simulation in this study are unlikely to be normally 
distributed. As a consequence, applying mean-variance or mean-absolute deviation may 
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not give the correct efficient set (King and Robison, 1984). In comparison, stochastic 
dominance does not require a normal distribution of the values of the variables under .... -.. ~ -- - ~ ::i·::;~.~·:;:-:~;:::, 
I', ,'> .. ','.',' ',' 
consideration. The gross margin probability distributions obtained by simulating the use 
and non-use of each risk management strategy will be graphed as cumulative distribution 
functions to carry out the visual stochastic dominance analysis. 
The stochastic dominance efficiency analysis will be carried out for each farmer in two 
stages. Firstly, the CDFs obtained from simulating the use and non-use of each risk 
response will be compared and the stochastically dominated CDF will be dismissed. 
Secondly, all of the CDFs of the dominant risk management strategies for each rice farm 
will be compared using stochastic dominance. The result of this comparison will be a set 
' .. 
of risk efficient risk strategies for each farmer. 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter ftrstly described the framework for this research, its design, and the 
methods used to fulfil its objectives. The theoretical foundation of this study is the 
expected utility model. Next, the geographic area under study and its rice producers 
were described. This chapter also discussed the data necessary to carry out this research 
and described the approaches to obtaining the farmers' perceptions on the relative 
importance of the sources of risk affecting rice producers, their potential risk responses 
to these sources, the relative importance of these strategies, and the necessary 
information to develop a gross margin stochastic model. Finally, it described the 
methodology associated with the processing and analysis of the data collected. The gross 
margin stochastic models, the simulation method and the application of stochastic 
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dominance efficiency analysis were outlined. The next chapter will describe and discuss 
the results obtained from this analysis. 
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CHAPTERS 
:::::~~:~::~~~--.:; ::-:.: 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION m:::?f::=g: 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described the design of the research and the methods used for the 
analysis. This chapter presents and discusses the results obtained from the analyses. In 
the fIrst two sections the results of the interviews are described, discussed and 
summarised. Section 5.2 contains the results related to the perceptions of the sources of 
risk, 5.3 those related to the risk management responses. In the third section, the results 
of the stochastic dominance analyses of the cumulative distribution functions, resulting 
from the simulations of the uses of each selected risk strategy, are outlined and 
discussed. This area is divided in two subsections. The fIrst presents the stochastic 
dominance efficiency analysis for the use and non-use of each strategy. The second 
subsection presents the same analysis, but for the comparisons among the efficient 
strategies obtained from the fIrst stochastic analysis. 
5.2 Sources of Risk 
In the analysis, the survey results from the twelve rice farmers interviewed were first 
considered as a whole and then divided into three groups according to the area farmed: 
4000-5000 ha (four large farms), 1000-1600 ha (three medium-sized farms), and 500-
900 ha (five small farms). The survey results are summarised in Table 5.1 (general 
results), Table 5.2 (large farms), Table 5.3 (medium-sized farms), and Table 5.4 (small 
farms). The perceived sources of risk as exhibited in each table were ranked, frrstly, 
according to the averages of the farmer ratings of the importance of each source of risk 
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and, secondly, according to the consistency of the views expressed, as represented by the 
r ,.", .', .,'!. ' ~. -'.-
standard deviation of the ratings. ~~~~~~~f~~¥ 
5.2.1 General Risk Source Results 
The most important perceived source of risk for all rice farmers in Mercedes and Curuzu 
Cuatia was 'changes in the economic and political situation of Brazil'. Its consistency, as 
measured by the standard deviation of the average fanner rating, was one of the highest 
for all the sources of risk (standard deviation = 0.62). The averages and standard 
deviations are contained in Table 5.1. The reason for the Brazilian situation being 
considered 'important' (average rating: 4.25) is that most of the rice produced in 
Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatil:l region is exported there. As a consequence, any economic 
downturn, or political crisis, affecting Brazil's economy will affect its rice imports and 
thus will impact on the economic situation of the rice farms in the surveyed region. 
While 'rainfall during the wrong time of the season' and 'risk from other weather factors 
(wind, temperature, frost and hail)' were considered as being equally important, the 
fonner had higher consistency than the latter and, consequently, they were ranked in the 
second and the third place respectively. These two perceived sources of risk had lower 
consistency; i.e., their ratings had higher standard deviations, than 'changes in the 
economic and political situation in Brazil'. The reason for this lower consistency is that 
weather risks depend on several factors that do not affect all rice farms in the same way, 
thus resulting in higher variability. In contrast, the economic and political situation in 
Brazil affects all farmers in the same way. The rest of the sources of risk fell into 
categories 3 (,quite important'), 2 (,somewhat important') and 1 ('not important'). 
• 
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Table 5.1 Sources of risk for all fanners a, b, c 
•• SolJrces·.().f •• Ri~~.· .•.. · ... · .. ••• •.•.•..•.•.•.•..•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• > ••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••..•••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•.•••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••• b~fi~~!~lr~~ge ••••• ~~~~::~~ .....•.•.•• :~.~k.in 
··········.·i/ ..... · ...· ... .i .... ·.·...........> <hi::12<>' 
Changes in the economic and political situation in Brazil M 4.25 
Rainfall in the wrong time of the season P 3.33 
Risk from other weather factors (wind, temp., hail, frost) P 3.33 
Changes in the world economic & political situation M 3.17 
Deficit in rainfall P 3.17 
Excess rainfall P 3.08 
Unexpected variability of product prices M 3.08 
Changes in interest rates F 2.92 
Changes in the economic & political situation in Argentina M 2.67 
Diseases, pests, and weeds P 2.50 
Changes in national government laws and policies I 2.33 
Problems with hired labour and contractors H 2.08 
Changes in technology T 2.08 
Changes in land prices F 1.92 
Unexpected variability of input prices M 1.83 
Accidents or problems with health H 1.83 
Changes in family sit.(partner. goals, marital status, etc.) H 1.75 
Changes in prOVincial government laws and policies I 1.58 
Being unable to meet contracting obligations M 1.33 
Theft Misc 1.17 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with your level of dept' , 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with the variability of yields and prices 
2.58 
3.17 
0.62 
1.23 
1.44 
0.94 
1.27 
0.90 
1.08 
1.31 
0.89 
1.00 
0.65 
1.08 
1.31 
1.00 
0.94 
0.94 
1.06 
0.79 
0.49 
0.39 
0.79 
0.58 
a The sources of risk are classified as production related (P), marketing related (M), financial related 
(F), human related (H), institutional related (I), and miscellaneous related (Mise). 
b The average rating is the sum of each farmer's rating divided by the number of farmers (n). The 
sources of risk were rated from 1 to 5, being 1 'not important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'quite 
important' , 4 'important', and 5 'extremely important' . 
c Standard deviation of the average farmer rating, measures the consistency of the ratings. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
As can be seen in Table 5.1 market and production risks dominated the ranking of 
perceived sources of risk. They occupied nine of the fIrst ten places in the ranking. Only 
one of these ten risks was fmanciaI; this was eighth in the ranking. Market risks were 
ranked fIrst, fourth, seventh and ninth, and production risks were ranked second, third, 
fifth, sixth and tenth. The effect of market and production risks, through their impact on 
the variability of prices and yields, was considered more important than the effect of 
other sources of risk such as the level of debt. This fmding supports those of Boggess et 
ai., (1985) who found that production and market risks were more important than other 
sources of risk for farmers in North Florida and South Alabama. However, it is 
noteworthy that these American farmers rated production risks as more important than 
;-:~'.:-----~.\...--:-> <~ 
S:~g~~;;j~··~~?~~i~~ 
i····-·',··'····'····· 
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market risks, whereas for Argentine rice farmers there was not a large difference in the 
..... t-"-: . ~ . 
importance between the two types of risk. The reason for this might be that, for ~ . '." ... ~ .... ~~:--::~;~~::-;.:.:::;:~ 
"_".'.'",--.-,". '0' 
Argentine rice fanners, there is no government intervention in the rice markets to reduce 
the variability of rice prices, whereas the US economy has a history of price stabilisation 
policies. 
The last two questions about the sources of risk sought to rank production and market 
risks, represented by the variability of rice yields and prices, against financial risks, 
represented by the level of debt. The results demonstrate that the former is perceived to 
be more important than the latter. They showed also that the consistency of the opinions 
relating to the former exceeds that ofthe latter. This might be attributed to the fact that 
production and market related variables are considered to be less controllable than 
fmancially related variables. 
'Logistics', 'availability of drying and storage capacity' and 'roads' comprised other 
sources of risk that some farmers thought were important and which were not included 
in the survey. However, only four farmers considered these sources of risk 'important' 
and consequently, they were not included in any further analysis. These sources of risk 
appear to be very specific to individual situations. For example, the state of the roads can 
be a source of risk for farmers whose farms are located in areas with difficult access. In 
addition, some farmers had their own storage and/or drying capacity, while others did 
not. 
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5.2.2 Large FamI Size Group Results 
: ,-,' ".~, -' . 
:<.>·.~<;~:< .... :.,'.4 . 
The results for the large fann size group are shown in Table 5.2. For this group of ~~:::#w?m; 
fanners the most important source of risk was, as for the set of respondents as a whole, 
'changes in the economic and political situation of Brazil'. This source of risk was most 
consistently rated important (standard deviation: 0.43) by rice fanners with large farms. 
'Deficit in rainfall', which was ranked the second most important source of risk, was 
considered 'important' by fanners, but it had a lower consistency than 'changes in the 
economic and political situation of Brazil'; i.e., the standard deviation was higher (1.22). 
The reason for this is that most large farms are located in areas where the water for 
irrigation is taken from dams; which are replenished with rainfall water. If there is a 
deficit, the d~ will not have enough water to irrigate the crop. 'Changes in the world 
~ - - - -~-.-
economic and political situation' and 'changes in interest rates' were also considered 
'important' by fanners. However, 'changes in the world economic and political situation' 
was positioned in third place and 'changes in interest rates' in fourth place, since it had 
:.~. 
lower consistency (0.83 vs 1.09 respectively). 
In contrast to the general group results discussed in Section 5.2.1, the first three places 
in the ranking for fanners with large farms were occupied by two market and one 
production sources of risk, while for the general group they were occupied by one 
market and two production sources of risk. This could be a sign that, for large farms, 
market risks are more important, possibly as a consequence of better control of 
production sources of risk. Other sources of risk, exhibited in Table 5.2, were grouped 
into those considered 'quite important', 'somewhat important', and 'not important'. 
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Table 5.2 Sources of risk for large fanns •. b. c 
+u.~:.,._ •• •.•. -::_' .... 
t:~:~:~ $=~j.:::-:~~:i 
1'':"'-, -:-:1 --:--~ '--- -,-.~ 
Changes in the economic & political situation in Brazil M 4.75 0.43 1 
Deficit in rainfall P 4.00 1.22 2 
Changes in the world economic and political situation M 3.75 0.83 3 
Changes in interest rates F 3.75 1.09 4 
Rainfall in the wrong time of the season P 3.25 1.30 5 
Unexpected variability of product prices M 3.00 1.41 6 
Risk from other weather factors (wind, temp, frost, hail) P 3.00 1.58 7 
Problems with hired labour and contractors H 2.75 0.43 8 
Excess rainfall P 2.75 1.09 9 
Diseases, pests, and weeds P 2.75 1.30 10 
Changes in the economic & political situation in Argentina M 2.50 0.87 11 
Changes in national government laws and policies I 2.50 0.87 12 
Changes in technology T 2.50 1.12 13 
Changes in provincial government laws and policies I 2.00 0.71 14 
Changes in land prices F 2.00 0.71 15 
Unexpected variability of input prices M 2.00 1.22 16 
Accidents or problems with health H 1.75 0.43 17 
Changes in family sit. (partner. goals, marital stat.,inherit.) H 1.50 0.50 18 
Being unable to meet contracting obligations M 1.25 0.43 19 
Theft Mise ·1.00 0.00 20 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with your level of debt 2.75 0.43 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with the variability of yields and prices 3.50 0.87 
a The sources of risk are classified as production related (P), marketing related (M), financial related 
(F), human related (H), institutional related (I), and miscellaneous related (Mise). 
b The average rating is the sum of each farmer's rating divided by the number of farmers (n). The 
sources of risk were rated from 1 to 5, being 1 'not important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'quite 
important' , 4 'important', and 5 'extremely important' . 
c Standard deviation of the average farmer rating, measures the consistency of the ratings. 
As with the general group results, market and production risks for large farms were 
considered as being more important than fmancial risks, occupying eight of the top ten 
choices. The most important perceived sources of risk for large farms, however, included 
I .. __ .. _. ____ , . 
rc::::~~','~;.c::,o: -~.-
1-, .. -
a personal or human risk ('problems with hired labour and contractors') which did not 
appear as a risk source category within the frrst ten places for the general group results. 
The reason for this difference is that larger farms need more hired labour and contractors 
than smaller farms do, so are likely to have more problems with labour and contractors. "- .. _--_-.':- ..... 
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For fanners with areas ranging from 4000 to 5000 ha, risk relating to the variability of 
yields and prices was ranked ahead of risk associated with the level of debt, as found for 
the general group. There was, however, a difference in the consistencies of these sources 
of risk ratings for each group. In the large fann group, the risk regarding the variability 
of the level of debt had higher consistency than the risk regarding the variability of yields 
and prices, while the reverse occurred with the general group. One explanation for this is 
that rice producers with large fanns have a stronger power of negotiation because they 
handle larger volumes of production and have greater capacity to collect and process 
market infonnation. Thus, the power of negotiation allows them to better control their 
debts and repayments. 
5.2.3 Medium Farm Size Group Results 
The results relating to the perceived of the sources of risk for medium-sized fann rice 
producers are exhibited in Table 5.3. The most important perceived source of risk for 
medium-sized fanns, as for the other groups, was 'changes in the economic and political 
situation in Brazil'. The consistency in considering the importance of this source of risk 
was the highest within this group; i.e., most of the farmers rated it as 'important' 
(standard deviation: 0.47). 
'Excess rainfall', 'unexpected variability of product prices', and 'changes in the world 
economic and political situation' shared the second place in the ranking; all three were 
considered 'quite important' and fanners were equally consistent in their ratings. In 
contrast with large fanns, 'excess rainfall' was rated more important for medium-sized 
fanns than for large fanns. This result is, again, related to the geographical location of 
the fanns. Most of the surveyed medium-sized fanns were located near rivers, from 
;".' :,~:,,"~'.~~ \'~::;...c 
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which the irrigation water was taken, so that when there was excess rainfall, the rivers 
rose and flooded the rice paddocks. 'Unexpected variability of product prices' was also 
found to be more important for mediwn-sized farms than for large ones. A possible 
explanation for this is that fanners with large farms can negotiate better prices as a result 
of larger amount of output produced. 'Changes in the world economic and political 
situation' was considered one of the three most important sources of risk, as it was in the 
large fann group. 
Table 5.3 Sources of risk for medium-sized farms ., b, c 
~;~,!!!,!Otrl$kf· . ... .>'~ilMitl~~.~r~:~\~jiP~"g 
Changes in the economic & political situation in Brazil M 4.33 0.47 
Excess rainfall P 3.00 0.82 . . 
Unexpected variability of product prices M 
Changes in the world economic and political situation M 
Risk from other weather factors (wind, temp, frost, hail) P 
Rainfall in the wrong time of the season P 
Changes in national government laws and policies I 
Deficit in rainfall P 
Changes in land prices F 
Changes in the economic & political situation in Argentina M 
Problems with hired labour and contractors H 
Diseases, pests, and weeds P 
Accidents or problems with health H 
Changes in family sit. (partner. goals, marital status, etc.) H 
Changes in technology T 
Unexpected variability of input prices M 
Changes in interest rates F 
Changes in provincial government laws and policies I 
Being unable to meet contracting obligations M 
Theft Misc 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
·3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
2.67 
2.67 
2.67 
2.67 
2.33 
2.33 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
1.67 
1.67 
1.33 
1.33 
1.00 
0.82 
0.82 
1.41 
0.47 
0.47 
0.94 
1.25 
0.47 
1.25 
0.82 
1.41 
1.41 
1.41 
0.47 
0.47 
0.47 
0.47 
0.00 
with your level of debt 2.00 0.82 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with the variability of yields and prices 3.00 0.00 
a The sources of risk are classified as production related (P), marketing related (M), financial related 
(F), human related (H), institutional related (1), and miscellaneous related (Mise). 
b The average rating is the sum of each farmer's rating divided by the number of farmers (n). The 
sources of risk were rated from 1 to 5, being 1 'not important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'quite 
important', 4 'important', and 5 'extremely important'. 
c Standard deviation of the average farmer rating, measures the consistency of the ratings. 
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'Risk from other weather factors' was considered 'quite important' as well, but the 
~::'::-"":7:-::''''> - -'. 
farmers were less consistent in their ratings, so it was placed in third position. The fourth f;::~iA@?~~ 
place is occupied by 'rainfall in the wrong time of the season' and 'changes in national 
government laws and policies'. Both sources of risk were equally important and farmers 
were equally consistent. The other two 'quite important' sources of risk were 'deficit in 
rainfall' and 'changes in land prices', which were rated equally, but farmers were less 
consistent rating them than rating the sources of risk in the fourth place. The other 
sources of risk were considered 'somewhat' or 'not important'. 
As with the other groups, market and production risks were the most important 
categories of. sources of risk. Market risks are ranked first and second. Production risks 
were placed second, third, fourth and fifth An institutional risk, 'changes in national 
government laws and policies', a category that did not appear in the other groups, was 
introduced in fourth place. Finally, a financial risk ('changes in land prices') was placed 
in the sixth position of the ranking. As with the general and large farm groups, market 
and production risks were considered to be more important than the other categories. 
5.2.4 Small Fann Size Group Results 
Table 5.4 exhibits the results for the small farm size group. The most important 
perceived source of risk for this group, as with the previously mentioned groups, was 
'changes in the economic and political situation in Brazil'. The reason for this is that, 
regardless of farm size, most of rice produced in the region is exported to this country. 
For small farms, this source of risk had the same average rating as the second and third 
sources, but the highest consistency. The second and third places in this ranking were 
'risk from other weather factors' and 'rainfall during the wrong time of the season', 
,; . 
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respectively. Both sources were considered equally important, but the fonner had higher 
:,.-,', - '--
consistency than the latter. All sources of risk for small farms were rated as less 
I;·;-: .. """-.;-.~ .;"";0._ 
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important than the sources of risk for the other two groups. This reinforces the notion 
that fanners from smaller farms might be less aware of the importance of the relative 
impacts of the different sources of risk. 
Table 5.4 Sources of risk for small farms •. b, c 
Changes in the economic & political situation in Brazil M 3.80 0.40 1 
Risk from other weather factors (wind, temp, frost, hail) P 3.80 0.98 2 
Rainfall in the wrong time of the season P 3.80 1.17 3 .' . . -
Excess rainfall P 3.40 0.49 4 
Unexpected variability of product prices M 3.00 0.71 5 
Changes In the economic &-political si~uation in Argentina M 3.00 0.89 6 
Changes in interest rates F . 3.00 1.10 7 
Changes in the world economic and political situation M 2.80 0.75 8 
Deficit in rainfall P 2.80 0.98 9 
Diseases, pests, and weeds P 2.60 0.49 10 
Changes in national government laws and policies I 2.00 0.00 11 
Unexpected variability of input prices M 1.80 0.75 12 
Accidents or problems with health H 1.80 0.75 13 
Changes in family sit. (partner. goals, marital stat., etc.) H 1.80 0.98 14 
Changes in technology T 1.80 1.17 15 
Changes in land prices F 1.40 0.49 16 
Theft Misc 1.40 0.49 17 
Inability to meet contracting obligations M 1.40 0.49 18 
Changes in provincial government laws and policies I 1.40 0.80 19 
Problems with hired labour and contractors H 1.40 0.80 20 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with your level of debt 2.80 0.75 0.00 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with the variability of yields and prices 3.00 0.00 0.00 
a The sources of risk are classified as production related (P), marketing related (M), financial related 
(F), human related (H), institutional related (I), and miscellaneous related (Mise). 
b The average rating is the sum of each farmer's rating divided by the number of farmers (n). The 
sources of risk were rated from 1 to 5, being 1 'not important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'quite 
important' , 4 'important', and 5 'extremely important' . 
c Standard deviation of the average farmer rating, measures the consistency of the ratings. 
'Excess rainfall', 'unexpected variability of product prices', 'changes in the economic 
and political situation of Argentina', 'changes in interest rates', 'changes in the world 
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economic and political situation', 'deficit in rainfall', and 'diseases and pests' were 
considered 'quite important', with other sources of risk being considered 'somewhat 
important' or 'not important'. 
Market and production risks dominated the sources of risks, as they did with the other 
groups. Market risks are ranked first, fifth, sixth, and eighth, while production risks are 
ranked second, third, fourth, ninth, and tenth. The seventh place, however, is occupied 
by a financial risk. . '. 
As with the other farm groups, general risk regarding the variability of yields and prices 
was considered more important than risk regarding the farmer's level of debt. The 
variability of yields and prices was rated the same by both farmers with medium-sized 
and with small farms. These results were completely consistent; i.e., both had standard 
deviations equal to zero. Risk related to the level of debt was viewed more consistently 
(lower standard deviation) by operators of small farms than was the case with the 
operators of medium-sized farms. 
5.2.5 Discussion of Sources of Risk Results 
The five sources of risk perceived as most important for each farm-size group are 
exhibited in Table 5.5. 'Changes in the economic and political situation in Brazil' was the 
most important source of risk for all the rice farmers surveyed. In addition, respondents, 
regardless of the farm size, were very consistent in their rating of the importance of this 
risk source. The importance of this source of risk was supported, after the interviews 
were done in December 1998, by an Argentine newspaper which reported that March 
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rice exports to Brazil had sharply decreased due to Brazil's economic crisis (La Nacion, 
1999). 
Changes in the economic Changes in the economic Changes in the economic 
& political situation in & political situation in & political situation in 
Brazil Brazil Brazil 
2 Deficit in rainfall Excess rainfall Risk from other weather 
factors 
3 Changes in the world Unexpected variability of Rainfall in the wrong time 
economic & political product prices of the season 
situation 
4 Changes in the interest Changes in the world Excess rainfall 
rate economic & political 
situation 
5 Rainfall in the wrong time Risk from other weather 
of the season factors 
. '-. ' 
, ~-
According to Martin (1996), fanners in New Zealand were also concerned with the 
r-":" '~.-' ", , 
economic and political instability of foreign countries. In her study, all groups of fanners 
and growers in New Zealand rated 'changes in the world economic and political 
situation' as important. For New Zealand fanners at that time, however, no specific 
country was more important than others. 
The other sources of risk contained within the five most important were similar across 
groups. For example, 'changes in the world economic and political situation' was 
important for large and medium-sized farms, and 'rainfall in the wrong time of the 
season' was important for large and small farms. In addition, 'unexpected variability of 
product prices' and 'risk from other weather factors' were important for medium and 
small farms. The importance of the 'unexpected variability of product prices' for medium 
and small farms might suggest that these types of fanners have less capacity to access 
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corrnnodity and financial markets for transferring this risk than fanners with large farms, 
.... ' 
........ -:.-.~ ......... ' -:. 
which supports the findings of Barry and Fraser (1976). r:f~;Wf·i¥{ 
Market and production risks were rated as being more important than other categories i· 
across all farm size groups. This finding supports the research of Martin (1996) which 
reported that New Zealand producers were also more concerned with the importance of 
market risks than other risks. However, New Zealand farmers were not equally 
concerned about the importance of production risks. 
Four relationships between farm size and sources of risk can be inferred from the results 
of the survey~ Firstly, as fann size decreases, the relative importance of production risk 
increases. This is shown in Table 5.6, where the percentages for each class of risk for 
each size group were calculated from sources of risk with an average rating higher than 
or equal to 3.00; for example, forty percent of these sources of risk for large farms were 
market risks. This might be because the larger farms have more resources to control 
production risks. These resources, which include technology, labour, expert advice, and 
management, allow farmers to implement production risk management strategies that 
control the impact or the appearance of this kind of risk. For example, fanners with large 
farms may use preventative health measures that reduce the incidence of production 
risks, as will be mentioned in Section 5.3. Consequently, they are less concerned about 
the importance of production risks than farmers with medium-sized and small farms. 
Secondly, rice producers with medium and small farms do not consi~er [mancial risks to 
be important, as shown in Table 5.6. The reason for this might be that these fanners may 
not have high levels of debt. This contention is supported by their rating of the risk 
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related to the fanner's level of debt as 'somewhat important'. Furthermore, producers 
with medium-sized farms rated 'keeping debt low', a risk management strategy, as the 
most important of all the financial strategies. This finding is similar to Martin's (1996) 
conclusion from her study of New Zealand farmers and growers. She concluded that 
these producers were not very concerned with fmancial risks, since they had made the 
necessary adjustments to control it. For example, they kept their debts low and 
effectively managed capital expenditures, thereby matching the behaviour of some rice 
farmers, as described in the next section. 
Table 5.6 Percentages of each risk categories according to the fann size. • 
SO, .... c~$Qffl$k .•... ............ ... tatgefal'm~j> ····Me(UI,ltrifatmli$m~UFarm$ •.. ' 
Market risks 40% 37.5% 40% 
Production risks 40% 50% 60% 
Financial risks 20% 
Institutional risks 12.5% 
a Calculated from the sources of risk that were rated three or more. i ! . 
, 
Thirdly, fanners with large farms considered 'deficit in rainfall' to be more important as a i 
source of risk than 'excess rainfall'. In contrast with that difference in rating, producers 
with medium-sized and small farms considered 'excess rainfall' more important than 
deficit in rainfall. As noted in Section 5.2.2 and Section 5.2.3, this is not a direct result of 
fann size, but rather a consequence of location. 
Finally, as the size of the rice farms decreases, the ratings given to the sources of risk 
decreases. For example, the average rating of importance for the 20 sources of risk for 
large farms was 2.64, while for medium-sized and small farms were 2.33 and 2.41 
respectively. This might be because farmers with smaller farms are less concerned with 
the reported sources of risk than the farmers with larger farms. A reason for this relative 
lack of concern might be that these producers have fewer management skills and less 
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knowledge that would allow them to recognise the actual importance of the sources of 
risk. For example, the four farmers with large farms each had a university degree, one of 
the three producers with medium-sized farms had a university degree and two of the five 
farmers of the small farms each had a university degree. In addition, some of the farm 
managers of large farms held university degrees. The next section will address the 
management strategies used to ameliorate the effects of perceived sources of risk. 
5.3 Risk Management Strategies 
The results of the analysis of responses to the survey on risk management strategies are 
presented in Tables 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11. The survey results were firstly ap.alysed 
as a whole; then, they were grouped according to farm size (large, medium, and small). 
,-
i,~ , 
For each group, the number of farmers using each strategy, the average rating given by 
the farmers, the total rating of the strategy (the sum of the individual respondent's 
ratings), and the consistency of these ratings (the standard deviation of the average of 
farmer ratings) were calculated. In Table 5.11, the three most important strategies for 
each category and each farm-size group are presented. The strategies in these tables were 
categorised into production strategies (1-9), .marketing (10-15), fmancial (16-26), and 
miscellaneous (27-28). The detailed tables for each farm size and the general group can 
be found in Appendix 1. 
There were three peculiarities in the survey results. Firstly, one farmer reported 
implementing the 'use of rice futures and options markets' when they do not exist in 
Argentina. It might be that this farmer confused futures and options markets with other 
sorts of market transactions that do exist. Secondly, the 'production to full capacity' 
i 
" 
strategy was eliminated from further analysis, since it is not a risk management strategy. 
91 
The correct risk management strategy is 'not producing to full capacity', but this was 
k· .:.,.-', ":,, .. -.. 
translated wrongly into Spanish as 'production to full capacity' . f~:~:~:~:i~.~~~-~~~: 
Thirdly, while rice farmers in the counties of Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia used a wide 
range of risk management strategies, they did not use 'other family members working off 
property'. This response was accordingly also eliminated from further analysis. There are 
two possible reasons for this lack of application. Several farms were company owned 
rather than being family owned. This means that contracted farm managers ran the farms 
and their family does not work for the company. In addition, in the case of a family 
owned fann, it is customary in Argentina that other members of the farmer's family 
either help by working on the farm or do not work at all. 
i -.. 
In the next sections, the most important production, marketing, financial and 
miscellaneous strategies determined by the total rating as defmed above, for each of the 
farm size groups, are presented and discussed. These strategies are then compared 
among groups and the reasons for these differences are discussed. 
5.3.1 Strategies Used by all Fanners 
Table 5.7 shows that the most important production strategy was 'using system of 
incentives and reward structure', which was used by most of the farmers, and was 
considered, on average, 'quite important' for risk management. According to the 
surveyed farmers, this strategy helps to maintain and sometimes to increase crop yields, 
since farm workers who receive incentives or rewards try to produce more. The second 
most important production strategy was 'planting more than one variety of rice with 
-, "" 
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different characteristics', which was also used by most of the fanners. Finally, the third 
production strategy in importance was 'buying machinery to substitute labour' . 
Table 5.7 Strategies used bYall~ann~rs··b.c.d. 
•• •• -0. •• 
Riskl11an~g~rnentstrategy· •. 
Production Strategies 
System of incentives and reward structures for labour 
Plant more than one variety of rice with different charact. 
Buy machinery to substitute labour 
Application of monitoring programmes for pest & diseases 
Use of more than one source of water 
Application of precautionary crop health measures 
Use of more than one irrigation system 
Combination of other enterprises in your operation 
Production of rice in other regions 
Marketing Strategies 
Spreading sales over time by storing harvested product 
Gathering market info. such as price forecasts & trends 
Use of forwardcontracting'(warrants) 
Contracting for purchasing inputs 
Use of futures and options markets 
Selection of varieties with lower price variability 
Financial Strategies 
Match debt repay. structure with income-generat. pattern 
Use of formal insurance 
Managing debt: monitoring debt & working with lenders 
Keeping debt low 
Maintain flexibility in pace of investments & withdrawals 
Hold liquid credit reserves 
Arrangement of overdraft reserves 
Lease assets rather than owing them 
Main farm operator working off property 
Investing off farm 
Hold assets for sale to meet cash demands 
Miscellaneous strategies 
Having long-term flexibility 
Short-term flexibility 
a Number of farmers using each strategy 
10 
10 
8 
6 
7 
6 
5 
7 
2 
10 
10 
6 
8 
1 
1 
10 
9 
9 
10 
10 
8 
7 
6 
7 
5 
3 
9 
7 
Tc)tal(n:::1~). ..••.. ••... . .. 
~"erageTotal.St~n~arci 
rating rating Deviation 
3.70 37 0.78 
3.20 32 0.75 
3.88 31 1.05 
4.17 25 0.37 
3.00 21 1.60 
3.33 20 0.75 
3.40 17 1.36 
2.14 15 0.99 
4.50 9 0.50 
4.70 47 0.64 
3.90 39 0.94 
4.00 24 0.58 
3.00 24 0.87 
5.00 5 0.00 
4.00 4 0.00 
4.10 41 1.14 
4.11 37 0.87 
4.11 37 0.99 
3.70 37 1.00 
3.60 36 1.02 
4.25 34 0.66 
3.29 23 1.03 
3.33 20 1.11 
2.57 18 0.90 
3.00 15 1.41 
1.67 5 0.47 
3.67 33 0.94 
3.86 27 0.83 
b Average rating is the sum of each farmer's rating divided by the number of farmers (n). The strategies 
were rated from 1 to 5, being 1 'not important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'quite important', 4 
'important', and 5 'extremely important'. 
c Total rating results from adding the rating given by each farmer or by multiplying the average rating 
by the number of farmers using each strategy. 
d Standard deviation of the average farmer rating, measures the consistency of the ratings. 
The most important marketing strategy was 'spreading sales over time by storing 
product already harvested'. This strategy was used by most of the fanners who 
considered it 'very important' for managing risk. Spreading sales allows the fanners to 
I. 
I' 
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receive better prices than they would obtain by selling immediately after harvest when 
,.," -. . 
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prices are normally lower. :-;',. '::,. .. ,~.-:,;~ .-'~. I;::~:~:'::z:;;:'::';::':~ 
j--.-•• '--'-- •... 
'Gathering market information such as price forecasts and trends' was the second most 
important marketing strategy, and was considered 'important' by most of the surveyed 
fanners. The third ranking strategy was 'using forward contracting', which was 
considered 'important' for some farmers. 'Using forward contracting' and 'contracting 
for purchasing inputs' could be equally positioned. However, the former had higher 
consistency than the latter, i.e., it had lower standard deviation. As a consequence, 'using 
forward contracting' was positioned in the third place. 
The most significant fmancial strategy was 'matching debt repayment structure with the 
income-generating pattern of rice production'. It was used by most of the farmers and 
considered 'important' for managing risk. This strategy was considered important 
because its implementation enables the fanner to repay debt congruently with the cash 
flow surpluses generated by the farm business. The second place, as determined by the 
total rating, was occupied by three strategies: 'using formal insurance', 'managing debt', 
and 'keeping debt low'. These three strategies, however, can be distinguished according 
to their standard deviations. As a result, 'using formal insurance' can be placed second, 
'managing debt' third, and 'keeping debt low' fourth In the miscellaneous group of risk 
management strategies, 'having long-term flexibility' was ranked more important to 
manage risk than 'having short-term flexibility' 
Overall, the five most important strategies, as determined by comparing the calculated 
total rating for each strategy, were: 1) 'spreading sales over time by storing product 
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already harvested'; 2) 'matching debt repayment structure with the income generating 
pattern of rice production'; 3) 'gathering market information such as price forecasts and 
trends'; 4) 'using system of incentives and reward structure'; and 5) 'using fonnal 
insurance'. The most favoured strategy can be classified as a marketing strategy, the 
second as a financial strategy, the third as a marketing strategy, the fourth as a 
production strategy, and the fifth as a financial strategy. From this categorisation, it can 
be inferred that marketing strategies were considered more important than financial and 
production strategies. The reason for this might be that market risks are more difficult to 
control or avoid in a totally deregulated market such as the rice market in Argentina. 
Despite the responses indicating that the surveyed rice farmers use most of the strategies 
presented to them, there was a large variation in the number of farmers using each of 
them Some of the strategies were used by very few farmers, while others were used by 
most of them For example, two marketing strategies were used only by 8% of the 
farmers (,selecting varieties with low price variability' and using futures and options 
markets'). In contrast, two production strategies (,planting more than one variety' and 
'using system of incentives and reward structure'), two marketing strategies ('spreading 
sales over time' and 'gathering market information'), and three [mancial strategies 
(,maintaining flexibility in the pace of investments', 'matching debt repayment', and 
'keeping debt low') were used by 83% ofthe farmers. 
5.3.2 Strategies Used by Fanners with Large Fanus 
The strategies used by farmers with large farms are exhibited in Table 5.8. The most 
important production risk management strategy for large farms was 'applying 
precautionary crop health measures' with all the farmers applying this strategy, and 
. -. ~ 
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rating it as being 'important'. Similarly, New Zealand producers considered 
;;".-',<-:':«,:':':' -' 
precautionary input use as the most important production strategy (Martin, 1996). The ;.:.:.< .. ~ ... :. ~,.",:, F-~:~~:'~:;~:~~::~~:~, 
reason for this importance might be that managers of large farms prefer to prevent 
greater pest and disease infestations by spraying an already lightly infested crop. 
'Planting more than one variety of rice with different characteristics' was ranked second, 
since it was used by all farmers and was rated 'quite important'. 'Using system of 
incentives and reward structure', the third strategy, was considered 'important', but not 
used by all farmers. 
The most important of all of the surveyed strategies for this group, and specifically of the 
marketing strategies, was 'spreading sales over time'. This strategy was 'extremely 
important' for all farmers with large farms. The reason for this was discussed in the 
previous section. The second and third most important marketing strategies were 
'gathering information on price forecasts and trends', which was 'important' for all 
farmers, and 'using forward contracting', which was 'important' for ahnost all farmers. 
Three of the four large-farm producers used these three strategies in combination in 
order to obtain higher prices than would be obtained by selling as soon as the crop is 
harvested. One of the farmers did not use 'using forward contracting', since this strategy 
is generally implemented when there is a need of liquidity between harvest and sale and 
this fanner might not need it. ~ " -~ - -,' 
r-
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Table 5.8 Strategies used by fanners with large fanns ., h, c, d 
<.'.:.-: ..... "'""":"">, ':-<:<:':.> . ..-:.":: -. ,": ..... . 
..... ... . . .. ............ .... .~argE! .(11=4)·· ··Riskrna~~ge~entstrat~gy ••••...... . •....•.• · .••.• ·.)/·.· •..•....... N()jJJsingAv~l'~g~'Totcli ·§~n~ar~ •. .. ......... .......................... .••.•••.. . ····.~frategy> rafirig·...iatlI'l9devilitioff 
Production Strategies 
Application of precautionary crop health measures 
System of incentives and reward structures for labour 
Plant more than one variety of rice with different charact. 
Application of monitoring programmes for pest & diseases 
Use of more than one irrigation system 
Buy machinery to substitute labour 
Production of rice in other regions 
Use of more than one source of water 
Combination of other enterprises in your operation 
Marketing Strategies 
Spreading sales over time by storing harvested product 
Gathering market info. Such as price forecasts & trends 
Use of forward contracting (warrants) 
Contracting for purchasing inputs 
Selection of varieties with lower price variability 
Use of futures and options markets 
Financial Strategies 
Match debt repayment structwith income-generat. pattern 
Managing debt monitoring debt & working with lenders 
Hold liquid credit reserves 
Maintain flexibility in pace of investments & withdrawals 
Keeping debt low 
Use of formal insurance 
Lease assets rather than owing them 
Investing off farm 
Main farm operator working off property 
Arrangement of overdraft reserves 
Hold assets for sale to meet cash demands 
Miscellaneous strategies 
Short-term flexibility 
Having long-term flexibility 
a Number of farmers using each strategy 
4 
3 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
4 
1 
0 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
4 
4 
3.50 14 0.50 
4.33 13 0.47 
3.25 13 0.83 
4.00 12 0.00 
4.00 12 1.41 
5.00 10 0.00 
4.50 9 0.50 
3.00 9 1.63 
2.00 6 1.4 
4.75 19 0.43 
4.25 17 0.83 
4.33 13 0.47 
3.00 12 1.00 
4.00 4 0.00 
0.00 0 0.00 
4.50 18 0.50 
4.50 18 0.50 
4.25 17 0.43 
3.50 14 1.12 
3.25 13 0.43 
3.67 11 0.47 
3.00 9 1.41 
2.67 8 1.25 
3.50 7 0.50 
2.50 5 1.50 
1.00 1 0.00 
4.00 16 0.00 
4.00 16 0.71 
b Average rating is the sum of each farmer's rating divided by the number of farmers (n). The strategies 
were rated from 1 to 5, being 1 'not important' , 2 'somewhat important', 3 'quite important' , 4 
'important', and 5 'extremely important'. 
c Total rating results from adding the rating given by each farmer or by multiplying the average rating 
by the number of farmers using each strategy. 
d Standard deviation of the average farmer rating, measures the consistency of the ratings. 
The most significant [mancial strategies were 'matching debt repayment with the income-
generating pattern of rice enterprise' and 'managing debt'. Both of these were 
'important' for all large farms, and farmers were equally consistent in ranking them The 
second ranked financial strategy was 'holding liquid credit reserves'. This strategy was 
'important' for all producers with large farms, The third ranked strategy was 
,", :',,;',-; :-: 
..... "_._._ .... '_.-
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'maintaining flexibility in the pace of investments and withdrawals', which was 
considered 'quite important' by all producers with large fanns. 
5.3.3 Strategies Used by Farmers with Medium-sized Fanns 
The results for fanners with medium-sized fanns are exhibited in Table 5.9. 'Buying 
machinery to substitute labour' was found to be the most important production risk 
management strategy; this response was used by all the fanners with medium-sized fanns 
and was considered 'quite important'. Implementing this strategy allows medium-fann 
producers to reduce risks related to labour, or the lack of it, during the peak season. The 
second place was occupied by 'applying monitoring programmes for pests and diseases', 
which was used by two of the three medium-sized fanns only, but was considered 
'extremely important'. Monitoring the levels of pests and diseases allows these fanners 
to reduce the risks of greater pest and disease attacks, which can cause large decreases in 
yields. However, it has to be followed by a treatment when the infestation reaches the 
level at which it can affect the yields. 'Using system of incentives and reward structures' 
was the third ranked production risk management strategy. All medium size fann 
producers used it, but they considered it less important than the second ranked strategy. 
'Spreading sales over time' was ranked as the most important marketing strategy, while 
'gathering market information such as price forecasts and trends' was ranked second. 
Both of these strategies were used on all medium-sized fanns, but while the former was ~ .' - . ---
considered 'important', the latter was considered as being only 'quite important'. The 
third most important marketing strategy was 'using forward contracting'. As mentioned 
in the previous section, the use of these three strategies allows the fanner to increase the 
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average price received for the crop without decreasing the fann solvency and to decrease 
the rice price variability. 
Table 5.9 Strategies used by fanners with medium-sized fanns ., b, c, d 
Ri~k~~~agW~(!~tstrat~gyt~~.~::J~~ ro1~~st~ndard· 
Production Strategies 
Buy machinery to substitute labour 
Application of monitoring programmes for pest & diseases 
System of incentives and reward structures for labour 
Use of more than one source of water 
Application of precautionary crop health measures 
Plant more than one variety of rice with different charact. 
Use of more than one irrigation system 
Combination of other enterprises in your operation 
Production of rice in other regions 
Marketing Strategies 
Spreading sales over time by storing product already 
Gathering market info. such as price forecasts & trends 
Use of forward contracting (warrants) 
Contracting for purchasing inputs 
Selection of varieties with lower price variability 
Use of futures and options markets 
Financial Strategies 
Keeping debt low 
Arrangement of overdraft reserves 
Maintain flexibility in pace of investments & withdrawals 
Managing debt: monitoring debt & working with lenders 
Match debt repayment struct.with income-generat. pattern 
Lease assets rather than owing them 
Use of formal insurance 
Hold liquid credit reserves 
Hold assets for sale to meet cash demands 
Main farm operator working off property 
Investing off farm 
Miscellaneous strategies 
Having long-term flexibility 
Short-term flexibility 
a Number of farmers using each strategy 
~$i"~I.ralillg<r~lj~gdeViation 
·.stl'at~gy····· 
3 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
3 
3 
1 
1 
0 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3 
2 
3.33 
4.50 
3.00 
3.00 
4.00 
3.00 
3.00 
2.00 
0.00 
4.33 
3.00 
·3.00 
2.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.33 
3.67 
3.33 
3.33 
3.00 
4.00 
4.00 
3.50 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
3.67 
4.50 
10 
9 
9 
6 
4 
3 
3 
2 
o 
13 
9 
3 
2 
o 
o 
13 
11 
10 
10 
9 
8 
8 
7 
4 
4 
2 
11 
9 
0.94 
0.50 
0.82 
2.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.94 
0.82 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.94 
0.47 
0.94 
1.25 
1.41 
0.00 
1.00 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.94 
0.50 
b Average rating is the sum of each farmer's rating divided by the number of farmers (n). The strategies 
were rated from 1 to 5, being 1 'not important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'quite important', 4 
'important', and 5 'extremely important' . 
c Total rating results from adding the rating given by each farmer or by multiplying the average rating 
by the number of farmers using each strategy. 
d Standard deviation of the average farmer rating, measures the consistency of the ratings. 
The highest ranked fmancial strategy was found to be 'keeping debt low'. This coincides 
with Martin's (1996) fmdings for New Zealand producers, who ranked keeping debt low 
i·.· 
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as the most highly ranked financial strategy. This indicates that medium-farm producers 
avoid incurring debt as a way of decreasing financial risks. 'Arrangement of overdraft 
reserves' and 'maintaining flexibility in the pace of investments and withdrawals' were 
ranked second and third respectively. All farmers used these three strategies, but they 
rated the strategies differently. Finally, within the miscellaneous strategies 'having long-
term flexibility' was rated as more important than 'having short-term flexibility'. 
5.3.4 Strategies Used by Fanners with Small Fanns 
The results for the strategies used by farmers with small farms are exhibited in Table 
5.10. The most important production strategy was 'planting more than one variety of rice 
with different characteristics'. All of the small farm managers used this strategy, and they 
rated it as 'quite important'. The second ranked production strategy was 'system of 
incentives and reward structure'. While this response was considered to be more 
important than the first strategy, not all farmers used it. The third ranked strategy was 
'buying machinery to substitute labour', which was used by fewer farmers and 
considered less important than the second. 
The highest ranked marketing strategy was 'spreading sales over time', while 'gathering 
market information' was second. The former was rated 'extremely important', while the 
latter was considered 'important'; three small-farm producers used both of them These 
strategies were used to obtain higher prices by selling the product later in the year when 
the prices are higher. The third ranked strategy was 'contracting for purchasing inputs'. 
This response was used to obtain lower input prices than would otherwise have been the 
case. Application of these strategies allows the farmers to reduce the variabilities of 
output and input prices, thereby increasing the stability of profits. 
Kfg:;Pi;~ 
I 
i .. ' .. ' 
I····· 
I 
1 
I 
I 
.. '(.", 
100 
Table 5.10 Strategies used by farmers with small farms •. b. c. d 
. ... ..•. . ....... " .. '. ........•.. ..••. . ..... . .... '. .... '. .••.. . ...... ·$ all( r1:;fiJ 
RiSl<m~llag~~~ijr~trat~gyy ·No.uS!rlgA\t~rag~Totcll. .>Stclnd~rd 
·stralegy.ralingrating<de"iation 
Production Strategies 
Plant more than one variety of rice with different charact. 
System of incentives and reward structures for labour 
Buy machinery to substitute labour 
Combination of other enterprises in your operation 
Use of more than one source of water 
Application of monitoring programmes for pest & 
diseases 
Application of precautionary crop health measures 
Use of more than one irrigation system 
Production of rice in other regions 
Marketing Strategies 
Spreading sales over time by storing product already 
Gathering market info. such as price forecasts & trends 
Contracting for purchasing inputs 
Use of forward contracting (warrants) 
Use of futures and options markets 
Selection of varieties with lower price variability 
Financial Strategies 
Use of formal insurance 
Match debt repayment with income-generat. pattern 
Maintain flexibility in pace of investments & withdrawals 
Keeping debt low 
Hold liquid credit reserves 
Managing debt: monitoring debt & working with lenders 
Arrangement of overdraft reserves 
Main farm operator working off property 
Investing off farm 
Lease assets rather than owing them 
Hold assets for sale to meet cash demands 
Miscellaneous strategies 
Having long-term flexibility 
Short-term flexibility 
a Number of farmers using each strategy 
5 
4 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
0 
4 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
0 
2 
1 
3.20 
3.75 
3.67 
2.33 
3.00 
4.00 
2.00 
2.00 
0.00 
5.00 
4.33 
3.33 
4.00 
5.00 
0.00 
'4.50 
4.67 
4.00 
3.67 
5.00 
4.50 
3.50 
2.33 
5.00 
3.00 
0.00 
3.00 
2.00 
16 
15 
11 
7 
6 
4 
2 
2 
0 
15 
13 
10 
8 
5 
0 
18 
14 
12 
11 
10 
9 
7 
7 
5 
3 
0 
6 
2 
0.75 
0.43 
0.94 
0.47 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.47 
0.47 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.87 
0.47 
0.82 
1.25 
0.00 
0.50 
0.50 
0.94 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
b Average rating is the sum of each farmer's rating divided by the number of farmers (n). The strategies 
were rated from 1 to 5, being 1 'not important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'quite important' , 4 
'important', and 5 'extremely important'. 
c Total rating results from adding the rate given by each farmer or by mUltiplying the average rating by 
the number of farmers using each strategy. 
d Standard deviation of the average farmer rating, measures the consistency of the ratings. 
'U se of formal insurance' was the most used and highest ranked [mandaI strategy 
(,important'). This indicates that, for small fanners, insuring assets is an important way 
of reducing risk. 'Matching debt repayment structure with the income generating pattern' 
was used less than 'using formal insurance', but was 'extremely important'. 'Maintaining 
~-'-:~ :~~. <.' :~ .• -;~. ',,-' 
f ~:~~~~~~~:~:~ ~ ~ ~~~: 
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flexibility in the pace of investments and withdrawals' was ranked lower than 'matching 
debt repayment' (,important'), but used by the same number of farmers. 
5.3.5 Comparison among Rankings of Strategies 
In this subsection, the rankings of each class of strategies will be compared among 
groups of farmers. The three most important strategies for each category of strategy and 
for each farm-size group are presented in Table 5.11. The three most important 
production strategies were similar but not identical across farm size groups. All of the 
producers used 'system of incentives and reward structure'. Large and small farms used 
'planting more than one variety', while 'buy machinery to substitute labour' was used by 
medium and small farms .. These similarities indicate that, regardless of the size of the 
fann, farmers commonly use production practices. 
Farmers with large farms did use one strategy that was not used by any of the other 
groups: the 'application of precautionary crop health measures'. This indicates that 
producers with large farms are more likely to prevent pest and disease infestations by 
using precautionary measures than by fighting infestations already settled on the crop. In 
contrast, medium farm producers were more concerned with monitoring the level of 
infestations of pest and diseases as opposed to preventing their attack. 
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Table 5.11 Most important strategies for the three fann-size groups 
Production Applying precautionary Buying machinery to Planting more than 
Marketing 
Financial 
Miscellaneous 
crop-health measures substitute labour one variety 
Using system of Applying monitoring Using system of 
incentives & reward programmes incentives & reward 
structure 
Planting more than one 
variety 
Spreading sales over 
time 
Gathering market info 
Using of forward 
contracting_ 
Matching debt 
repayment structure 
with income generating 
pattern 
Managing debt 
Holding liquid reserves 
Having short-term 
flexibility 
Having long-term 
flexibility 
Using system of 
incentives & reward 
structure 
Spreading sales over 
time 
Gathering market info 
Using of forward 
contracting. 
Keeping debt low 
Arranging overdraft 
_ reserves 
Maintaining flexibility in 
pace of investments & 
withdrawals 
Having long-term 
flexibility 
Having short-term 
flexibility 
structure 
Buying machinery to 
substitute labour 
Spreading sales over 
time 
Gathering market info 
Contracting for 
J~urchasin~ inputs 
Using formal insurance 
Matching debt 
repayment structure 
with income generating 
pattern 
Maintaining flexibility 
in pace of investments 
& withdrawals 
Having long-term 
flexibility 
Having short-term 
flexibility 
'Spreading sales over time by storing product already harvested' and 'gathering market 
infonnation on price forecasts and trends' were rated as the two most important 
marketing strategies across size groups. In addition, considering all of the strategy 
classes, these marketing strategies were highly rated for all of the size-related groups. 
These two strategies were also the most important marketing responses for producers in 
North Florida and South Alabama (Boggess et ai., 1985). This demonstrates the 
importance for all types of farmers, of reducing the variability of the output price, thus 
ensuring lower variability of profits. 
New Zealand producers did not use the same marketing strategies across groups as the 
surveyed rice farmers (Martin, 1996). The reason for these differences might be that 
:. '- '.'. .:.'~ . '-' 
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many NZ producers market their product through their respective marketing boards 
(Martin, 1996); consequently, they do not need to implement marketing strategies to 
avoid and control risk to the same extent as rice farmers in Argentina, since their 
marketing boards confront market risks on their behalf. 
'Using forward contracting' was ranked as the third most important strategy only for 
large and medium-sized farms. The farmers use this strategy to ensure their solvency 
while waiting to sell their product. This strategy was not important for small farms, 
possibly because these farms have lower output and the farmer would therefore have 
' .. ~ - . - .".-
little power in negotiating contracts with financial intermediaries. In addition, this type of 
farmer may have more resource limitations than larger farmers. For example, they could 
have restricted access to fmancial assistance and commodity markets. Instead of 'using 
forward contracting', small farms used 'contracting for purchasing inputs' as a way of 
reducing the variability of input prices. Such producers contract the purchase of inputs 
with the rice mills, to which they sell their output, and pay for associated costs with a 
percentage of their output sales. Barry and Fraser (1976) observed a similar situation for 
cropping and livestock farmers in the United States, where forward contracting appeared 
to be more suitable for larger farms since these farmers experience more frequent market 
contact, handle larger volumes of production, and have greater capacity to collect and 
process market information. 
The three most important fmancial strategies were dissimilar among groups. The three 
most important financial strategies used by large and medium-sized farms were 
completely different. 'Maintaining flexibility in the pace of investments' was ranked the 
third most important financial strategy for medium and small farms; and 'matching debt 
104 
repayment' were the first ranked and second ranked strategies for large and small fanns, 
, ,<. - .- .. 
r •• :-, .•.• ,,', •. , 
respectively. These differences might reflect the dissimilar financial situations of rice ~~f~W::(y::.' 
producers across groups which result in their implementation of different strategies. 
Finally, within the miscellaneous strategies, medium and small farms considered most 
important 'having long tenn flexibility'. In comparison, 'having short-tenn flexibility' 
was ranked more important than 'having long-tenn flexibility' for large farms. However, 
this only was due to the lower consistency in the rating of 'having long-tenn flexibility'. 
5.3.6 Relationships between Fann-Size and Use of Risk Management Strategies 
Farmers with large fanns used more risk management strategies than farmers with 
medium-sized farms did, while small farm producers used even fewer strategies (Table 
5.12). It may be concluded from this that the number of strategies used by the rice 
farmers in this region is associated with farm size. The explanation for this finding might 
be the same as that relating to farm size and farmers' ratings of sources of risk; i.e., that 
larger farms have more resources, such as management skills, access to key infonnation 
and expert advice, which allow them to recognise sources of risk and implement 
strategies to ameliorate them This association might be also explained by the [mdings of 
Barry and Fraser (1976), who found that the feasibility of risk strategies appeared to vary 
greatly according to the firm's size, its major enterprises, and its quality management. 
Thus, they concluded that large farm producers tended to have greater managerial 
capacity and easier access to commodity and [mancial markets that allow them to easily 
transfer risks by implementing more risk responses (Barry and Fraser, 1976). 
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Production (9 strat.) 7 78% 5 56% 4 
Marketing (6 strat.) 4 67% 3 50% 2 
Financial (11 strat.) 9 82% 9 82% 5 
Miscellaneous (2 st.) 2 100% 2 100% 2 
Total 28 strat. 22 79% 19 68% 13 
a The percentages were calculated using the total number for each class 
From the analysis of the percentages of marketing and production strategies used, it can 
be inferred that the smaller the farm size, the lower the number of strategies 
implemented. The percentages shown in Table 5.12 demonstrate that producers used a 
higher proportion of available fmancial strategies than is the case with other strategies. 
This contrasts with the fmding that farmers perceived risk regarding the variability of 
yields and prices as being more important than the risk associated with the farm's level of 
debt. This difference may be reconciled by the possibility that the farmers regarded the 
risk related to their level of debt as less important than other sources simply because they 
perceived that this type of risk was already under control due to their use of the 
,.:'-
strategies. This notion is supported by the perceptions of New Zealand producers who 
rated financial risks as moderately important, since they believed that they had already 
made the necessary adjustments to control them (Martin, 1996). 
With respect to the particular fmancial strategies available, it was noteworthy that 
producers with large farms implemented 'managing debt', instead of 'keeping debt low' 
as did farmers with medium-sized farms and two of the small farms. This might indicate 
that large farms try to expand their businesses by borrowing money, while medium and 
small farms try to decrease fmancial risks by not borrowing money. These behaviours are 
supported by the fmdings of Boggess et ai., (1985), for farmers in the United States, and . 
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Martin (1996), for New Zealand producers. In the US, Boggess et ai., (1985) found that 
larger producers tended to be more highly leveraged and held more financial reserves 
than smaller ones. This might be explained by the fact that they could spread risks over a 
larger number of stockholders; smaller farms, however, had little capacity for this kind of 
risk reduction (Barry and Fraser, 1976). For New Zealand producers 'keeping debt low' 
was the most important fmancial strategy, probably because New Zealand producers 
might have similar characteristics to farmers with small farms in Argent~a. 
5.3.7 Summary of Risk Management Strategies Results 
The importance of the risk management strategies was determined by considering the 
ratings of all the farmeJ:s together and multiplying the average importance of each 
strategy by the number of farmers who used it. Then, the five most important were 
identified for the general group: 1) 'spreading sales over time by storing product already 
harvested'; 2) 'matching debt repayment structure with the income generating pattern of 
rice production'; 3) 'gathering market information such as price forecasts and trends'; 4) 
'system of incentives and reward structure'; and 5) 'use of formal insurance'. 
5.4 Results of the Simulations of Gross Margin Models 
The gross margin models, as explained in Chapter 4, are stochastic models of the rice 
enterprise in which the deterministic values of the rice price and yield are replaced by 
subjective probability distribution functions. The parameters of these distribution 
functions are the minimum, most likely, and maximum values that the price and yield can 
take on, according to the farmers' opinions, when each strategy is used or not used. 
These stochastic models were simulated using @Risk software package. During each 
simulation, the software programme samples the price and yield distributions (input 
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distributions), according to the number of iterations selected for the simulation, and 
calculates a gross margin. The result of the sampling is a probability distribution function 
of the gross margin (outcome distribution) for the simulated model. Finally, the 
distributions were converted into cumulative distribution functions (CDFs), in order to 
carry out the efficiency analysis. 
Not all of the strategies listed in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 were considered for use in the 
simulation analysis that followed the initial comparisons reported above. The five 
selected were 1) 'spreading sales over time by storing product already harvested'; 2) :. '-'. -,',,' 
. .. - ~ .. ~-- -.".--
'gathering market information such as price forecasts and trends'; 3) 'system of 
incentives and reward structure'; 4) 'planting more than one variety with different 
characteristics'; and 5) 'use of forward contracting'. Financial strategies were not 
considered for two reasons. Firstly, farmers considered risks associated with the 
variability of rice yields and prices to be more important than risks associated with the 
level of debt. Secondly, including fmancial strategies and comparing five strategies and 
twelve cases in the analysis would have been too complex and time-consuming given the 
time and resources 'available for this research As a consequence, the four most important 
marketing and production strategies were considered for the analysis. Although 'use of 
forward contracting' was not within the five most important strategies, it was included as 
the fifth strategy because several farmers used it together with 'spreading sales over 
time' and 'gathering market information' as a risk management package. 
The analysis of the results of the simulation was carried out in two stages by applying 
visual first-degree and second-degree stochastic dominance efficiency analysis. In the 
first stage, the gross margin cumulative distribution when a selected strategy was used 
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was compared to the gross margin cumulative distribution when that strategy was not 
used. This pairwise comparison, which was undertaken for each strategy and each 
fanner, detennined the stochastically dominated CDF. However, there were some pairs 
of strategies between which no first or second-degree stochastic dominance could be 
established because the curves were intertwined, the area above the crossing point was 
larger than the lower one, or the size of the area above and below the crossing point 
could not be differentiated. Consequently, these pairs were dismissed a posteriori. The 
dominant CDFs for each fanner represented the efficient set for that particular fanner 
and were compared with each other in the second stage by using visual stochastic 
dominance analysis. 
To effectively facilitate this analysis, the farms and the risk management strategies i 
I 
analysed were coded using the letter F and a number from 1 to 11 to represent each of 
the farms for which the use of strategies was simulated, and using the letters P or M to 
represent production or marketing strategies. The letter P was sub-coded with the 
numbers 1 or 2, representing the two production strategies (,planting more than one 
variety with different characteristics' (1) and 'system of incentives and reward structure' 
(2». The letter M was sub-coded with the numbers 1, 2, or 3, representing the three 
marketing strategies ('spreading sales over time by storing product already 
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harvested' (1), 'gathering market infonnation such as price forecasts and trends' (2) and 
'use of forward contracting' (3)). The CDFs obtained by simulating the non-use of each 
strategy were coded by prefixing the letters P or M with the letter N and by following the 
code with a nwnber, as above, representing the particular strategy not used. 
5.4.1 Comparison of each CDF Obtained by Simulating the Use and Non-use of 
each Risk Management Strategy 
Visual stochastic dominance analysis was used to compare cwnulative distributions 
obtained by simulating the use and non-use of each strategy. As described in Chapter 3, 
first-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) can be graphically established when 
comparisons of cwnulative distribution functions do not cross each other, in which case, 
one distribution dominates the other' when it lies completely to the right of the dominated 
distribution. If the distributions cross each other, second-degree stochastic dominance 
(SSD) can be used to detennine the dominance. A cwnulative distribution function 
dominates another in a second-degree sense when the accwnulated area under its CDF is 
less than or equal to the area under the dominated CDF. This dominance is visually 
established when the area below the crossing point is larger than the area above it. If the 
area above the crossing point exceeds the area below, SSD can not be established, and if 
the CDFs are intertwined, or the areas above and below are very similar, SSD can not be 
visually established either. 
Each pairwise comparison is presented in a figure where both CDFs were plotted to 
visually detennine the relationship between them For farm Fl, the largest rice fann, 
while NP1 was dominated (second-degree) by PI, the only production strategy used by 
this farmer (Figure 5.1a), NM1, NM2 and NM3 were dominated (first-degree) by their 
respective counterparts M 1, M2 and M3 (Figures 5. 1 b, 5.1 c, 5. 1 d). 
: •••. _.-:_ •.• - ... c. <_',-, 
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Figure 5.1 Pairwise comparisons between the CDFs representing the use and non-
use of each of the strategies implemented by farm F1 B,b. 
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a PI : COP representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting more than one variety'; NFl: CDF 
representing the non-use of production strategy 1; Ml: COF representing the use of marketing strategy 
1, 'spreading sales over time'; NMl: COF representing the non-use of marketing strategy 1; M2: COF 
representing the use of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; NM2: COF representing 
the non-use of marketing strategy 2; M3: CDF representing the use of marketing strategy 3, 'forward 
contracting'; NM3: CDFrepresenting the non-use of marketing strategy 3. 
b Cum Prob (%): cumulative probability expressed in percentage; GM ($!ha): gross margin expressed in 
US dollars per hectare. 
For fann F2, while PI dominated NPI in a second-degree sense (Figure 5.2a), P2, Ml 
and M2 dominated (fIrst-degree) their counterparts NP2, NMI and NM2 (Figures 5.2b, 
5.2c and 5.2d). There was no second-degree stochastic dominance between M3 and 
NM3, since they crossed in one point and the area above the crossing point was larger 
than the area below (Figure 5.2e). 
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Figure 5.2 Pairwise comparisons between the CDFs representing the use and non-
use of each of the strategies implemented by farm F2 8. 
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a PI: COP representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting more than one variety'; NPl: COP 
representing the non-use of production strategy 1; P2: COP representing the use of production strategy 
2, 'system of incentives and reward structure'; NP2: COP representing the non-use of production 
strategy 2; Ml: COP representing the use of marketing strategy 1, 'spreading sales over time'; NMl: 
COP representing the non-use of marketing strategy 1; M2: COP representing the use of marketing 
strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; NM2: COP representing the non-use of marketing strategy 
2; M3: COP representing the use of marketing strategy 3, 'forward contracting'; NM3: COP 
representing the non-use of marketing strategy 3. 
b Cum Prob (%): cumulative probability expressed in percentage; GM ($/ha): gross margin expressed in 
US dollars per hectare. 
~"'--~-~~.-.;~-" ;.~- ,". ~. 
~.~ -->"r";",' .,';-'~-,".' 
r':i:~;'~?:~~\:~~~:~~: 
, .. :,. 
, , . - - ~ - .. - ~ ~ ... - ~ , 
r-, , 
112 
In the case of farm F3, PI, MI and M2 dominated (first-degree) NPI, NMI and NM2 
(Figures 5.3a, 5.3b and 5.3c). 
Figure 5.3 Pairwise comparisons between the CDFs representing the use and non-
use of each of the strategies implemented by farm F3 a, b 
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a PI: CDF representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting several varieties'; NPl: CDF 
representing the non-use of production strategy 1; Ml: CDF representing the use of marketing strategy 
1, 'spreading sales over time'; NMl: CDF representing the non-use of marketing strategy 1; M2: CDF 
representing the use of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; NM2: CDF representing 
the non-use of marketing strategy 2. 
b Cum Prob (%): cumulative probability expressed in percentage; 
GM ($/ha): gross margin expressed in US dollars per hectare. 
For farm F4, PI, P2, MI, M2 and M3 dominated (fIrst-degree) their counterparts not 
using the strategies NPI, NP2, NMI, NM2 and NM3 (Figures 5.4a, 5.4b, 5.4c, 5.4d and 
5.4e). 
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Figure 5.4 Pairwise comparisons between the CDFs representing the use and non-
use of each of the strategies implemented by farm F4 B,b. 
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a PI: CDF representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting more than one variety'; NP1: CDF 
representing the non-use of production strategy 1; P2: CDF representing the use of production strategy 
2, 'system of incentives and reward structure'; NP2: CDF representing the non-use of production 
strategy 2; M1: CDF representing the use of marketing strategy 1, 'spreading sales over time'; NM1: 
CDF representing the non-use of marketing strategy 1; M2: CDF representing the use of marketing 
strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; NM2: CDF representing the non-use of marketing strategy 
2; M3: CDF representing the use of marketing strategy 3, 'forward contracting'; NM3: CDF 
representing the non -use of marketing strategy 3. 
b Cum Prob (%): cumulative probability expressed in percentage; GM ($/ha): gross margin expressed in 
US dollars per hectare. 
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Fann F5 used only two strategies, and in both cases M2 and M3 dominated (frrst-degree) 
NM2 and NM3 (Figures 5.5a and 5.5b). 
Figure 5.5 Pairwise comparisons between the CDFs representing the use and non-
use of each of the strategies implemented by farm F5 B,b. 
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a M2: CDF representing the use of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; NM2: CDF 
representing the non-use of marketing strategy 2; M3: CDFrepresenting the use of marketing strategy 3, 
'forward contracting'; NM3: CDFrepresenting the non-use of marketing strategy 3. 
b Cum Frob (%): cumulative probability expressed in percentage; GM ($/ha): gross margin expressed in 
US dollars per hectare. 
For fann F6, which used four strategies, P2, MI, M2 and M3 dominated (first-degree) 
NP2, NMI, NM2 and NM3 (Figures 5.6a, 5.6b, 5.6c and 5.6d). 
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Figure 5.6 Pairwise comparisons between the CDFs representing the use and non-
use of each of the strategies implemented by farm F6 a,b. 
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a P2: CDP representing the use of production strategy 2, 'system of incentives and reward structure'; 
NP2: CDP representing the non-use of production strategy 2; Ml: CDP representing the use of 
marketing strategy 1, 'spreading sales over time'; NMl: CDP representing the non-use of marketing 
strategy 1; M2: CDP representing the use of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; 
NM2: CDP representing the non-use of marketing strategy 2; M3: CDP representing the use of 
marketing strategy 3, 'forward contracting'; NM3: CDP representing the non-use of marketing strategy 
3. 
b Cum Prob (%): cumulative probability expressed in percentage; GM ($lha): gross margin expressed in 
US dollars per hectare. 
Fann F7 used three strategies; PI dominated (second-degree) its counterpart NPI 
(Figure 5.7a). MI and M2 dominated (first-degree) NMI and NM2 (Figures 5.7b and 
5.7c). 
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Figure 5.7 Pairwise comparisons between the CDFs representing the use and non-
use of each of the strategies implemented by fann F7 B,b. 
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a PI: COF representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting several varieties'; NP1: COF 
representing the non-use of production strategy 1; M1: CDF representing the use of marketing strategy 
1, 'spreading sales over time'; NM1: COF representing the non-use of marketing strategy 1; M2: COF 
representing the use of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; NM2: CDF representing 
the non-use of marketing strategy 2. 
b Cum Prob (%): cumulative probability expressed in percentage; GM ($lha): gross margin expressed in 
US dollars per hectare. 
Fann FS also used three strategies. PI dominated (second-degree) NPI (Figure 5.Sa). 
MI and M2 dominated (fIrst-degree) NMI and NM2 (Figures 5.Sb and 5.Sc). 
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Figure 5.S Pairwise comparisons between the CDFs representing the use and non-
use of each of the strategies implemented by fann FS a,b. 
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a PI: CDF representing the use of production strategy I, 'planting several varieties'; NPI: CDF 
representing the non-use of production strategy I; MI: CDF representing the use of marketing strategy 
I, "spreading sales over time'; NMI: CDF representing the non-use of marketing strategy I; M2: CDF 
representing the use of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; NM2: CDF representing 
the non-use of marketing strategy 2. 
b Cum Prob (%): cumulative probability expressed in percentage; GM ($/ha): gross margin expressed in 
US dollars per hectare. 
The case of fann F9 was identical to fann F2, since both farms have the same manager, 
but different owners. While Pl dominated (second-degree) NPl (Figure 5.9a), P2, Ml 
and M2 fIrst-degree dominated NP2, NMl and NM2 (Figures 5.9b, 5.9c and 5.9d), As 
for fann F2, there was no dominance between M3 and NM3 (Figure 5.ge). 
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Figure 5.9 Pairwise comparisons between the CDFs representing the use and non-
use of each of the strategies implemented by fann F9 a,b. 
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a PI: CDP representing the use of production strategy 1 'planting several varieties'; NPI: CDP 
representing the non-use of production strategy 1; P2: CDP representing the use of production strategy 
2, 'system of incentives and reward structure'; NP2: CDP representing the non-use of production 
strategy 2; M1: CDP representing the use of marketing strategy 1, 'spreading sales over time'; NMl: 
CDP representing the non-use of marketing strategy 1; M2: CDP representing the use of marketing 
strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; NM2: CDP representing the non-use of marketing strategy 
2; M3: CDP representing the use of marketing strategy 3, 'forward contracting'; NM3: CDP 
representing the non-use of marketing strategy 3. 
b Cum Prob (%): cumulative probability expressed in percentage; GM ($/ha): gross margin expressed in 
US dollars per hectare 
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Fann FlO used only strategy PI. Between PI and NPI there was no second-degree 
stochastic dominance (Figure S.lOa). 
Figures 5.10 Pairwise comparisons between the CDFs representing the use and 
non-use of each of the strategies implemented by farm FlO a,b. 
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a PI: COP representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting several varieties'; NPl: COP 
representing the non-use of production strategy 1. 
b Cum Prob (%): cummulative probability expressed in percentage; 
OM ($lha): gross margin expressed in US dollars per hectare. 
Finally, fannF11 used three strategies. PI, P2 and M3 dominated in a frrst-degree sense 
NPI, NP2 and NM3 (Figure 5.lla, S.llb and S.llc). 
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Figure 5.11 Pairwise comparisons between the CDFs representing the use and non-
use of each of the strategies implemented by farm F11 a,b. 
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a PI: CDP representing the use of production strategy 1, planting several varieties'; NPI: CDF 
representing the non-use of production strategy 1; P2: CDF representing the use of production strategy 
2, 'system of incentives and reward structure'; NP2: CDP representing the non-use of production 
strategy 2; M3: CDP representing the use of marketing strategy 3, 'forward contracting'; NM3: CDP 
representing the non -use of marketing strategy 3. 
b Cum Frob (%): cumulative probability expressed in percentage; OM ($/ha): gross margin expressed in 
US dollars per hectare. 
The dominance of one CDF over another CDF implies that the dominant CDF is 
superior. For example, Figure 5.12 is derived from Figure S.llc and demonstrates that 
F11M3 is superior to F11NM3. The actual observations used in the construction of the 
CDFs exhibited in Figure S.llc and 5.12 are contained in Table 5.13. It can be seen that 
for FllM3 there is a 50% probability that the expected gross margin from using this 
strategy will be less than or equal to $489.73, while for FllNM3 there is a 50% 
: .'.-
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probability that the gross margin will be less than or equal to $363.69. That is, when 
fanner 11 uses marketing strategy 3 ('using forward contracting'), there is a 50% 
probability he will increase his gross margin by up to 34.7% ([FllM3 gross margin -
F11NM3 gross margin]IFIINM3 gross margin). The same analysis can be completed for 
any other pair of CDFs. 
Figure 5.12 Comparison between CDFs obtained using and not using a risk 
management strategy 
Cu Frob (%) NM3 
363.69 489.73 GM$/ha 
i 
I 
i 
Table 5.13 Comparison between FllNM3 and FllM3 c 
.. · •••petc~ntil·~ .• •••••••••• ••• ·~~.~~rIJ·.·~i~~i~~y·· •••••• ;~,,~/~~~ie~·~ ....... ·· ..... · .. 
0% 145.01 230.89 
5% 233.94 330.26 
10% 260.07 
15% 277.31 
20% 292.46 
25% 306.40 
30% 
35% 
40% 
45% 
50% 
55% 
60% 
65% 
70% 
75% 
80% 
85% 
90% 
95% 
100% 
317.37 
330.80 
342.83 
353.59 
363.69 
374.65 
387.14 
399.41 
412.16 
425.82 
440.98 
457.24 
477.10 
509.15 
. 601.97 
c M3 is 'using forward contracting' 
361.34 
384.32 
403.49 
421.34 
436.73 
449.89 
464.21 
477.24 
489.73 
501.86 
513.95 
527.80 
543.52 
556.69 
576.86 
596.39 
625.23 
665.57 
828.13 
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The following five tables summarise the results of the comparisons between each pair of 
cumulative distribution functions for each strategy. The results for these comparisons are 
located in the diagonal of each table. The table is read horizontally; for example, in Table 
5.14, NPI (i.e., production strategy 1 not used) of fann Fl was dominated by PI (i.e., 
production strategy used, offann Fl). 
Table 5.14 Pairwise comparison for production strategy PI 'planting several 
varieties of rice' ob 
F1 P1 F2P1F3Pl F4PtF7P1F8Pt.F9Pt<F10PtFl1P1 
F1NP1 
F2NP1 u 
F3NP1 u 
F4NPl u 
F7NP1 
F8NP1 
·F9NPf.u 
F10NP1.. ? 
Ft1NP1 . 
an = dominant, u = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
b FxPy: CDFs representing the use of production strategy y by farm Fx; FxNPy: CDFs representing the 
non use of production strategy y by farm Fx. 
--!:;-:'-: 
~-"~-'.'.' ... ' 
~ .' ... ,'. ' 
I::;:~:~ 
~ .-.-'. . 
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Table 5.15 Pairwise comparison for production strategy P2 'using system of 
incentives and reward structure' 8 b 
····F2P2 i ···F4P2· ··.····F6P2»f.9P2F11P2. 
ilf~~P~\ .•. } 
·F4NP2·········· 
•• ·~6NP2 ••••• >··. 
F9NP2.······ .. 
FfiNP2 
an = dominant, u = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
b FxPy: CDFs representing the use of production strategy y by farm Fx; FxNPy: CDFs representing the 
non use of production strategy y by farm Fx. 
Table 5.16 Pairwise comparison for marketing strategy M1 'gathering market 
<F1NM1 
F2NM2 
F3 NI\II 1 
F4NM1· 
F6NM1 
>F7NMt.· ••• ···· 
••.•• ~.~.~~~ •••••.•••.•••.••• 
information on rice forecasts' 8 b 
FIM1·F2MiY· .··.·F$MI.P4MfF6Pt F71V11F8Mt •• ···• •.• F9M1· 
an = dominant, u = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
b FxMy: CDFs representing the use of marketing strategy y by farm Fx; FxNMy: CDFs representing the 
non use of marketing strategy y by farm Fx. 
Table 5.17 Pairwise comparison for marketing strategy M2 'spreading sales over 
time b stOli rice ... ' 8 b 
. ... .. F1M2<F2M2F3M2F4M2FsI\II2FtsI\ll2f7M2· F8M2· 1=9l1li2 ~1~M2)·· 
F2NM2 
F3NM2u 
f4NM2 ···u 
F5NM2 · 
·F6NM2··· 
F7NIII12 
~N~ U 
F9NM2u 
an = dominant, u = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
b FxMy: CDFs representing the use of marketing strategy y by farm Fx; FxNPy: CDFs representing the 
non use of marketing strategy y by farm Fx. 
.. '"', 
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Table 5.18 Pairwise comparison for marketing strategy M3 'using forward 
, a b 
an = dominant, u = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
b FxMy: CDFs representing the use of marketing strategy y by farm Fx; FxNPy: CDFs representing the 
non use of marketing strategy y by farm Fx. 
5.4.2 Summary of the Results of the CDF Pairwise Comparisons 
For rice fanners in the counties of Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia, implementing marketing 
and production risk management strategies was shown to be an effective way of reducing 
risk. In all but three of thirty eight pairwise comparisons, CDFs obtained by simulating 
the use of two production and three marketing strategies dominated the CDFs obtained 
by simulating the non-use of them 
The CDFs for which there was no stochastic dominance were PI and M3. For PI in one 
case (FlO) and for M3 in two cases (F2 and F9), the CDF obtained by simulating the use 
of these strategies did not dominate, at a second-degree level, the CDF obtained by 
simulating their non-use. For all the other cases, stochastic dominance of the use of the 
strategy over its non-use was evident. It appears from these results that the 
implementation of 'planting several varieties of rice with different characteristics' (PI) 
and 'using forward contracting' (M3) might be less effective in reducing risk than the 
implementation of the other risk management responses. 
For the five fanners who used it, 'system of incentives and reward structure' (P2) was 
effective in reducing risk, since the CDFs obtained by simulating its use dominated the 
l ... ,.::.-.: ... :.:':.-e, 
~H~.~5:l~;?~?~~ 
, 
I ;~.!;:,;.' '-r" J 
,I.' .~ ; .,.,"." .. 
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CDFs obtained by simulating the non-use of it. 'Gathering market infonnation on price 
forecasts and trends' (Ml) was similarly effective in reducing risk for the eight fanners 
who used it, and 'spreading sales over time by storing product already harvested' (M2) 
was effective in reducing risk for the nine fanners who used it. 
5.4.3 Comparison among the Dominant CDFs within the Set of Strategies used 
by Each Farmer 
Having ascertained the pairwise dominance characteristics for selected strategies, the 
dominant CDFs from each pairwise comparison were then plotted in one graph for each 
fann to establish the superior strategies; The results of these comparisons are presented 
separately for each fann analysed, and the results discussed. The explanation of the 
results for each fann, and their respective figures and tables, are presented in descending 
order according to fann size; i.e., fann Fl is larger than fann F2, which is larger than 
fann F3, and so on. 
In the case of fann Fl, Ml dominated (first-degree) the other marketing and production 
strategies, M3 dominated (fIrst-degree) M2 and PI, and PI was dominated by the Ml, 
M2, and M3 (Figure 5.13 and Table 5.19). 
Table 5.19 Farm Fl 
-:.": )::".: .. \;:: :/::~:~:: ,:': f":: :":" ".. . 
Strat~gie~ •... 
P1 
M1 
M2 
M3 
+ 
+ 
M1 M2 
+ 
+ + 
a + = dominant, - = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
M3 
+ 
bPI: CDF representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting more than one variety'; Ml: CDF 
representing the use of marketing strategy 1, 'spreading sales over time'; M2: CDF representing the use 
of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; M3: CDF representing the use of marketing 
strategy 3, 'forward contracting'. 
'. ~.' .:-.•.. ;-~,--: .. :.;>-
~~~~~:~~~~~p~~~~~~~ 
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For farm F2, P2 was dominated (first-degree) by PI, but not by Ml and M2, since they 
crossed P2; and the area above the crossing point was larger than the area below. 
Consequently, there was no second-degree stochastic dominance between them (Figure 
, -
5.13 and Table 5.20). The dominance between Ml and M2 could not be determined, 
since they crossed each other so many times that further analysis was impossible. In 
addition, the dominance between PI and Ml-M2 could not be established, since the size 
of the upper and lower areas could not be differentiated . 
. -.. -. . 
strategies· P2 M1 M2 
P1 + ? ? 
P2 ? ? 
M1 ? ? ? 
M2 ? ? ? 
a + = dominant, - = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
bPI: CDP representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting more than one variety'; P2: CDP i . 
representing the use of production strategy 2, 'system of incentives and reward structure'; Ml: CDP 
representing the use of marketing strategy 1, 'spreading sales over time'; M2: CDP representing the use 
of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information' . 
Farm F3 implemented production strategy PI, marketing strategy Ml and M2. The 
dominance between Ml and M2 could not be determined, since they were intertwined 
(Figure 5.13 and Table 5.21), while PI dominated (second-degree) Ml-M2. 
Table 5.21 Fann F3 
§trategiesi •..•. 
P1 
M1 
M2 
M1 
+ 
? 
M2 
+ 
? 
a + = dominant, - = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
bPI: CDP representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting more than one variety'; Ml: CDP 
representing the use of marketing strategy 1, 'spreading sales over time'; M2: CDP representing the use 
of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information'. 
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Figure 5.13 Comparisons among dominant CDFs for each fann (F1 to F6)8 
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a PI: CDP representing the use of production strategy 1; P2: CDP representing the use of production 
strategy 2; M1: CDP representing the use of marketing strategy 1; M2: CDP representing the use of 
marketing strategy 2; M3: CDP representing the use of marketing strategy 3. 
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For fann F4, M3 dominated (first-degree) the rest of the CDFs obtained by simulating 
the use of the other risk management strategies implemented by this fanner (Figure 5. 13 
and Table 5.22). M2 dominated (frrst-degree) Ml, PI and P2, while Ml crossed PI and 
P2, but there was no second degree stochastic dominance evident between Ml and PI 
and Ml and P2, since the area above the crossing point was larger than the one below it. 
Finally, PI dominated (frrst-degree) P2. 
Table 5.22 Farm F4 
',< .. : .. .: ..... -:, .::::::: ":":: 
St~t.!giej ... 
P1 
P2 
M1 
M2 
M3 
? 
+ 
+ 
P2 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
M1 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
a + = dominant, - = dominated, ? = no doririnance of the alternative in that row. 
M2 M3 
+ 
bPI: CDP representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting more than one variety'; P2: CDP 
representing the use of production strategy 2, 'system of incentives and reward structure'; Ml: CDP 
representing the use of marketing strategy 1, 'spreading sales over time'; M2: COP representing the use 
of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; M3: COP representing the use of marketing 
strategy 3, 'forward contracting'. 
For fannF5, which used only marketing strategies 2 and 3, M2 dominated M3 at a frrst-
degree level (Figure 5.13 and Table 5.23). 
Table 5.23 Farm F5 
:':':" :-:: ';)<':":~:j;':' .... -:j::.: :" 
$frategi&$ ..•..• 
M2 
M3 
M3 
+ 
a + = dominant, - = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
b M2: COP representing the use of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; M3: CDP 
representing the use of marketing strategy 3, 'forward contracting'. 
For fann F6, there was no second-degree dominance among Ml, M2, and M3, since the 
area above the crossing point between these curves was larger than the area below it 
(Figure 5.13 and Table 5.24). Ml, M2 and M3 dominated (frrst-degree) P2. 
:<-:..,. .• ~ -.•• -' . " 
"," ',- -
-_ ..... -., ... 
:. - ~ J '," 
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Table 5.24 Fann F6 arison matrix 8 b 
.·.~t~at~~ie~ •••. •.• .• ••••••• M1 M2 M3 
P2 
M1 + ? ? 
M2 + ? ? 
M3 + ? ? 
a + = dominant, - = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
b P2: CDP representing the use of production strategy 2, 'system of incentives and reward structure'; 
Ml: CDP representing the use of marketing strategy 1, 'spreading sales over time'; M2: CDP 
representing the use of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; M3: CDP representing the 
use of marketing strategy 3, 'forward contracting'. 
For fannF7, Ml was dominated first-degree by M2 (Figure 5.14 and Table 5.25). There 
was no second-degree stochastic dominance between M2 and PI, since the area above 
the crossing point was larger than the area below it. 
Table 5.25 Fann F7 airwise com arison matrix 8 b 
.•• strat~gi~S •••••••  •••••••• · •..• strate~~~s 
P1 
M1 
M2 ? 
M1 M2 
+ ? 
+ 
a + = dominant, - = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
bPI: CDP representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting more than one variety'; Ml: CDP 
representing the use of marketing strategy 1, 'spreading sales over time'; M2: CDP representing the use 
of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information' . 
For fann F8, there was no dominance evident among PI, Ml, and M2; Ml and M2 
crossed each other at several points, resulting in their indistinguishability. In addition, the 
area below the crossing point between MI-M2 and PI was smaller that the upper area 
(see Figure 5.14 and Table 5.26). 
-.: -,. ;-. 
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Figure 5.14 Comparisons among dominant CDFs for each fann (F7 to F9 and Fll)& 
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The results for farm F9 were identical to farm F2. As indicated above, in Section 5.4.1, 
the reason for this was that both farms have the same manager, who was interviewed to 
obtain the parameters of the probability distribution functions. There was no dominance 
between M1 and M2, since both were intertwined. P2 was dominated by PI at a frrst-
degree level (Figure 5.14 and Table 5.27). Ml and M2, which crossed P2, did not 
dominate P2, since the area below the crossing point was smaller than the upper one. In 
addition, the dominance between M1-M2 and PI could not be determined, since the sizes 
of the areas below and above the crossing point could not be differentiated. 
Table 5.27 Farm F9 airwise com arison matrix 8 b 
pi M1 M2 
'" ··""'·"'·'·"/»$ttategi~$«· Strat~~i~~ P1 
P1 '+ ? ? 
P2 ? ? 
M1 ? ? ? 
M2 ? ? ? 
a + = dominant, - = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
b PI: COP representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting more than one variety'; P2: COP 
representing the use of production strategy 2, 'system of incentives and reward structure'; Ml: COP 
representing the use of marketing strategy 1, 'spreading sales over time'; M2: COP representing the use 
of marketing strategy 2, 'gathering market information'. 
The case of farm FlO was not analysed in this section, because this farmer could provide 
the parameters for only one strategy. 
For farm Fll, M3 dominated PI and P2 (frrst-degree). P2 was also dominated (frrst-
degree) by PI (Figure 5.14 and Table 5.28). 
i -
i·::~-~-:"·~·'.""'- -;";' 
i:;~~:';::~~~~~;:~; 
1-':'· 
Strategies 
P1 
P2 
M3 
airwise com arison matrix 8 b 
f)trtlt~gi!s ••. 
P1 P2 M3 
+ 
+ + 
a + = dominant, - = dominated, ? = no dominance of the alternative in that row. 
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bPI: CDP representing the use of production strategy 1, 'planting more than one variety'; P2: CDP 
representing the use of production strategy 2, 'system of incentives and reward structure'; M3: CDP 
representing the use of marketing strategy 3, 'forward contracting'. 
5.4.4 Summary of the Comparisons among the Dominant CDFs within each Set 
of Strategies for Each Fanner 
The comparison of the production risk management strategies indicates that 'planting 
several varieties of rice with different characteristics' (PI) can be considered more 
effective in reducing risk than 'using system of incentives and reward structure' (P2), 
since, for all farmers who implemented both responses together (4 cases), PI always 
dominated P2. The dominance of Plover P2 means that the farmer can obtain a higher 
gross margin with the same probability by implementing strategy PI than by 
implementing P2. The reason for this superiority could be that implementing PI does not 
involve any cost, while P2 involves the extra cost of labour. 
Marketing strategies might be considered more efficient than production strategies in 
reducing risk. For four farms, marketing strategies dominated production strategies. In 
the case of farm FI, MI, M2 and M3 dominated Pl. For farm F4, M2 and M3 dominated 
PI and P2. In the case offarmF6, MI, M2 and M3 dominated P2, and for farmFll, M3 
dominated PI and P2. The reason for the superiority of marketing over production 
strategies, for these farmers, might be that the increase in output prices due to the use of 
marketing strategies has a greater impact on the gross margin than the increase in yields 
due to the use of production strategies. In contrast, a production strategy dominated the 
" ~. " .:,', , 
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marketing strategies implemented in only two cases. For farm F3, PI was superior to MI 
and M2; and for farmF7, PI was superior to Ml. 
Within the marketing strategies, the results of the comparisons were not clear enough to 
determine which strategies were more effective. The reason for the non-existence of 
dominance among marketing strategies could be that several farmers used MI, M2 and 
M3, or MI and M2, together as a package to obtain higher prices. As a consequence, the 
parameters for each of the probability distributions for the marketing strategies were the 
same regardless of the marketing strategy used. This occurred in four cases, while for the ' .. .: " ~ - . 
'. ~,' 
other four cases, the probability distributions of the marketing strategies, while not 
identical, were similar. 
In the next chapter, the conclusions drawn from the results, the limitations of the study, 
the implications of the results, and the areas for further research will be described. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 described the results obtained from the information collected from the rice 
farmers surveyed. This chapter briefly summarises this research, presents the 
conclusions drawn from the study in the context of the problem being addressed, 
discusses the implications of the findings, identifies the limitations of the research, and 
suggests areas for future research 
The research carried out for this thesis consisted of interviewing 12 rice farmers (the 
entire population) in the counties of Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia in the province of 
i',', 
Corrientes to ascertain their perceptions of the sources of risk affecting their businesses 
and their responses to risks. The second part of the interview sought to establish the 
costs of production, prices, and yields possibly obtained by implementing five 
marketing and production strategies in order to develop the gross margin stochastic 
model. 
Gross margin stochastic models for each strategy (two models for each strategy, one 
simulating the use and the other simulating the non-use of that strategy) and for each 
farm were simulated using @Risk software. The outputs of the simulations comprised 
two cumulative probability distributions for each strategy, one representing the 
cumulative probability of obtaining different gross margins using a specific risk 
management strategy and the other representing the cumulative probability of obtaining 
different gross margins not using that specific strategy. Each pair of these CDFs was 
compared by using visual stochastic dominance analysis, thus determining which CDFs 
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were more efficient in reducing risk. Efficient CDFs were then compared, obtaining 
the efficient set of cumulative distributions for each farm. The results relating to the 
analyses described above are summarised in Tables 6.1,6.2,6.3 and 6.4. 
Ral1ked 
2 
3 
4 
5 
General 
Changes in the 
economic & political 
situation in Brazil 
Rainfall in the wrong 
time of the season 
Risk from other 
weather factors 
Changes In the world 
economic & political 
situation 
Deficit in rainfall 
Changes in the Changes in the 
economic & political economic & political 
situation in Brazil situation in Brazil 
Deficit in rainfall Excess rainfall 
Changes in the world 
economic & political 
situation 
Changes in the 
interest rate 
Rainfall in the wrong 
time of the season 
Unexpected variability 
of product prices 
Changes in the world 
economic & political 
situation 
Risk from other 
weather factors 
Table 6.2 Most important risk mana2ement stratesdes 
.•..•. ·¢ategoi'Yi>General.·· .......... ···Larae ••••••.••••.•.....•.••••.• <><Medium < ...... . 
Production Using system of Applying Buying machinery to 
incentives & reward precautionary crop- substitute labour 
Marketing 
Financial 
structure health measures 
Planting more than Using system of 
one variety incentives & reward 
structure 
Buying machinery to Planting more than 
substitute labour one variety 
Spreading sales over 
time 
Gathering market 
information 
Using of forward 
contracting 
Matching debt 
repayment structure 
with income 
generating pattern 
Using formal 
insurance 
Managing debt 
Spreading sales over 
time 
Gathering market 
information 
Using of forward 
contractina 
Matching debt 
repayment structure 
with income 
generating pattern 
Managing debt 
Holding liquid 
reserves 
Miscellanea Having long-term Having short-term 
flexibility us flexibility 
Having short-term 
flexibility 
Having long-term 
flexibility 
Applying monitoring 
programmes 
Using system of 
incentives & reward 
structure 
Spreading sales over 
time 
Gathering market 
information 
Using of forward 
contractina 
Keeping debt low 
Arranging overdraft 
reserves 
Maintaining flexibility 
in pace of 
investments & 
withdrawals 
Having long-term 
flexibility 
Having short-term 
flexibility 
Changes in the 
economic & political 
situation in Brazil 
Risk from other 
weather factors 
Rainfall in the wrong 
time of the season 
Excess rainfall 
Planting more than 
one variety 
Using system of 
incentives & reward 
structure 
Buying machinery to 
substitute labour 
Spreading sales over 
time 
Gathering market 
information 
Contracting for 
ourchasina inouts 
Using formal 
insurance 
Matching debt 
repayment structure 
with income 
generating pattern 
Maintaining flexibility 
in pace of 
investments & 
withdrawals 
Having long-term 
flexibility 
Having short-term 
flexibility 
"',--'- ~ ~ -< ~ •••• -'.-
~-~i~~:~~:~~~~~~:~ 
! - ,- ..... :.- ' .. "-,~ .', 
In 8 cases, P1 
dominated 
NP1, in 1 case 
there was no 
dominance. 
airwise com arisons for each strate 
In 5 out 5 
cases, P2 
dominated 
NP2. 
In 8 out of 8 
cases, M1 
dominated 
NM1. 
In 9 cases out 
of 9, M2 
dominated 
NM2. 
In 5 out 7 
cases, M3 
dominated 
NM3, in the 
other 2 cases 
there was no 
dominance. 
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a PI: COP representing the use of production strategy 1 'planting several varieties'; NFl: COP 
representing the non -use of production strategy 1; P2: COP representing the use of production strategy 2, 
'system of incentives and reward structure'; NP2: COP representing the non,.use of production strategy 2; 
Ml: COP representing the use of marketing strategy 1, 'spreading sales over time'; NMl: COP 
representing the non-use of marketing strategy 1; M2: COP representing the use of marketing strategy 2, 
'gathering market information'; NM2: COP representing the non-use of marketing strategy 2; M3: COP 
representing the use of marketing strategy 3, 'forward contracting'; NM3: CDP representing the non-use 
of marketing strategy 3. 
, ' , , ' 
! •. ~ ~'.~-:'.:~ .:.-....• ~ 
.;. .... '-' ... "" .. '. 
f :~~:::.:!~::.:.:::.~~:.:.;:.: 
:. ', .. --,., ..... -: .. ·.·.-P 
Table 6.4 Summary of comparisons among dominant risk management 
strate ·es· 
• .·Strat~gre~ 
P1 
P2 
M1 
M2 
M3 
P1 dominated 
P2 in 4 out of 4 
cases 
P1 dominated 
M1 in 2 cases, 
no dominance 
in 4 cases, and 
P1 was 
dominated by 
M1 in 1 case 
out of 7 
P1 dominated 
M2 in 1 cas(3, 
no dominance 
in 4 cases, and 
P1 was 
dominated by 
M2 in 2 cases 
out of 7 
P1 was 
dominated by 
M3 in 3 out of 3 
cases 
P2 
P2 was 
dominated by 
P1 in 4 out of 4 
cases 
P2was 
dominated by 
M1 in 1 case 
and there was 
no dominance 
in 3 out of 4 
cases 
P2 was 
dominated by 
M2 in2 cases 
and there was 
no dominance 
in 2 out of 4 
cases 
P2was 
dominated by 
M3 in 3 out of 3 
cases 
M1 
M1 dominated 
P1 in 1 case, 
no dominance 
in 4 cases, and 
M1 was 
dominated by 
P1 in 2 cases 
out of 7 
M1 dominated 
P2 in 1 case 
and there was 
no dominance 
in 3 cases out 
of 4 
M1 dominated 
M2 in 1 case, 
there was no 
dominance in 5 
cases, and M1 
was dominated 
by M2 in 2 
cases out of 8 
M2 
M2 dominated 
P1 in 2 cases, 
no dominance 
in 4 cases, and 
M2was 
dominated by 
P1 in 1 case 
out of 7 
M2 dominated 
P2 in 2 cases 
and there was 
no dominance 
in 2 out of 4 
cases 
M2 dominated 
M1 in 2 cases, 
there was no 
dominance in 5 
cases, and M2 
was dominated 
by M1 in 1 case 
out of 8 
M1 dominated M2 dominated 
M3 in 1 case, M3 in 1 case, 
there was no there was no 
dominance in 1 dominance in 1 
case, and M1 case, and M2 
was dominated was dominated 
by M3 in 1 case by M3 in 2 
out of 3 cases out of 4 
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M3 
M3 dominated 
P1 in 3 out of 3 
cases 
M3 dominated 
P2 in 3 out of 3 
cases 
M3 dominated 
M1 in 1 case, 
there was no 
dominance in 1 
case, and M3 
was dominated 
by M1 in 1 case 
out of 3 
M3 dominated 
M2 in 2 cases, 
there was no 
dominance in 1 
case, and M3 
was dominated 
by M2 in 1 case 
out of 4 
a Pl: COP representing the use of production strategy 1 'planting several varieties'; P2: COP representing 
the use of production strategy 2, 'system of incentives and reward structure'; Ml: COP representing the 
use of marketing strategy I, 'spreading sales over time'; M2: COP representing the use of marketing 
strategy 2, 'gathering market information'; M3: COP representing the use of marketing strategy 3, 'using 
forward contracting' . 
6.2 Conclusions 
The objective of this study was to evaluate the risk reducing effects on gross margins of 
the implementation of risk responses perceived to be important and used by Argentine 
rice farmers and, by undertaking this evaluation, to indicate an optimal response set. As 
outlined in Chapter 1, the specific objectives were to: 1) ascertain the rice farmers' 
perceptions about the relative importance of different sources of risk; 2) establish the 
risk responses that rice farmers implement; 3) determine the influence of the size of 
, 
! 
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farms on farmers' perceptions of the risk sources and on the nature of their risk 
responses; and 4) evaluate the risk reducing effects of the farmers' responses on the 
gross margins of the rice enterprise. In the following subsections, the conclusions for 
each of the specific objectives will be presented. 
6.2.1 Rice Fanners' Perceptions of Sources of Risk 
Rice farmers in the counties of Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia perceive sources of market 
and production risks as being more important than sources of [mancial risk or sources of 
miscellaneous risk. This is confirmed by the higher importance given to the variability 
of yields and prices as sources of risk, which cause production and market risks. These 
farmers also consistently perceive one particular source of marketing risk, 'changes in 
the economic and political situation in Brazil', to be the most important of all of the 
sources considered. 
Six other sources of risk identified as being important fall into the production and 
marketing risk categories. These risks include four production risks, namely 'rainfall in 
the wrong time of the season', 'risk from other weather factors', 'deficit in rainfall' and 
'excess rainfall'; and two marketing risks, namely 'changes in the world economic and 
political situation' and 'unexpected variability of product prices'. This result supports 
the fact that all farmers considered risk related to the variability of yields and prices to 
be more important than risk related to the level of debt. 
6.2.2 Rice Fanners' Responses to Risk 
The most important risk response, for all the rice farmers, was 'spreading sales over 
time by storing harvested product', a marketing strategy. This strategy allows farmers to 
obtain better output prices and reduce their variability. Other strategies that were 
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perceived to be important included, in order of perceived importance, 'matching 
debt repayment with the income generating pattern of rice production' (fmancial), 
'gathering market information such as price forecasts and trends' (market), 'system of 
incentives and reward structure' (production), 'use of formal insurance' (fmancial), and 
'managing debt: monitoring debt and working with lenders' (fmancial). For the analysis 
of the effects of risk responses on reducing risk, only the four marketing and production 
strategies which scored highest were considered. 
Rice producers implemented relatively more of the listed fmancial strategies than was 
evident for marketing and production responses. This might correspond with their 
perceptions about sources of risk. For instance, all of the farmers interviewed 
considered fmancial risks and risk regarding the level of debt as being less important 
than market and production risks and risks regarding the variability of prices and yields. 
It is possible that farmers, having implemented more responses to control certain classes 
of risks (in this study fmancial risks), then perceived these risks as being less important 
than others, since they may be under control. In other words, farmers seem to perceive 
sources of risk as more important when they have not used strategies to control them 
6.2.3 Relationship between the Size of Rice Farms and Producers' Perceptions of 
Sources of Risk and Risk Responses 
The relationships found between farm size and farmers' risk perceptions and responses 
will be presented in the next subsections. 
6.2.3.1 Farm Size and Risk Sources 
The analysis of the relationship between the sizes of rice farms and the farmers' 
perceptions of the sources of risk reported in Chapter 5 indicated that the smaller the 
farm size the more important production risks are, relative to other sources of risk. 
._'-_.--. 
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Fanners of medium and small farms did not perceive financial risks as being as 
important as other sources, since there was not any fmancial risk within the most 
important risk sources. Finally, it appears that rice producers with large farms are more 
concerned about of sources of risk as a whole since they rated them, on average, higher 
than producers with medium and small farms did. 
6.2.3.2 Farm Size and Risk Responses 
The results of this study indicate that not only do producers with small farms implement 
fewer risk management strategies than producers with large farms, but also that fanners 
of smaller farms actually use fewer marketing and production strategies as the fann area 
decreases. This relationship, however, does not hold when considering fmancial and 
miscellaneous strategies, the use of which, in general, remains quite stable regardless of 
fannsize. 
Finally, fanners with large farms rated 'managing debt: monitoring debt and working 
with lenders' and 'matching debt repayment with the income generating pattern of the 
rice enterprise' more highly than fanners with medium-sized and small farms did. In 
contrast with the above, all medium-sized and three small fann-sized producers 
considered 'keeping debt low' more important than producers with large farms did. It 
can be inferred from this difference that fanners with large farms tend to be more highly 
leveraged than fanners with medium-sized and small farms. This conclusion was also 
drawn by Boggess et al (1985) in their study on US farmers. The higher leverage might 
help rice fanners to expand their businesses by borrowing money and reinvesting in 
their rice enterprises, while medium-sized and small farms reduce fmancial risks by not 
incurring debt. Consequently, they are more fmancially secure, although not highly 
profitable (Boggess et al, 1985). 
6.2.4 Effects of the Implementation of Risk Responses on the Gross Margin of 
the Rice Enterprise 
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The use of marketing and production risk management strategies by rice farmers 
reduces the downside effects of risk on the rice gross margin. The stochastic dominance 
analysis carried out in this study showed that the cumulative distribution functions of 
the gross margins obtained from simulating the use of the five selected responses were 
superior to the cumulative distribution functions obtained from simulating the non-use 
of these responses. This dominance occurred in 35 of the 38 responses analysed. The 
three responses not complying with this result comprised 'planting several varieties with 
different characteristics' (once) and 'using forward contracting' (twice). The 
underpinning logic for this fmding is that the implementation of a superior risk response 
results in a farmer obtaining a highyr gross margin with the same probability as would 
be obtained by not implementing that strategy. 
It can be concluded that 'planting several varieties with different characteristics' is 
considered more efficient in reducing the effects of risk than 'using system of incentives 
and reward structure', since the CDFs obtained simulating the use of the former 
dominated the CDFs of the latter. The marketing strategies evaluated appear to be more 
effective in reducing risk than the production strategies. From 15 comparisons between 
production and marketing strategies, marketing strategies were superior to production 
strategies in 12 cases. In contrast, only in three other comparisons production strategies 
dominated marketing responses. 
6.3 Implications 
This thesis adds to the body of empirical knowledge concerning farmers' perceptions of 
risk, their responses to risk, and the efficiency of farmers' responses in reducing risk. 
The fmdings demonstrate that 'changes in the economic and political situation in Brazil' 
~: ,_,~: .-: .• _~r_ ~._:_'::. 
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is not only the most important source of risk for farmers in the study area, but also 
:-:.::; .. :~::;::.~~,..-: 
its importance holds regardless of farm size. The importance of this source of risk was t:~~~~:~~:~~~:~:%W 
corroborated at the end of 1999 harvesting season by the closure of the Brazilian 
market. The implication of the reliance on the Brazilian market and the problem caused 
by its closure reinforces the need for new markets to be developed by both individuals 
and the industry as a whole. Support by local and national governments and rural 
organisations could take the form of assisting and encouraging trade missions to 
investigate potential new markets. 
Farmers seem to perceive sources of risk as more important when they have not 
previously used strategies to control them The implication for this fmding is that 
'·".'.--:--1:'" 
extension agencies and farm consultants should concentrate their advice on the 
implementation of the risk responses to control sources of risk for which fewer 
strategies have already been used, i.e., which are new to the farmer. In the case of 
Argentinean rice farmers, the implication of this study is that the advice should be 
focused on the implementation of suitable risk management strategies to control 
marketing and production risks. 
This research suggests that farmers' behaviours with respect to risk differ according to 
the size of the farms. This implies that farm consultants and government extension 
agencies should use different approaches for different sizes of farms when advising on 
risk management. For example, in the counties of Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia, 
Argentina, rice farmers' levels of concern with production risks increase as the farm 
size decreases. As a consequence, consultants and extension agents should concentrate 
in the analysis of production risk and in the implementation of responses to control this 
type of risk when advising farmers with smaller rice farms. It is also evident that 
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farmers with small farms are not concerned about financial risk, while the reverse 
holds true for farmers with large farms. In this case, consultants and extension agents 
should advise farmers with large farms more comprehensively as to the implementation 
of strategies to control fmancial risks. Finally, the number of production and marketing ; .. 
strategies utilised by rice farmers decreases as the area of the farms decreases. These 
behaviours indicate a need for policy makers and consultants to consider the size of the 
farms when determining and implementing policies or advising farmers about risk 
management. 
Farmers with medium-sized and small farms tended to be less leveraged than farmers 
with large farms, the implication being that medium-sized and small farms reduce 
. ., 
financial risks by not incurring debt. On the other hand, 'borrowing money and 
reinvesting in their businesses, assuming that the leverage is favourable, will increase 
the growth rate of the business. If this assumption holds true, farmers with small and 
medium-sized farms would be expected to grow, ceteris paribus, at a slower rate than 
large, more highly leverage farms. If it is the will of the government to encourage small 
and medium-sized farms to grow, it should implement policies to assist these farmers 
with access to loans for expansion and/or reinvestment. 
An important implication, also pointed out by Martin (1996), is that there is not 
necessarily a direct linkage between a specific risk source and the risk management 
response that alleviates that risk. While in the study area, farmers are more concerned 
about the economic and political situation in Brazil, they have not considered 
diversifying their export markets to mitigate this risk. It may be that the implementation 
of this strategy is beyond their capabilities and is possible only for the mills, which are 
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directly involved in exporting. Consultants need to consider this lack of linkage and 
encourage the use of different strategies or groups of strategies to control a specific risk. 
Overall, marketing and production risk responses used by rice farmers were efficient in 
reducing risk; consequently, consultants and government extension agencies should 
encourage the implementation of other responses to control risk. This research 
demonstrates that many farmers' strategic responses to risk are stochastically efficient 
in that their use dominates their non-use. Furthermore, in the cases of dominant 
responses, some were found to be more efficient than others when viewed on an 
individual farm basis. While the marketing and production risk management strategies 
used by the farmers were found to be efficient in fulfilling their common objective, 
some of these responses appeared to be more efficient at decreaSing risk than others. For 
example, marketing strategies in general were more efficient than production strategies 
in reducing risk. This difference in efficiency becomes blurred when the marketing risk 
responses are combined as a package to ameliorate risk. While, in an ideal situation, 
farmers would implement the most efficient risk management strategies within each 
category, due to a lack of opportunity and cognitive limitations, not all will do so. The 
findings of this study do not imply that only efficient responses within each category 
should be applied, but rather that is desirable that these should be preferred to less 
efficient responses. In the absence of efficient responses, less efficient responses are ,' ........ ', __ .... _.'-~ _:.l_' •. _~_.' 
more desirable than none at all. In other words, even though this study found that 
marketing strategies were more efficient than production strategies, it should not be 
inferred that only marketing strategies have to be applied. 
.'-"-, .-' 
'C' •• --' _ ,'. 
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6.4 Limitations 
r~ .:, ""'.-
One of the limitations of this research is that the results and conclusions are specific to i;:~fF;~-:{~~~I~~~~~ 
, 
the rice fanners in the counties of Mercedes and Curuzu Cuatia. In order to extrapolate 
them to the whole population of rice producers in the province of Corrientes or in 
Argentina, it would be necessary to sample the whole population and undertake 
appropriate statistical analyses. 
The lists of sources of risk and strategic responses that the fanners were asked to 
comment on might not cover all the risks affecting them and the responses they 
implement. To overcome this drawback, it would be necessary to pre-survey farmers to 
determine their view of risk sources and their responses. However, this would require 
resources, such as funds and time, which were not available for this study. - ,'-,"r- - ".-
The way in which the probability distributions of each of the stochastic variables were 
determined also limits this research. Subjective determination of a probability 
distribution may introduce error to the estimates of the variables. This error varies 
according to the fanner's know ledge of the variable. If the fanner lacks this know ledge, 
it will be reflected in the estimators by increasing the error. However, alternative 
empirical or historical data, also used to determine the price and yield probability 
distributions, was not available. Consequently, the only way to determine the 
probability distributions was by seeking the fanners' opinions. 
A [mal important limitation is that visual fIrst and second-degree stochastic dominance 
methods were used to determine the dominance between CDFs. However, to establish 
the stochastic dominance when the CDFs were intertwined, it would be better to use a 
computational method, so that the dominance could be precisely determined. The use of 
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stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF), which has a stronger 
"- ',. 
,'.' :~,.:~ ... ','~' ~",', ~'. 
discriminatory power, accomplished by introducing bounds on the absolute risk-
aversion coefficient within a second-degree stochastic dominance analysis, was beyond 
the scope of this study. 
6.5 Areas for Future Research 
It was concluded in this study that, for all rice farmers in this region, some sources of 
risk and responses to risk were more important than others. It would be interesting to 
know if this conclusion holds for all rice farmers in this province and for all rice farmers 
in Argentina. Such a study could also probe the relationship between farmers' risk 
perceptions and responses and, for example, other socio-economic characteristics such 
as education, fmancialleverage ratio, and experience in farming. Finally, it would be 
interesting to carry out stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF) to 
increase the discriminatory power of the efficiency analysis and see whether or not a 
better differentiation of the most effective strategies could be obtained. 
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Name: 
Fann: 
Date and Place: 
FIRST INTERVIEW 
1. General Infonnation 
1.1. Which of the following situations describe better your situation as a manager? 
Management of the farm receiving a salary 1 
Management receiving a percentage of the income 2 
Management receiving a percentage of the income and salary 3 
Owner or co-owner 4 
1.2. What is the total area of the farm? 
ba 
1.3. What enterprises do you carry out in your farm? 
1.4. What area does each enterprise occupy? 
ha 
ha 
ha 
ha 
ha 
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1.5. What enterprise do you consider the most important as a source of income? 
r:;."···.·~\··· 
H:~;~~~~~~~?f; 
1.6. What percentage of the total income does this enterprise represent? 
1.7. What degree of risk does each enterprise you carry out involve? Choose a number 
from 1 to 5 (being 1 not risky and 5 extremely risky) to rate the degree of riskiness 
associated with each enterprise. 
1 2 3 4 5 
. ... ' .... 
, . .::: - "~' ," 
1 2 3 4 5 
.. , . -'~ 
.' ,~~ - "'r . -," 
1 2 3 4 5 '· .. ·r' ,.. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.8. If there is any enterprise that involves more risk than the others, why do you 
consider that enterprise riskier than the others? 
i 
I •. 
I 
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2. Characteristics of rice production 
Considering the practices you implement to produce rice: 
2.1. What varieties of rice do you plant? 
2.2. What proportion of each variety? 
-----------------------------------------% 
% -----------------------------------------
% -----------------------------------------
% -----------------------------------------
--------------------------------------_% 
I 
-----------------------------------------% I 
2.3. What quantity of seeds per hectare do you use for each variety? 
Kgl1la 
Kg/ha 
Kg/ha 
Kg/ha 
Kg/ha 
Kg/ha 
2.4. What cultivation practices do you do? 
159 
2.5. How much does each cultivation practice cost? 
$&a .. 
$&a 
$&a 
$&a 
$&a 
$&a 
2.6. How do you plant? 
i , . 
2.7. How much do the planting and seed cost per hectare? 
___________________________________ $&a 
___________________________________ $&a 
2.8. Do you fertilise the crop? 
YES NO 
2.9. What kind of fertilisers do you use? 
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2.10. What quantity of each fertiliser do you use? 
Kg/ha 
Kg/ha 
Kg/ha 
Kg/ha 
2.11. When do you apply each fertiliser? 
2.12. How much does each fertiliser'cost per hectare? '-: ~ -
$/ha 
$/ha 
$/ha 
$/ha 
2.13. How much does the fertiliser application cost per hectare? (If it does have an extra 
cost) 
$/ha 
$/ha 
.:~ .-- '" -.-. '. -- -
2.14. Do you apply herbicides to the rice crop? 
YES NO 
2.15. What herbicides do you use? 
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2.16. What quantity of each herbicide do you use? 
lIha 
lIha 
lIha 
lIha 
lIha 
2.17. When do you apply each herbicide? 
'," .---
2.18. How much does each herbicide cost? 
$lha 
$lha 
$lha 
$lha 
$lha 
2.19. how much does the application of herbicide cost? 
$lha 
$lha 
$lha 
$lha 
2.20. Do you apply insecticides? 
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YES NO 
2.21. What insecticides do you apply? 
2.22. What quantity of each insecticide do you apply? 
lIha 
lIha 
lIha I , .. 
I···. 
lIha 
lIha 
2.23. When do you apply each insecticide? 
2.24. How much does each insecticide cost per hectare? 
$/ha 
$/ha 
$/ha 
$/ha 
2.25. How much does the application of insecticide cost? 
$/ha 
$/ha 
2.26. Do you apply fungicides? 
YES NO 
2.27. What fungicides do you use? 
2.28. What quantities of each one do you use? 
111m 
l/ha 
l/ha 
l/ha 
l/ha 
2.29. When do you use each one? 
2.30. How much does each fungicide cost per hectare? 
$lha 
$lha 
$lha 
$lha 
2.31. How much does the application of fungicide cost per hectare? 
$lha 
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$/ha 
2.32. Do you hire specific labour for rice production? 
YES NO 
2.33. How much does that labour hiring cost? 
$/ha 
2.34. How much diesel oil per hectare do you use for rice irrigation? 
l/ha 
2.35. How much does it cost per hectare? 
$/ha 
2.36. When does the rice harvesting start? 
2.37. When does the riceharvesting 'fmish? 
2.38. How do you harvest? 
Contractor 
Own harvester 
Other way (please specify) 
2.39. How much does the harvest cost per hectare? 
$/ha 
2.40. What marketing cost do you pay? 
164 
, . , 
~ . -- .. - ... ~; -. 
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2.41. How does each marketing expense cost? 
$/ha ton 
$/ha ton 
$/ha ton 
$/ha ton 
2.42. Do you lease land for rice production? 
SI NO 
2.43. How many hectares do you lease? 
ha 
2.44. How much do you pay per leased hectare? 
$/ha 
2.45. How much does the permanent labour cost per hectare? 
$/ha 
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Sources of Risk 
'his questionnaire must be answered by the person/persons that make the decisions in the operation 
fthe firm 
How important to your rice operation is each of the following sources of risk? (Please circle the appropriate number for each one) 
Source of risk Importance 
Not Important Somewhat Quite Important 
Important Important 
Excess rainfall 1 2 3 4 
Deficit in rainfall 1 2 3 4 
Rainfall at the wrong time of the season 1 2 3 4 
Risk from other weather factors 1 2 3 4 
Pest and diseases that affect the rice crop 1 2 3 4 
Unexpected variability of rice prices 1 2 3 4 
Unexpected variability of input prices 1 2 3 4 
Changes in the interest rates 1 2 3 4 
Changes in the world economic and political situation 1 2 3 4 
Changes in the economic and political situation in Brazil 1 2 3 4 
,;: r 
' .. -':: ::." ',,_I :, 
Extremely 
Important 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
-:"~I~f}~:~-
~:~~t-\, 
....... 
0'1 
-.....l 
------- -- - ---
Source of risk Importance 
Not hnportant Somewhat Quite Important Extremely 
Important Important Important 
Changes in the economic and political situation in Argentina 1 2 3 4 5 
Changes in national government laws and policies 1 2 3 4 5 
Changes in the provincial government laws and policies 1 2 3 4 5 
Changes in land prices 1 2 3 4 5 
Accidents or problems with health 1 2 3 4 5 
Changes in family situation (partnership goals, marital status, 1 2 3 4 5 
etc.). 
-0\ 
00 
'I', ';:::~f"-,:-
"1"1-," • 
" 
j!i")], 
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:"j~-~: 
, ;', , 
------ -- --
Source of risk Importance 
Not Important Somewhat Quite Important Extremely 
Important Important Important 
Pro blems with hired labour and contractors 1 2 3 4 5 
Theft 1 2 3 4 5 
Inability to meet contracting obligations 1 2 3 4 5 
Changes in technology 1 2 3 4 5 
Others (please specify) 1 2 3 4 5 
How much risk do you think there is with your level 0 debt? Minimal Some Moderate Large Very Large 
Overall, how much risk do you think there is with changing Minimal Some Moderate Large Very large. 
prices and yields for your operation? 
...... 
~ 
:~ r~~~':' 
" . <,' 
..... ' , 
;t? ~'. ','(;''-
. -.~ , t.~· 
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4. Risk Management 
For each of the following options to manage risk, please circle the number to indicate 
the importance of them in your particular operation. In addition, circle '2. YES' if you 
use it, or '1. NO' if you do not use it. 
If it is not possible for you to use any of the following options to manage risk, please 
circle 'NA' and 'l.NO'. 
How important is each of the following for managing risk in your operation? 
Combination of other enterprises in your operation 
Production of rice in other regions 
Application of precautionary crop health measures 
Planting more than one variety of rice with different 
characteristics 
Use of more than one source of water 
Use of more than one irrigation system 
Buy machinery to substitute labour 
Use of system of incentives and reward structure 
Production to full capacity 
Application of monitoring and programmes for pests and diseases 
---~-T:~-,'" ,':'-.::- ~~ ~--
~ ; . ,,~ .. : : 
;; 
~: 
" 
IMPORTANCE 
5 4 
5 4 
5 4 
5 4 
5 4 
5 4 
5 4 
5 4 
5 4 
5 4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
'L', 
, . '~ ~ 
., 
.", . 
2 I NA 
2 I NO 
2 I NO 
2 I NO 
2 I NO 
2 1 NO 
2 I NO 
2 1 NO 
2 I NO 
2 I NO 
Do you use this 
method? 
2. YES 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2. SI 
1. NO 
1. NO 
1. NO 
1. NO 
1. NO 
1. NO 
1. NO 
1. NO 
I. NO 
1. NO 
::rI:·. 
Tit: :: ••.. 
...... 
-.l ...... 
Short-tenn flexibility 
Selection of varieties with low price variability 
Spreading sales over time by storing product 
Use of forward contracting 
Contracting for input purchases 
Use of futures and options markets 
Gathering market information, such as price forecasts and trends 
Hold assets for sale to meet cash demands 
Maintenance of flexibility in the pace of investments and 
withdrawals 
Matching debt repayment structure with the income generating 
pattern of the rice enterprise 
Leasing assets rather than owning them 
Hold liquid credit reserves 
; 
',< " ; ,;~ 
,--,' 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
2 1 ND 2. SI 1. NO 
2 1 ND 2. SI 1. NO 
2 1 ND 2. SI 1. NO 
2 1 ND 2. SI 1. NO 
2 1 ND 2. SI 1. NO 
2 1 ND 2. SI 1. NO 
2 1 ND 2. SI I.NO 
2 1 ND 2. SI 1. NO 
2 1 ND 2. SI 1. NO 
2 1 ND 2. SI 1. NO 
2 1 ND 2. SI 1. NO 
2 1 ND 2. SI 1. NO 
--.....l 
N 
lll! 
'l ',-i ~',', 
Use of formal insurance 5 4 3 
Arrangement of overdraft reserves 5 4 3 
Main farm operator working off property 5 4 3 
Other family members working off property 5 4 3 
Investing off farm 5 4 3 
Management of debt 5 4 3 
Keeping debt low 5 4 3 
Long-term flexibility 5 4 3 
.," 
"11 
" .:.1 
,.' '., 
2 1 ND 
2 1 ND 
2 1 ND 
2 1 ND 
2 1 ND 
2 1 ND 
2 1 ND 
2 1 ND 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2. SI 
2.SI 
1. NO 
I 
1. NO ' 
1. NO 
1. NO 
1. NO 
1. NO 
1. NO 
1. NO 
!iH 
...... 
-....l 
W 
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Name: 
Fann: 
Place and Date: 
SECOND INTERVIEW 
ITEM Quantity Price $/ha 
Variable cost 
Seeds 
Cultivation 
Planting 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides 
Pesticides 
Labour 
Diesel irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Total Variable Cost 
Output Yield (tonne/ha) $/tonne $/ha 
Total Output Value 
VC TOV 
GROSS MARGIN 
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Strategy 1: planting several varieties of rice with different characteristics 
1. If you would not implement planting several rice varieties with different 
characteristics as a risk management strategy, how your variable costs had change? 
2. Planting several varieties of rice with different characteristics affects the variability of 
price or yield? 
3. If you would not implement planting several rice varieties with different - -- -' -,-,.-- ' .. '~ 
characteristics as a risk management strategy, which would be the maximum, minimum, 
most likely value of the ____ _ 
Maximum: 
Minimum: 
Most likely value: 
4. hnplementing planting several varieties of rice with different characteristics as a risk 
management strategy, which would be the maximum, minimum, most likely value of 
the _____ _ 
Maximum: 
Minimum: 
Most likely value: 
• -";-'f 
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Strategy 2: system of incentives and reward structure for labour 
1. If you had not implemented system of incentives and reward structure for labour as a 
risk management strategy, how would your variable costs have changed? 
2. System of incentives and reward structure for labour affects the variability of price or 
yield? 
3. If you had not implemented system of incentives and reward structure for labour as a 
risk management strategy, which would be the maximum, minimum, most likely value 
ofthe ____ _ 
Maximum: 
Minimum: 
Most likely value: 
4. hnplementing system of incentives and reward structure for labour as a risk 
management strategy, which would be the maximum, minimum, most likely value of 
the _____ _ 
Maximum: 
Minimum: 
Most likely value: 
~ •. ,. ~:-:..:,- ~7:"i' . ..: ... 
v.,;:"-:: •. :.'" :.:_;.~ 
F:~:::;:':';:';:~:j..:~~,:i 
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Strategy 3: gathering market information, such as price forecasts and trends 
1. If you had not implemented gathering market information, such as price forecasts and 
trends as a risk management strategy, how would your variable costs have changed? 
2. Gathering market information, such as price forecasts and trends affects the 
variability of price or yield? 
3. If you had not implemented gathering market information, such as price forecasts and 
trends as a risk management strategy, which would be the maximum, minimum, most 
likely value of the ____ _ 
Maximum: 
Minimum: 
Most likely value: 
4. hnplementing gathering market information, such as price forecasts and trends as a 
risk management strategy, which would be the maximum, minimum, most likely value 
ofthe ____ _ 
Maximum: !:.,--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum: 
Most likely value: 
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Strategy 4: spreading sales over time by storing output 
1. If you had not implemented spreading sales over time by storing output as a risk 
i·~ ":. ' .... , .. ".- .-; . 
~::fg;;;;4~:i: 
management strategy, how would your variable costs have changed? 
2. Spreading sales over time by storing output affects the variability of price or yield? 
3. If you had not implemented spreading sales over time by storing output as a risk 
management strategy, which would-be the maximum, minimum, most likely value of 
the ____ _ 
Maximum: 
Minimum: 
Most likely value: 
4. Implementing spreading sales over time by storing output as a risk management 
strategy, which would be the maximum, minimum, most likely value of the 
Maximum: 
Minimum: 
Most likely value: 
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Strategy 5: forward contracting (warrants) 
1. If you had not implemented forward contracting (warrants) as a riskmanagement ~:.:->:. - ," .. '-,-:-; ~:~}:;:bP) 
strategy, how would your variable costs have changed? 
2. Forward contracting (warrants) affects the variability of price or yield? 
3. If you had not implemented forward contracting (warrants) as a risk management 
strategy, which would be the maximum, minimum, most likely value of the 
Maximum: 
Minimum: 
Most likely value: 
4. Implementing forward contracting (warrants) as a risk management strategy, which 
would be the maximum, minimum, most likely value of the ______ ' 
Maximum: 
Minimum: 
Most likely value: 
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Strategy 6: production to full capacity 
1. If you had not implemented production to full capacity as a risk management 
strategy, how would your variable costs have changed? 
2. Production to full capacity affects the variability of price or yield? 
. . 
3. If you had Dot implemented production to full capacity as a risk management 
strategy, which would be the maximum, minimum, most likely value of the 
Maximum: 
Minimum: 
Most likely value: 
4. hnplementing production to full capacity as a risk management strategy, which would 
be the maximum, minimum, most likely value of the _____ _ 
Maximum: 
Minimum: 
Most likely value: 
APPENDIX 2 
SOURCES OF RISK AND RISK RESPONSES 
.....••.. Fe ...•• < ·F4 .....>< TQ.tal· ....... Av~rag~ ••• ·..StanQatd .•• ·...R.~llldhg 
45G[)· ha ... 4()OOlla •.•••. . ....•.•• ···..ri~4<> [leviatlc:ifi) •.•.••... 
5 4 5 19 4.75 0.43 
2 4 5 16 4.00 1.22 2 
Changes in the the world econ. and polit. sit. 5 3 3 4 15 3.75 0.83 3 
Changes in interest rates 5 4 4 2 15 3.75 1.09 4 
Rainfall in the wrong time of the season 2 4 2 5 13 3.25 1.30 5 
Unexpected variability of product prices 5 3 3 12 3.00 1.41 6 
Risk from other weather factors (wind, temp, frost, hail) 1 2 5 4 12 3.00 1.58 7 
Problems with hired labour and contractors 3 3 3 2 11 2.75 0.43 8 
Excess of rainfall 1 3 4 3 11 2.75 1.09 9 
Diseases, pests, and weeds 2 4 4 11 2.75 1.30 10 
Changes in the econ. & polit. sit. of Argentina 3 3 3 10 2.50 0.87 11 
Changes in national goverment laws and policies 3 3 3 10 2.50 0.87 12 
Changes in technology 3 4 2 10 2.50 1.12 13 
Changes in provincial government laws and policies 2 3 2 8 2.00 0.71 14 
Changes in land prices 1 2 3 2 8 2.00 0.71 15 
Unexpected variability of input prices 4 1 2 8 2.00 1.22 16 
Accidents or problems with health 2 2 2 7 1.75 0.43 17 
Changes in family sit. (partner. goals, marit. stat., inherit.) 2 2 6 1.50 0.50 18 
Being unable to meet contracting obligations 2 5 1.25 0.43 19 
Theft 4 1.00 0.00 20 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with your level of debt 2 3 3 3 11 2.75 0.43 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with the variability of yields and prices 5 3 3 3 14 3.50 0.87 
Note: the rating is based in a Likert scale where 1 is not important and 5 is extremely important. 
c, 
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4 13 4.33 0.47 
3 2 4 9 3.00 0.82 2 
Unexpected variability of product prices 2 4 3 9 3.00 0.82 2 
Changes in the the world econ. and polit. sit. 3 2 4 9 3.00 0.82 2 
Risk from other weather factors (wind, temp, frost, hail) 4 4 9 3.00 1.41 3 
Rainfall in the wrong time of the season 3 2 3 8 2.67 0.47 4 
Changes in national goverment laws and policies 3 2 3 8 2.67 0.47 4 
Deficit of rainfall 2 2 4 8 2.67 0.94 5 
Changes in land prices 4 3 1 8 2.67 1.25 6 
Changes in the econ. & polit. sit. of Argentina 3 2 2 7 2.33 0.47 7 
Problems with hired labour and contractors 4 2 1 7 2.33 1.25 8 
Diseases, pests, and weeds 3 2 6 2~00 0.82 9 
Accidents or problems with health 4 6 2.00 1.41 10 
Changes in family sit. (partner. goals, marit. stat., inherit.) 4 6 2.00 1.41 10 
Changes in technology 4 6 2.00 1.41 10 
Unexpected variability of input prices 2 2 5 1.67 0.47 11 
Changes in interest rates 2 2 5 1.67 0.47 11 
Changes in provincial government laws and policies 2 4 1.33 0.47 11 
Being unable to meet contracting obligations 2 4 1.33 0.47 12 
Theft 3 1.00 0.00 13 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with your level of debt 3 2 6 2.00 0.82 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with the variability of yields and prices 3 3 3 9 3.00 0.00 
Note: the rating is based in a Likert scale where 1 is not important and 5 is extremely important. 
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Table A2.3 Sources of risk for each small farm a 
··F8.F9 . . •...••• ••• F1() ...« .F11>.F12 .•• ·/.Total ··Avetage· StandatdFhmkilig .. 
. {iOOha •.•. t:lo()t!~ .·...E)(J(:J@«·f)OOha ·0==5 . De"i~ti.::Ji"i· .. . .... 
Changes in the econ. & polit. sit. of Brazil 3 4 4 19 0.40 
Risk from other weather factors (wind, temp, frost, hail) 4 4 2 5 4 19 3.80 0.98 2 
Rainfall in the wrong time of the season 5 2 5 3 4 19 3.80 1.17 3 
Excess of rainfall 3 3 4 3 4 17 3.40 0.49 4 
Unexpected variability of product prices 3 3 2 4 12 3.00 0.71 5 
Changes in the econ. & polit. sit. of Argentina 3 4 2 4 2 15 3.00 0.89 6 
Changes in interest rates 3 4 3 4 15 3.00 1.10 7 
Changes in the the world econ. and polit. sit. 3 4 2 3 2 14 2.80 0.75 8 
Deficit of rainfall 2 2 4 4 2 14 2.80 0.98 9 
Diseases, pests, and weeds 2 3 2 3 3 13 2.60 0.49 10 
Changes in national goverment laws and policies 2 2 2 2 2 10 2,00 0.00 11 
Unexpected variability of input prices 2 2 3 9 1.80 0.75 12 
Accidents or problems with health 2 2 3 9 1.80 0.75 13 
Changes in family sit. (partner. goals, marit. stat., inherit.) 3 3 9 1.80 0.98 14 
Changes in technology 2 4 9 1.80 1.17 15 
Changes in land prices 2 2 7 1.40 0.49 16 
Theft 2 2 7 1.40 0.49 17 
Being unable to meet contracting obligations 2 2 7 1.40 0.49 18 
Changes in provincial govemment laws and policies 3 7 1.40 0.80 19 
Problems with hired labour and contractors 3 7 1.40 0.80 20 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with your level of debt 2 3 4 2 3 14 2.80 0.75 
In general, how much risk do you think there is 
with the variability of yields and prices 3 3 3 3 3 15 3.00 0.00 
Note: the rating is based in a Likert scale where 1 is not important and 5 is extremely important. 
The code used for the farmers in these tables it is not exactly the same as the code used for the efficiency analysis (FSD and SSD) comparison, since farmer F9 in sources of risk and risk 
management strategies was not considered for the efficiency analysis. 
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efann 
...... . . Risk Mahagement ~trategy 5daJh~.45~~h~ ......•. 45~:~a~o:&hari Total . .Avera~e .. Standard ··.·ObservatIons De~atiOn ......... 
Combination of other enterprises in your operation NO 1 1 4 6 2 1 3 
Production of rice in other regions 5 NO NO 4 9 5 0.5 2 
Application of precautionary crop health measures 4 3 3 4 14 4 0.5 4 
Plant more than one variety of rice with different 4 4 2 3 13 3.25 0.8 4 
characteristics 
Use of more than one source of water NO 3 5 9 3 1.6 3 
Use of more than one irrigation system 5 2 NO 5 12 4 1.4 3 
Buy machinery to substitute labour 5 NO NO 5 10 5 0.0 2 
System of incentives and reward structures for labour 4 5 NO 4 13 4 0.5 3 
Application of monitoring progammes for pest and 4 4 NO 4 12 4 0.0 3 
diseases 
No. Strategies Used 7 7 4 9 7 
Selection of varieties with lower price variability 4 NO NO NO 4 4 0.0 1 
Spreading sales over time by storing product already 4 5 5 5 19 5 0.4 4 
harvest 
Use of forward contracting (warrants) 4 4 NO 5 13 4 0.5 3 
Contracting for purchasing inputs 4 2 4 2 12 3 1.0 4 
Use of futures and options markets NO NO NO NO 0 0 
Gathering market information such as price forecasts 3 5 4 5 17 4 0.8 4 
and trends 
No. Strategies Used 5 4 3 4 4 
Hold assets for sale to meet cash demands 1 NO NO NO 1 1 0.0 1 
Maintain flexibility in the pace of investments 4 5 3 2 14 4 1.1 4 
and withdrawals 
Match debt repayment structure with the income- 4 5 4 5 18 5 0.5 4 
generating pattern of rice production 
Lease assets rather than owing them 4 4 NO 9 3 1.4 3 
Hold liquid credit reserves 4 4 4 5 17 4 0.4 4 
Use of formal insurance 4 3 4 NO 11 4 0.5 3 
Arrangement of overdraft reserves NO 1 NO 4 5 3 1.5 2 
Main farm operator working off property 3 4 NO NO 7 4 0.5 2 
Other family members working off property NO NO NO NO 0 
Investing off farm 3 NO 4 8 3 1.2 3 
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Managing debt: monitoring debt and working with 4 5 4 5 18 5 0.5 
lenders to ease debt burden in critical times 
Keeping debt low 3 3 3 4 13 3 0.4 
No. Strategies Used 10 10 6 8 9 
Having long-term flexibility 5 3 4 4 16 4 0.7 
Short-term flexibility 4 4 4 4 16 4 0.0 
No. Strategies Used 26 25 17 25 
Note: the rating is based in a Likert scale where 1 is not important and 5 is extremely important. 'No' is not used and 'ND' is not available 
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Table A2.S Risk mana~ement strategies for each medium-sized farm 
.•..•.•.••.• ·.RisKMahagernent§tr~tfJ~Y>< •.• .... ... [1~b~~~)136&h~ib~h~..TPW>Average. .:t~~~6~.·()bServati()f1s··· 
Combination of other enterprises in your operation NO NO 2 
Production of rice in other regions NO NO NO 
Application of precautionary crop health measures NO NO 4 
Plant more than one variety of rice with different NO NO 3 
characteristics 
Use of more than one source of water 5 1 ND 
Use of more than one irrigation system 3 NO NO 
Buy machinery to substitute labour 4 2 4 
System of incentives and reward structures for labour 4 3 2 
Application of monitoring progammes for pest and 5 NO 4 
diseases 
No. Strategies used 5 3 6 
Selection of varieties with lower price variability NO NO NO 
Spreading sales over time by storing product already 5 5 3 
harvest 
Use of forward contracting (warrants) NO 3 NO 
Contracting for purchasing inputs NO 2 NO 
Use of futures and options markets NO NO NO 
Gathering market information such as price forecasts 4 3 2 
and trends 
No. Strategies used 2 4 2 
Hold assets for sale to meet cash demands NO 2 2 
Maintain flexibility in the pace of investments 4 2 4 
and withdrawals 
Match debt repayment structure with the income- 5 2 2 
generating pattem of rice production 
Lease assets rather than owing them 4 4 NO 
Hold liquid credit reserves 4 3 NO 
Use of formal insurance 5 NO 3 
Arrangement of overdraft reserves 4 4 3 
Main farm operator working off property 2 2 NO 
Other family members working off property NO NO NO 
Investing off farm NO 2 NO 
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2 2 
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4 4 
3 3 
6 3 
3 3 
10 3 
9 3 
9 5 
5 
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13 4 
3 3 
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9 3 
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4 2 
10 3 
9 3 
8 4 
7 4 
8 4 
11 4 
4 2 
2 2 
.. 
0.0 
0.0 
2.0 
0.0 
0.9 
0.8 
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0.0 
0.0 
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0.0 
0.9 
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0.0 
0.5 
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0.0 
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Managing debt: monitoring debt and working with 5 2 3 10 3 1.2 
lenders to ease debt burden in critical times 
Keeping debt low 5 3 5 13 4 0.9 
No. Strategies used 9 10 7 9 
Having long-term flexibility 5 3 3 11 4 0.9 
Short-term flexibility 5 4 NO 9 5 0.5 
No. Strategies used 20 21 19 
Note: the rating is based in a Likert scale where 1 is not important and 5 is extremely important. 'No' is not used and 'ND' is not available 
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Combination of other enterprises in your operation 3 2 2 NO NO 
Production of rice in other regions NO NO NO NO NO 
Application of precautionary crop health measures NO NO 2 NO NO 
Plant more than one variety of rice with different 4 2 3 4 3 
characteristics 
Use of more than one source of water 2 NO 4 NO NO 
Use of more than one irrigation system NO NO NO 2 NO 
Buy machinery to substitute labour 5 3 NO NO 3 
System of incentives and reward structures for labour 3 NO 4 4 4 
Application of monitoring progammes for pest and NO NO 4 NO NO 
diseases 
No. of strategies used 5 3 6 3 3 
Selection of varieties with lower price variability NO NO NO NO NO 
Spreading sales over time by storing product already 5 5 5 NO NO 
harvest 
Use of forward contracting (warrants) NO NO 4 NO 4 
Contracting for purchasing inputs 3 NO 3 4 NO 
Use of futures and options markets 5 NO NO NO NO 
Gathering market information such as price forecasts 4 4 5 NO NO 
and trends 
No. of strategies used 4 2 4 1 1 
Hold assets for sale to meet cash demands NO NO NO NO NO 
Maintain flexibility in the pace of investments 5 NO 3 4 NO 
and withdrawals 
Match debt repayment structure with the income- 5 NO 5 NO 4 
generating pattern of rice production 
Lease assets rather than owing them NO NO 3 NO NO 
Hold liquid credit reserves NO 5 5 NO NO 
Use of formal insurance 5 5 5 NO 3 
Arrangement of overdraft reserves NO 4 3 NO NO 
Main farm operator working off property 3 NO 3 NO 
Other family members working off property NO NO NO NO NO 
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Investing off fann 5 NO NO NO NO 5 5 0.0 
Managing debt: monitoring debt and working with 4 NO 5 NO NO 9 5 0.5 2 
lenders to ease debt burden in critical times 
Keeping debt low 4 2 NO NO 5 11 4 1.2 3 
No. of strategies used 7 4 8 1 4 5 
Having long-tenn flexibility NO NO 2 NO 4 6 3 1.0 2 
Short-tenn flexibility NO NO 2 NO NO 2 2 0.0 1 
No. of strategies used 19 12 22 8 12 
Note: the rating is based in a Likert scale where 1 is not important and 5 is extremely important. 'No' is not used and 'ND' is not available. 
The code used for the farmers in these tables it is not exactly the same as the code used for the efficiency analysis (FSD and SSD) comparison, since farmer F9 in sources of risk and risk 
management strategies was not considered for the efficiency analysis. 
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APPENDIX 3 
AVERAGE GROSS MARGINS 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F1 (P1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 7183.33 0.15 1077.50 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 42 
Cultivation 87.5 
Fertilisation 68.4 
Herbicides & Pesticides 120.5 
Labour 170 
Irrigation 34.4 
Spraying 46 
Harvest 135 
Drying 126 
Other Expenses 30 
Leasing 0 
Total Expenses 859.8 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 109 
Net Expenses 750.8 
GROSS MARGIN 326.70 
190 
a Gross margin of farm FI when using production strategy PI. Please refer to note at the end of this 
appendix for a definition of PI 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F1 (NP1) 
a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 7050 0.15 1057.5 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 42 
Cultivation 87.5 
Fertilisation 68.4 
Herbicides & Pesticides 120.5 
Labour 170 
Irrigation 34.4 
Spraying 46 
Harvest 135 
Drying 126 
Other Expenses 30 
Leasing 0 
Total Expenses 859.8 
less estimated costs of 109 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 750.8 
GROSS MARGIN 306.7 
a Gross margin of farm FI when not using production strategy PI. Please refer to note at the end of this 
appendix for a definition of PI 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F1 (M1)a 
ITEM 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
6900.00 0.20 
$/ha 
42 
87.5 
68.4 
120.5 
170 
34.4 
46 
135 
126 
30 
o 
859.8 
109 
$/ha 
1380.00 
750.8 
629.20 
191 
a Gross margin of farm PI when using marketing strategy MI. Please refer to note at the end of this 
appendix for a definition of MI 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F1 (NM1) 
a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6900 0.15 1035 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
42 
87.5 
68.4 
120.5 
170 
34.4 
46 
135 
126 
30 
o 
859.8 
109 
750.8 
284.2 
a Gross margin of farm PI when not using marketing strategy Ml. Please refer to note at the end of this 
appendix for a definition of MI 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F1 (M2) a 
ITEM 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
6900.00 0.20 
$/ha 
42 
87.5 
68.4 
120.5 
170 
34.4 
46 
135 
126 
30 
o 
859.8 
46 
$/ha 
1385.75 
813.8 
571.95 
192 
a Gross margin of farm Fl when using marketing strategy M2. Please refer to note at the end of this 
appendix for a definition of M2 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F1 (NM2)a 
ITEM 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Yield (kglha) 
6900 
Price ($/kg) $/ha 
0.145 1000.5 
$/ha 
42 
87.5 
68.4 
120.5 
170 
34.4 
46 
135 
126 
30 
0 
859.8 
109 
750.8 
249.7 
a Gross margin of farm Fl when not using marketing strategy M2. Please refer to note at the end of this 
appendix for a definition of M2 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F1 (M3) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6900.00 0.20 1385.75 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 42 
Cultivation 87.5 
Fertilisation 68.4 
Herbicides & Pesticides 120.5 
Labour 170 
Irrigation 34.4 
Spraying 46 
Harvest 135 
Drying 126 
Other Expenses 30 
Leasing 0 
Total Expenses 859.8 
less estimated costs of not 63 
implementing other strategies 
Net Expenses 796.8 
GROSS MARGIN 588.95 
a Gross margin of farm Fl when using marketing strategy M3. Please refer to note at the end of this 
appendix for a definition of M3 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F1 (NM3) a 
ITEM 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of not 
implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
6900 0.145 
$/ha 
42 
87.5 
68.4 
120.5 
170 
34.4 
46 
135 
126 
30 
o 
859.8 
109 
$/ha 
1000.5 
750.8 
249.7 
a Gross margin of farm Fl when not using marketing strategy M3. Please refer to note at the end of this 
appendix for a definition of M3 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F2 (P1) a ~',:. -;-. .... ~ .,-
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 7600 0.19 1444 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 55 
Cultivation 166 
Fertilisation 105.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 43.30 
Labour 156.72 
Irrigation 35.86 
Spraying 24.6 
Harvest 136.1 
Drying 119.52 
Other Expenses 87.5 
Leasing 60 
Total Expenses 989.7 
less estimated costs of 110 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 879.7 
GROSS MARGIN 564.3 
a Gross margin of farm F2 when using production strategy Pl. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F2 (NP1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price $/ha 
($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 7516.67 0.19 1428.17 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 55 
Cultivation 166 
Fertilisation 105.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 43.30 
Labour 156.72 
Irrigation 35.86 
Spraying 24.6 
Harvest 136.1 
Drying 119.52 
Other Expenses 87.5 
Leasing 60 
Total Expenses 989.7 
less estimated costs of 110 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 879.7 
GROSS MARGIN 879.70 1428.17 548.47 
a Gross margin of farm F2 when not using production strategy Pl. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F2 (P2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 7600 0.19 1444 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 55 
Cultivation 166 
Fertilisation 105.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 43.30 
Labour 156.72 
Irrigation 35.86 
Spraying 24.6 
Harvest 136.1 
Drying 119.52 
Other Expenses 87.5 
Leasing 60 
Total Expenses 989.7 
less estimated costs of 70 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 919.7 
GROSS MARGIN 919.7 1444 524.3 
a Gross margin of farm F2 when using production strategy P2. Please refer to note at the end of this 
appendix for a definition of P2 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F2 (NP2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6616.67 0.19 1257.17 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 55 
Cultivation 166 
Fertilisation 105.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 43.30 
Labour 156.72 
Irrigation 35.86 
Spraying 24.6 
Harvest 136.1 
Drying 119.52 
Other Expenses 87.5 
Leasing 60 
Total Expenses 989.7 
less estimated costs of 110 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 879.7 
GROSS MARGIN 879.70 1257.17 377.47 
a Gross margin of farm F2 when not using production strategy P2. Please refer to note at the end of this 
appendix for a definition of P2 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F2 (Ml) a 
ITEM ~. ~-.. '." .' .. ~-.'.-.', 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6933.33 0.21 1444.44 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 55 
Cultivation 166 
Fertilisation 105.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 43.30 
Labour 156.72 
Irrigation 35.86 
Spraying 24.6 
Harvest 136.1 
Drying 119.52 
Other Expenses 87.5 
Leasing 60 
Total Expenses 989.7 
less estimated costs. of 110 
, •• ,- •• - ••••• '0 
I', _ 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 879.7 
GROSS MARGIN 879.70 1444.44 564.74 
a Gross margin of farm F2 when using marketing strategy MI. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F2 (NM1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6933.33 0.19 1317.33 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 55 
Cultivation 166 
Fertilisation 105.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 43.30 
Labour 156.72 
Irrigation 35.86 
Spraying 24.6 
Harvest 136.1 
Drying 119.52 
Other Expenses 87.5 
Leasing 60 
Total Expenses 989.7 
less estimated costs of 110 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 879.7 
GROSS MARGIN 879.70 1317.33 437.63 
a Gross margin of farm F2 when not using marketing strategy MI. 
- - -'-
',.'-
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F2 (M2) a 
ITEM 
Yield {kglha} Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6933.33 0.21 1444.44 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 55 
Cultivation 166 
Fertilisation 105.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 43.30 
Labour 156.72 
Irrigation 35.86 
Spraying 24.6 
Harvest 136.1 
Drying 119.52 
Other Expenses 87.5 
Leasing 60 
Total Expenses 989.7 
less estimated costs of 110 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 879.7 
GROSS MARGIN 879.70 1444.44 564.74 
a Gross margin of farm F2 when using marketing strategy M2. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F2 (NM2) 
a 
ITEM 
Yield {kglha} Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6933.33 0.19 1317.33 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 55 
Cultivation 166 
Fertilisation 105.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 43.30 
Labour 156.72 
Irrigation 35.86 
Spraying 24.6 
Harvest 136.1 
Drying 119.52 
Other Expenses 87.5 
Leasing 60 
Total Expenses 989.7 
less estimated costs of 110 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 879.7 
GROSS MARGIN 879.70 1317.33 437.63 
a Gross margin of farm F2 when not using marketing strategy M2. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F2 (M3) a ' , r:-;--::~:'-'-">--"-
I ..... '-. ,', •. - _.'~._ 
ITEM F~.~~~·~:·:~·':::':;' 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6933.33 0.21 1444.44 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 55 
Cultivation 166 
Fertilisation 105.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 43.30 
Labour 156.72 
Irrigation 35.86 
Spraying 24.6 
Harvest 136.1 
Drying 119.52 
Other Expenses 87.5 
Leasing 60 
Total Expenses 989.7 
less estimated costs of 40 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 949.7 
GROSS MARGIN 949.70 1444.44 494.74 
a Gross margin of farm F2 when using marketing strategy M3. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F2 (NM3) 
a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6933.33 0.19 1317.33 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 55 
Cultivation 166 :-.. :--<-:-:' ,:' ,~-: ~ ~, 
Fertilisation 105.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 43.30 
Labour 156.72 
Irrigation 35.86 
Spraying 24.6 
Harvest 136.1 
Drying 119.52 
Other Expenses 87.5 
Leasing 60 
Total Expenses 989.7 
less estimated costs of 110 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 879.7 
GROSS MARGIN 879.70 1317.33 437.63 
a Gross margin of farm F2 when not using marketing strategy M3. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F3 (P1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 7166.67 0.23 1648.33 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 81.6 
Cultivation 99 
Fertilisation 57.8 
Herbicides & Pesticides 80 
Labour 90 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
o 
26.6 
108 
120 
663 
663 Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 663 1648.33 985.33 
a Gross margin of farm F3 when using production strategy Pl. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F3 (NP1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6250 0.23 1437.5 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 81.6 
Cultivation 99 
Fertilisation 57.8 
Herbicides & Pesticides 80 
Labour 90 
Irrigation 0 
Spraying 26.6 
Harvest 108 
Drying 120 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 663 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 663 
GROSS MARGIN 663 1437.5 774.5 
a Gross margin of farm F3 when not using production strategy Pl. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F3 (M1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 6500 0.247 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 81.6 
Cultivation 99 
Fertilisation 57.8 
Herbicides & Pesticides 80 
Labour 90 
Irrigation 0 
Spraying 26.6 
Harvest 108 
Drying 120 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 663 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 663 1603.33 
a Gross margin of farm F3 when using marketing strategy MI. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F3 (NM1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) 
Total Outcome Value 6500 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 663 
Price ($/kg) 
0.223 
$/ha 
81.6 
99 
57.8 
80 
90 
0 
26.6 
108 
120 
663 
1451.67 
$/ha 
1603.33 
663 . 
940.33 
$/ha 
1451.67 
663 
788.67 
a Gross margin of farm F3 when not using marketing strategy MI. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F3 (M2) a r~,,,,:::, .. :.· -<-
ITEM 
1~::;;K;:m: 
Yield (kg/ha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6500 0.247 1603.33 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 81.6 
Oultivation 99 
Fertilisation 57.8 
Herbicides & Pesticides 80 
Labour 90 
Irrigation 0 
Spraying 26.6 
Harvest 108 
Drying 120 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
~-':~.~<,~;~'- .':~ 
Total Expenses 663 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 663 
GROSS MARGIN 663 1603.33 940.33 
a Gross margin of farm F3 when using marketing strategy M2. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F3 (NM2) 
a 
ITEM 
Yield (kg/ha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6500 0.22 1430 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 81.6 
Oultivation 99 
Fertilisation 57.8 
Herbicides & Pesticides 80 
Labour 90 
Irrigation 0 
Spraying 26.6 
Harvest 108 
Drying 120 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 663 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 663 
GROSS MARGIN 663 1430 767 
a Gross margin of farm F3 when not using marketing strategy M2. 
'- _. - -- ,,--
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F4 (P1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 7000 0.17 1190 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
VC TOV 
665.2 
$/ha 
44 
93 
74 
117.3 
80 
71.5 
27 
108 
113.4 
0 
25.2 
753.4 
88.2 
1190 
665.2 
GM 
524.8 
a Gross margin of farm F4 when using production strategy Pl. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F4 (NP1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
1105 Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of not 
implementing other strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
6500 0.17 
665.2 
$/ha 
44 
93 
74 
117.3 
80 
71.5 
27 
108 
113.4 
o 
25.2 
753.4 
88.2 
665.2 
1105 439.8 
a Gross margin of farm F4 when not using production strategy Pl. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F4 (P2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 7000 0.17 1190 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 44 
Cultivation 93 
Fertilisation 74 
Herbicides & Pesticides 117.3 
Labour 80 
Irrigation 71.5 
Spraying 27 
Harvest 108 
Drying 113.4 
Other Expenses 0 
Leasing 25.2 
Total Expenses 753.4 
less estimated costs of 63 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 690.4 1190 
a Gross margin of farm F4 when using production strategy P2. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F4 (NP2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) 
Total Outcome Value 6500 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 665.2 
Price ($/kg) 
0.17 
$/ha 
44 
93 
74 
117.3 
80 
71.5 
27 
108 
113.4 
0 
25.2 
753.4 
88.2 
1105 
690.4 
499.6 
$/ha 
1105 
665.2 
439.8 
a Gross margin of farm F4 when not using production strategy P2. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F4 (M1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 6500 0.19 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
44 
93 
74 
117.3 
80 
71.5 
27 
108 
113.4 
o 
25.2 
753.4 
88.2 
a Gross margin of farm F4 when using marketing strategy MI. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F4 (NM1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) 
Total Outcome Value 6500 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Price ($/kg) 
0.165 
$/ha 
44 
93 
74 
117.3 
80 
71.5 
27 
108 
113.4 
0 
25.2 
753.4 
88.2 
$/ha 
1235 
665.2 
569.8 
$/ha 
1072.5 
665.2 
407.3 
a Gross margin of farm F4 when not using marketing strategy MI. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F4 (M2) a 
ITEM 
Yield {kglha} Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 6500 0.215 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 44 
Cultivation 93 
Fertilisation 74 
Herbicides & Pesticides 117.3 
Labour 80 
Irrigation 71.5 
Spraying 27 
Harvest 108 
Drying 113.4 
Other Expenses 0 
Leasing 25.2 
Total Expenses 753.4 
less estimated costs of not 25.2 
implementing other strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
a Gross margin of farm F4 when using marketing strategy M2. 
GROSS MARGIN OF F4 (NM2) a 
ITEM 
$/ha 
1397.5 
728.2 
669.3 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6500 0.17 1105 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
44 
93 
74 
117.3 
80 
71.5 
27 
108 
113.4 
o 
25.2 
753.4 
88.2 
665.2 
439.8 
a Gross margin of farm F4 when not using marketing strategy M2. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F4 (M3) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 6500 0.215 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 44 
Cultivation 93 
Fertilisation 74 
Herbicides & Pesticides 117.3 
Labour 80 
Irrigation 71.5 
Spraying 27 
Harvest 108 
Drying 113.4 
Other Expenses 0 
Leasing 25.2 
Total Expenses 753.4 
less estimated costs of not 88.2 
implementing other strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
a Gross margin of farm F4 when using marketing strategy M3. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F4 (NM3) a 
ITEM 
$/ha 
1397.5 
665.2 
732.3 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6500 0.17 1105 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
44 
93 
74 
117.3 
80 
71.5 
27 
108 
113.4 
o 
25.2 
753.4 
88.2 
665.2 
439.8 
a Gross margin of farm F4 when not using marketing strategy M3. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F5 (M2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6000 0.2283 1370 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 36.8 
Cultivation 74 
Fertilisation 78.2 
Herbicides & Pesticides 72.81 
Labour 100 
Irrigation 0 
Spraying 14.25 
Harvest 108 
Drying 72.8 
Other Expenses 33.6 
Leasing 90 
.:;", 
Total Expenses 680.46 
less estimated costs of not 53.7 
implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 626.76 
GROSS MARGIN 743.24 
a Gross margin of farmF5 when using marketing strategy M2. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F5 (NM2) 
a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6000 0.1867 1120 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 36.8 
Cultivation 74 
Fertilisation 78.2 
Herbicides & Pesticides 72.81 
Labour 100 
Irrigation 0 
Spraying 14.25 
Harvest 108 
Drying 72.8 
Other Expenses 33.6 
Leasing 90 
Total Expenses 680.46 
less estimated costs of 102.08 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 578.38 
GROSS MARGIN 541.62 
a Gross margin of farm F5 when not using marketing strategy M2. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F5 (M3) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kg/ha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6000 0.1892 1135 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 36.8 
Cultivation 74 
Fertilisation 78.2 
Herbicides & Pesticides 72.81 
Labour 100 
Irrigation 0 
Spraying 14.25 
Harvest 108 
Drying 72.8 
Other Expenses 33.6 
Leasing 90 
Total Expenses 680.46 
less estimated costs of 48.38 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
a Gross margin of farm F5 when using marketing strategy M3. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F5 (NM3) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kg/ha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 6000.00 0.1417 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 36.8 
Cultivation 74 
Fertilisation 78.2 
Herbicides & Pesticides 72.81 
Labour 100 
Irrigation 0 
Spraying 14.25 
Harvest 108 
Drying 72.8 
Other Expenses 33.6 
Leasing 90 
Total Expenses 680.46 
less estimated costs of 102.08 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
632.08 
502.92 
$/ha 
850.00 
578.38 
271.62 
a Gross margin of farm F5 when not using marketing strategy M3. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F6 (P2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 8000 0.1933 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 45 
Cultivation 100 
Fertilisation 0 
Herbicides & Pesticides 0 
Labour 250 
Irrigation 105 
Spraying 0 
Harvest (including drying) 250 
Drying 
Other Expenses 230 
Leasing 180 
Total Expenses 1160 
less estimated costs of not 73.8 
implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
a Gross margin of farm F6 when using production strategy P2. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F6 (NP2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) 
Total Outcome Value 7500 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest (including drying) 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 1071.8 
Price ($/kg) 
0.193 
$/ha 
45 
100 
0 
0 
250 
105 
0 
250 
230 
180 
1160 
88.2 
1450 
$/ha 
1546.67 
1086.2 
460.47 
$/ha 
1450 
1071.8 
378.2 
a Gross margin of farm F6 when not using production strategy P2. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F6 (M1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 7500 0.2183 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest (including drying) 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of not 
implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
45 
100 
o 
o 
250 
105 
o 
250 
230 
180 
1160 
83.2 
a Gross margin of farm F6 when using marketing strategy MI. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F6 (NM1) a 
ITEM 
$/ha 
1637.5 
1076.8 
560.7 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 7500 0.1967 1475 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest (including drying) 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
45 
100 
o 
o 
250 
105 
o 
250 
230 
180 
1160 
88.2 
1071.8 
403.2 
a Gross margin of farm F6 when not using marketing strategy MI. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F6 (M2) a I·,·,·'·;··""'.···'·· 
ITEM ~i&t~:::~~ig;: 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 7500 0.2183 1637.5 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 45 
Cultivation 100 
Fertilisation 0 
Herbicides & Pesticides 0 
Labour 250 
Irrigation 105 
Spraying 0 
Harvest (including drying) 250 
Drying 
Other Expenses 230 
Leasing 180 
Total Expenses 1160 
less estimated costs of not 48.2 
implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 1111.8 "-'.-"'--.". 
GROSS MARGIN 1111.8 1637.5 525.7 
a Gross margin of farm F6 when using marketing strategy M2. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F6 (NM2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 7500 0.1967 1475 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 45 
Cultivation 100 
Fertilisation 0 
Herbicides & Pesticides 0 
Labour 250 
Irrigation 105 
Spraying 0 
Harvest (including drying) 250 
Drying 
Other Expenses 230 
Leasing 180 
Total Expenses 1160 
less estimated costs of not 88.2 
implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 1071.8 
GROSS MARGIN 403.2 
a Gross margin of farm F6 when not using marketing strategy M2. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F6 (M3) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest (including drying) 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of not 
implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
7500 0.2183 
$/ha 
45 
100 
o 
o 
250 
105 
o 
250 
230 
180 
1160 
59.4 
a Gross margin of farm F6 when using marketing strategy M3. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F6 (NM3) a 
ITEM 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest (including drying) 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of not 
implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
7500 0.1967 
$/ha 
45 
100 
o 
o 
250 
105 
o 
250 
230 
180 
1160 
88.2 
$/ha 
1637.5 
1100.6 
536.9 
$/ha 
1475 
1071.8 
403.2 
a Gross margin of farm F6 when not using marketing strategy M3. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F7 (P1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) 
Total Outcome Value 4916.67 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Price ($/kg) 
0.19 
$/ha 
68 
70 
67 
60 
120 
70 
0 
72 
45 
70 
642 
a Gross margin of farm F7 when using production strategy Pl. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F7 (NP1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 4666.67 0.19 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 68 
Cultivation 70 
Fertilisation 67 
Herbicides & Pesticides 60 
Labour 120 
Irrigation 70 
Spraying 0 
Harvest 72 
Drying 45 
Other Expenses 70 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 642 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
934.17 
642 
292.17 
$/ha 
886.67 
642 
244.67 
a Gross margin of farm F7 when not using production strategy Pl. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F7 (M1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kg/ha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 4333.33 0.20 852.22 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 68 
Cultivation 70 
Fertilisation 67 
Herbicides & Pesticides 60 
Labour 120 
Irrigation 70 
Spraying 0 
Harvest 72 
Drying 45 
Other Expenses 70 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 642 
less estimated costs of not 
implementing other strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
a Gross margin of farm F7 when using marketing strategy MI. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F7 (NM1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kg/ha) 
Total Outcome Value 4333.33 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Price ($/kg) 
0.19 
$/ha 
68 
70 
67 
60 
120 
70 
0 
72 
45 
70 
642 
642 
210.22 
$/ha 
801.67 
642 
159.67 
a Gross margin of farm F7 when not using marketing strategy MI. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F7 (M2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
4333.33 0.24 
$/ha 
68 
70 
67 
60 
120 
70 
o 
72 
45 
70 
642 
a Gross margin of farm F7 when using marketing strategy M2. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F7 (NM2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 4333.33 0.18 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
68 
70 
67 
60 
120 
70 
o 
72 
45 
70 
642 
a Gross margin of farm F7 when not using marketing strategy M2. 
$/ha 
1018.33 
642 
376.33 
$/ha 
794.44 
642 
152.44 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM Fa (P1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 5583.33 0.1867 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
64 
48 
67 
71 
125 
58 
20 
108 
70 
20 
651 
27.5 
a Gross margin of farmF8 when using production strategy PI. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM Fa (NP1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 5250 0.1867 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 64 
Cultivation 48 
Fertilisation 67 
Herbicides & Pesticides 71 
Labour 125 
Irrigation 58 
Spraying 20 
Harvest 108 
Drying 70 
Other Expenses 20 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 651 
less estimated costs of 27.5 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
1042.22 
623.5 
418.72 
$/ha 
980 
623.5 
356.5 
a Gross margin of farm F8 when not using production strategy Pl. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM Fa (M1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 5250 0.21 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
T atal Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
64 
48 
67 
71 
125 
58 
20 
108 
70 
20 
651 
27.5 
a Gross margin of farm F8 when using marketing strategy Ml. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM Fa (NM1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 5250 0.1833 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 64 
Cultivation 48 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
67 
71 
125 
58 
20 
108 
70 
20 
651 
27.5 
$/ha 
1102.5 
623.5 
479 
$/ha 
962.5 
623.5 
339 
a Gross margin of farm F8 when not using marketing strategy MI. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM Fa (M2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
5250 0.215 
$/ha 
64 
48 
67 
71 
125 
58 
20 
108 
70 
20 
651 
a Gross margin of farm F8 when using marketing strategy M2. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM Fa (NM2) 
a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 5250 0.185 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
64 
48 
67 
71 
125 
58 
20 
108 
70 
20 
651 
27.5 
$/ha 
1128.75 
651 
477.75 
$/ha 
971.25 
623.5 
347.75 
a Gross margin of farm F8 when not using marketing strategy M2. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F9 (P1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 7980 0.19 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 64.5 
Cultivation 143.1 
Fertilisation 117.4 
Herbicides & Pesticides 28.1 
Labour 132.3 
Irrigation 70.4 
Spraying 20 
Harvest 137.2 
Drying 125.4 
Other Expenses 66 
Leasing 0 
Total Expenses 904.4 
less estimated costs of not 110 
implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
a Gross margin of farm F9 when using production strategy Pl. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F9 (NP1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) 
Total Outcome Value 7892.50 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Price ($/kg) 
0.19 
$/ha 
64.5 
143.1 
117.4 
28.1 
132.3 
70.4 
20 
137.2 
125.4 
66 
0 
904.4 
110 
$/ha 
1516.2 
794.4 
721.8 
$/ha 
1499.5 
8 
794.4 
705.18 
a Gross margin of farm F9 when not using production strategy Pl. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F9 (P2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
7980 0.19 
$/ha 
64.5 
143.1 
117.4 
28.1 
132.3 
70.4 
20 
137.2 
125.4 
66 
o 
904.4 
70 
a Gross margin of farm F9 when using production strategy Pl. 
GROSS MARGIN FARM F9 (NP2) a 
ITEM 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
6947.50 0.19 
$/ha 
64.5 
143.1 
117.4 
28.1 
132.3 
70.4 
20 
137.2 
125.4 
66 
o 
904.4 
110 
$/ha 
1516.2 
834.4 
681.8 
$/ha 
1320.03 
794.4 
525.63 
a Gross margin of farm F9 when not using production strategy Pl. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F9 (M1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 7280.33 0.21 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of not implementing 
other strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
64.5 
143.1 
117.4 
28.1 
132.3 
70.4 
20 
137.2 
125.4 
66 
o 
904.4 
110 
a Gross margin of farm F9 when using marketing strategy Ml. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F9 (NM1) a 
ITEM 
$/ha 
1516.74 
794.4 
722.34 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
7280.33 0.191383.2 
$/ha 
64.5 
143.1 
117.4 
28.1 
132.3 
70.4 
20 
137.2 
125.4 
66 
o 
904.4 
110 
6 
794.4 
588.86 
a Gross margin of farm F9 when not using marketing strategy MI. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F9 (M2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 7280.33 0.21 
Expenses $Iha 
Seed 64.5 
Cultivation 143.1 
Fertilisation 117.4 
Herbicides & Pesticides 28.1 
Labour 132.3 
Irrigation 70.4 
Spraying 20 
Harvest 137.2 
Drying 125.4 
Other Expenses 66 
Leasing 0 
Total Expenses 904.4 
less estimated costs of not 110 
implementing other strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN . 
a Gross margin of farm F9 when using marketing strategy M2. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F9 (NM2) a 
ITEM 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Yield (kglha) 
7280.33 
Price ($/kg) 
0.19 
$/ha 
64.5 
143.1 
117.4 
28.1 
132.3 
70.4 
20 
137.2 
125.4 
66 
o 
904.4 
110 
$/ha 
1516.74 
794.4 
722.34 
$/ha 
1383.26 
794.4 
588.86 
a Gross margin of farm F9 when not using marketing strategy M2. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F9 (M3) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 7280.33 0.21 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
64.5 
143.1 
117.4 
28.1 
132.3 
70.4 
20 
137.2 
125.4 
66 
o 
904.4 
40 
a Gross margin of farm F9 when using marketing strategy M3. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F9 (NM3) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
Total Outcome Value 7280.33 0.19 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 64.5 
Cultivation 143.1 
Fertilisation 117.4 
Herbicides & Pesticides 28.1 
Labour 132.3 
Irrigation 70.4 
Spraying 20 
Harvest 137.2 
Drying 125.4 
Other Expenses 66 
Leasing 0 
Total Expenses 904.4 
less estimated costs of not 110 
implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
1516.74 
864.4 
652.34 
$/ha 
1383.26 
794.4 
588.86 
a Gross margin of farm F9 when not using marketing strategy M3. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F10 (P1) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6500 0.18 1170 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
$/ha 
585 
49 
43 
54 
52.92 
110 
893.92 
893.92 
276.08 
a Gross margin of farm FlO when using production strategy PI. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F10 (NP1) 
a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 6833.33 0.18 1230.00 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 
Cultivation 585 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 49 
Spraying 43 
Harvest 54 
Drying 52.92 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 110 
Total Expenses 893.92 
less estimated costs of not 
implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 893.92 
GROSS MARGIN 336.08 
a Gross margin of farm FlO when not using production strategy Pl. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM Fll (Pl) a 
ITEM 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
5500.00 0.18 
$/ha 
66.3 
50 
67.1 
54 
70 
61.6 
9 
54 
51.3 
128.7 
612 
87.08 . 
$/ha 
980.83 
524.92 
455.91 
a Gross margin of farm FII when using production strategy Pl. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM Fll (NP1) 
a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 5000.00 0.18 891.67 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 66.3 
Cultivation 50 
Fertilisation 67.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 54 
Labour 70 
Irrigation 61.6 
Spraying 9 
Harvest 54 
Drying 51.3 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 128.7 
Total Expenses 612 
less estimated costs of 87.08 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 524.92 
GROSS MARGIN 366.75 
a Gross margin of farm FII when not using production strategy Pl. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F11 (P2) a 
ITEM 
Total Outcome Value 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
Harvest 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) 
5500.00 0.18 
$/ha 
66.3 
50 
67.1 
54 
70 
61.6 
9 
54 
51.3 
128.7 
612 
53.7 
$/ha 
980.83 
558.3 
422.53 
a Gross margin of farm FI1 when using production strategy Pl. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F11 (NP2) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 5000.00 0.18 891.67 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 66.3 
Cultivation 50 
Fertilisation 67.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 54 
Labour 70 
Irrigation 61.6 
Spraying 9 
Harvest 54 
Drying 51.3 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 128.7 
Total Expenses 612 
less estimated costs of 87.08 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 524.92 
GROSS MARGIN 366.75 
a Gross margin of farm FI1 when not using production strategy Pl. 
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GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F11 (M3) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) . $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 5000.00 0.20 1016.67 
Expenses $/ha 
Seed 66.3 
Cultivation 50 
Fertilisation 67.1 
Herbicides & Pesticides 54 
Labour 70 
Irrigation 61.6 
Spraying 9 
Harvest 54 
Drying 51.3 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 128.7 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
612 
87.08 
524.92 
491.75 
a Gross margin of farm FII when using marketing strategy M3. 
GROSS MARGIN OF FARM F11 (NM3) a 
ITEM 
Yield (kglha) Price ($/kg) $/ha 
Total Outcome Value 5000.00 0.18 891.67 
Expenses 
Seed 
Cultivation 
Fertilisation 
Herbicides & Pesticides 
Labour 
Irrigation 
Spraying 
$/ha 
66.3 
50 
67.1 
54 
70 
61.6 
9 
227 
Harvest 54 :-_·_.c,_: __ c_:~.:_ 
Drying 
Other Expenses 
Leasing 
Total Expenses 
less estimated costs of 
not implementing other 
strategies 
Net Expenses 
GROSS MARGIN 
51.3 
128.7 
612 
87.08 
524.92 
366.75 
a Gross margin of farm FI1 when not using marketing strategy M3. 
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Table A3.1 Estimated costs of implementing each strategy ($/ha) a b 
···.< ••• ·.·iP1»>·>P2Y ·><Mt ···M2:\<······.)Ma><>Total< 
Farm F1 No 
Farm F2 No 40 
Farm F3 No 
Farm F4 No 25.2 
Farm F5 
Farm F6 14.4 
Farm F7 No 
Farm Fa No 
Farm F9 No 40 
Farm F10 No 
Farm F11 No 33.38 
a No:: no costs involved, -= strategy not used. 
No 63 
No No 
No No 
No 63 
48.38 
5 40 
No No 
No 27.5 
No No 
46 109 
70 110 
o 
No 88.2 
53.7 102.08 
28.8 88.2 
o 
27.5 
70 110 
o 
53.7 87.08 
228 
b These estimates were given by each farmer or were average from the estimates already given by the rest 
of the farmers when the specific farmer was not sure of the cost. 
Note: 
1. Risk management strategy code 
P 1: Plantmg several varieties of rice with different characteristics 
P2: Usmg System of mcentives and reward structure to labour 
M 1: Gathermg market information such as price forecasts and trends 
M2: Spreadmg sales over time by stormg rice already harvest 
M3: Usmg forward contractmg 
2. It is assumed that the expenses m the gross margm mc1ude the cost of implementing 
all the strategies that each farmer uses so that the costs incurred m implementing the 
strategies that are not being analysed in each case are subtracted. 
3. The rice yields and prices as indicated in the gross margins are the mean for each 
distribution. 
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APPENDIX 4 
PARAMETERS FOR THE STOCHASTIC VARIABLES 
Ri$kmana ·emeritstrate· . <F3 ..<plt.· •.• t F5 ···.·.FS.·>.<F7 •• ·.<)PS.·.· . F9·· Fl0··.Ft1. 
Planting several varieties of rice with different characteristics 
Max yield (kg/ha) 7500 8200 10000 8500 6000 6500 8610 7000 6500 
Min yield (kglha) 6800 7000 5000 5500 3500 5000 7350 6000 4500 
Most likel~ ~ield (kg/ha} 7200 7600 7000 7000 5000 5500 7980 6500 5500 
Using system of incentives and reward structures for labour 
Max yield (kglha) 8200 8500 8500 8610 6500 
Min yield (kglha) 7000 5500 7500 7350 4500 
Most likel~ ~ield (kg/ha} 7600 7000 8000 7980 5500 
Gathering market information such price forecasts & trends 
Max price ($/kg) 0.22 0.23 0.32 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 
Min price ($/kg) 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Most likel~ ~rice ($/kg} 0.2 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.21 
Spreading sales over time by storing product already harvest 
Max price ($/kg) 0.225 0.23 0.32 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 
Min price ($/kg) 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.18 
Most likel~ ~rice ($Ikg} 0.2 0.21 0.21 0.215 0.225 0.22 0.235 0.215 0.21 
Using forward contracting (warrants) 
Max price ($/kg) 0.225 0.23 0.24 0.235 0.25 0.23 0.24 
Min price ($/kg) 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Most likely price ($/kg) 0.2 0.21 0.215 0.185 0.22 0.21 0.2 
;, 
;; "" I 
N 
N 
\0 
each strategy and averages without using any production or marketing strategy 
Plant several varieties of rice with different characteristics (P1) 
Max yield without using P1 (kglha) 
Min yield without using P1 (kglha) 
Most likely yield without usina P1 (k 
System of incentives and reward structures for labour (P2) 
Max yield without using P2 (kglha) 
Min yield without using P2 (kg/ha) 
Most likely yield without usina P2 (kalha 
Gathering market information such price forecasts & trends (M1) 
Max price without using M1 ($/kg) 
Min price without using M1 ($Ikg) 
Most likely price without usino M1 ($/k 
Spreading sales over time by storing product already harvest(M2) 
Max price without using M2 ($/kg) 
Min price without using M2 ($Ikg) 
Most likely price without usino M2 ($/ko) 
Use of forward contracting (warrants) (M3) 
Max price without using M3 ($/kg) 
Min price without using M3 ($Ikg) 
Most likelY price without using M3 ($/ko) 
Average price distribution not using any marketing strategy a 
Max without any strategy 
Min without any strategy 
Most likelY without any strateov 
Average yield distribution not using any production strategy b 
Max without any strategy 
Min without any strategy 
Most likelLvrlthout any strateoy 
F2/F3>F4> ·F5 ' .. ·F6/FT ..Fa ...• F9' .·· .. F10.>F1t. 
8000 8200 9500 8000 6000 7000 8610 7500 6000 
5500 6500 4000 5000 2000 3500 6825 5500 4000 
7200 7600 6000 6500 5000 5250 7980 7000 5000 
7500 8000 8000 7875 6000 
5000 5000 7000 5250 4000 
6800 6500 . 7500 7140 5000 
0.17 0.21 0.32 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 
0.13 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.18 
0.15 0.18 0.21 0.165 0.2 0.18 0.18 0.18 
0.18 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 
0.13 0.18 0.21 0.16 . 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 
0.14 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.2 0.18 0.185 0.18 
0.18 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.2 
0.13 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.15 
0.14 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.2 0.18 0.18 
0.18 0.21 0.28 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.20 
0.13 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.15 
0.14 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
8000 7850 9500 8000 8000 6000 7000 8243 7500 6000 
5500 5750 4000 5000 . 7000 2000 3500 6038 5500 4000 
7200 7200 6000 6500 7500 5000 5250 7560 7000 5000 
a The average was calculated from the min, max, and most likely prices for the strategies used by each farmer. 
b The average was calculated from the min, max, and most likely yields for the strategies used by each farmer. 
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APPENDIXS 
GROSS MARGIN CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION DATA 
Table AS.l Farm Fl gross marg!n cumulative distribution data ($/ha) 
OOm" .. Pt···· ... NP1 M1 .. ·NM1· ·M2>NM2 ·M3NM3 
i'rpil(%)· •• ···.· 
0 154.69 39.99 289.87 7.84 227.38 -8.72 262.58 -11.71 
5 215.34 145.07 424.75 120.93 371.51 92.64 384.83 93.56 
10 230.63 178.25 467.38 156.72 410.09 125.80 428.31 123.12 
15 242.03 198.88 498.62 179.88 440.83 148.46 458.01 146.68 
20 253.04 217.29 521.57 198.06 467.23 166.44 482.92 166.99 
25 262.57 235.11 546.57 216.58 487.94 183.39 504.53 183.87 
30 273.68 248.20 568.62 230.84 510.36 200.08 525.21 197.57 
35 283.89 260.22 586.60 245.78 527.87 214.78 542.97 210.45 
40 294.19 273.81 603.39 258.67 546.71 226.39 558.23 224.55 
45 304.58 287.13 620.14 272.09 562.54 238.05 575.04 237.46 
50 313.92 300.60 636.31 286.54 579.37 249.02 592.63 249.14 
55 327.56 313.68 651.69 299.62 593.63 261.16 608.5 262.07 
60 339.83 327.04 666.76 310.05 606.56 272.19 625.97 274.43 
65 353.73 340.26 682.41 322.42 621.27 285.76 642.18 286.46 
70 368.87 353.93 696.00 337.30 636.49 296.26 655.5 297.13 
75 380.97 372.52 713.27 351.10 655.34 309.92 673.37 313.74 
80 397.37 395.92 733.62 367.70 673.93 331.25 693.92 331.45 
85 418.05 416.03 754.77 387.30 695.36 350.52 716.23 350.72 
90 441.53 446.47 779.85 410.62 719.99 376.34 744.29 375.81 
95 471.55 489.75 819.87 446.97 763.50 404.16 781.09 409.28 
100 578.92 637.85 961.52 568.57 928.44 566.11 933.41 555.02 
Note: PI is planting several varieties with different characteristics, NPI is not using PI, P2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NP2 is not using P2, MI is gathering 
market information on price forecasts and trends, NMI is not using MI, M2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NM2 is not using M2, M3 is using forward contracting, 
NM3 is not using M3. 
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Table AS.2 Farm F2 gross margin cumulative distribution data ($lha) 
ClIrtlProb ... ·P1· NP1 . ··P2·· .. ·.>NP2)M1><NMfM2>NM2 M3>.NM3 
(%) 
0 397.36 318.20 357.68 70.10 216.61 177.60 201.04 182.76 143.91 171.21 
5 457.15 421.30 416.77 206.20 371.99 278.71 380.23 272.04 303.85 272.37 
10 480.33 445.11 433.81 245.93 415.98 307.29 417.93 304.85 344.59 307.28 
15 495.04 464.58 450.28 275.82 445.76 332.46 444.24 330.72 368.53 326.71 
20 505.75 478.11 463.20 296.52 465.70 351.06 467.31 350.52 390.64 349.14 
25 513.79 491.54 473.85 312.43 483.44 368.91 487.76 368.12 412.64 366.44 
30 522.88 503.60 483.02 326.70 503.97 382.88 504.23 386.72 432.51 384.80 
35 531.17 515.20 492.17 340.50 521.27 397.57 520.17 402.14 452.63 401.79 
40 541.02 525.86 501.66 354.73 537.41 413.23 538.42 416.23 467.92 415.71 
45 550.11 536.98 510.86 367.15 552.05 426.18 553.45 427.82 486.09 429.27 
50 559.83 546.87 519.87 381.07 567.40 439.93 568.69 439.31 500.04 444.16 
55 568.59 556.01 528.64 393.44 581.70 452.57 583.12 451.31 516.28 454.68 
60 576.95 566.26 537.78 406.31 598.35 466.01 596.32 465.82 531.65 466.74 
65 588.12 578.79 548.37 419.06 613.49 478.76 612.74 478.80 547.31 477.95 
70 598.03 589.10 559.18 431.44 628.29 491.73 625.65 491.86 561.66 489.66 
75 609.01 601.24 573.32 444.31 643.77 506.01 643.43 506.47 577.76 502.40 
80 622.76 614.86 585.49 459.62 663.60 523.19 664.93 522.32 594.45 519.06 
85 640.15 632.99 600.30 477.08 686.67 541.47 683.57 539.95 611.82 540.22 
90 658.22 655.40 620.54 503.53 716.92 563.53 705.07 562.34 633.36 561.99 
95 688.09 688.71 645.95 535.82 747.17 594.13 739.61 595.43 669.15 595.96 
100 796.66 785.04 761.27 630.27 853.84 697.92 869.49 702.98 798.48 727.46 
Note: PI is planting several varieties with different characteristics, NPI is not using PI, P2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NP2 is not using P2, Ml is gathering 
market infonnation on price forecasts and trends, NMI is not using MI, M2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NM2 is not using M2, M3 is using forward contracting, 
NM3 is not using M3. 
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Table AS.3 Fann F3 gross margin cumulative distribution data ($/ha) 
Cum ProbP1NPJ .' , M1 ',NM1>M2 ' "'NM2 
(0/0)' 
o 441.50 210.73 259.26 107.08 216.47 197.73 
5 609.52 378.70 462.61 337.82 458.04 370.98 
10 675.75 456.52 541.15 414.67 535.11 443.06 
15 721.12 507.45 602.96 474.26 599.16 500.67 
20 759.06 552.00 652.77 517.60 654.30 541.33 
25 793.38 583.70 699.40 562.60 695.81 575.67 
30 826.68 618.80 744.33 605.08 739.96 613.17 
35 866.94 652.78 786.91 642.29 783.58 644.90 
40 900.06 687.94 827.43 683.73 827.67 678.83 
45 934.80 719.79 864.05 717.49 861.58 712.61 
50 967.73 751.94 909.05 759.34 902.41 748.58 
55 1000.02 786.92 953.76 801.06 955.71 780.65 
60 1033.77 824.02 997.93 842.07 997.36 815.13 
65 1068.77 858.70 1042.58 877.44 1057.13 853.64 
70 1103.06 900.13 1086.60 925.00 1099.97 897.00 
75 1143.82 942.40 1147.08 978.90 1152.66 943.38 
80 1194.91 986.90 1204.41 1039.48 1211.29 995.88 
85 1251.50 1053.68 1280.76 1116.001279.18 1056.53 
90 1323.39 1120.151374.17 1204.61 1374.58 1133.09 
95 1424.34 1220.81 1520.41 1352.25 1531.32 1223.56 
100 1827.88 1614.792262.15 1954.91 2068.47 1517.68 
Note: PI is planting several varieties with different characteristics, NPI is not using PI, P2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NP2 is not using P2, Ml is gathering 
market information on price forecasts and trends, NMI is not using MI, M2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NM2 is not using M2, M3 is using forward contracting, 
NM3 is not using M3. 
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Table AS.4 Farm F4 gross marg!n cumulative distribution data ($/ha) 
CUIlrProbP1 ... NP1 .... P .,' . ' •. ".' ••. 2 NP2··· Ml ··.NM1 ······M2NM2<· M3<NM3 
<rof' 
0 275.84 185.49 256.49 177.20 179.14 103.48 288.69 176.03 337.02 162.29 
5 363.38 276.08 335.42 276.44 340.83 226.79 433.84 261.46 494.97 261.27 
10 391.20 304.19 368.66 310.13 382.85 258.91 478.49 293.60 542.16 296.10 
15 414.18 328.57 392.12 332.76 417.65 289.01 510.95 319.12 572.36 320.63 
20 431.48 349.75 409.07 349.72 444.13 313.30 541.58 345.69 596.87 343.84 
25 448.81 366.21 425.32 365.09 469.79 330.68 565.33 363.95 622.11;> 361.42 
30 467.36 379.69 439.58 382.30 489.64 346.11 589.28 379.26 645.62 378.45 
35 485.33 396.21 453.79 398.69 508.74 362.78 611.43 395.74 668.88 394.42 
40 498.92 410.66 468.60 412.33 526.53 379.52 632.04 410.82 688.46 410.51 
45 509.90 425.46 481.73 424.94 545.80 391.24 650.54 422.20 710.33 427.09 
50 525.48 438.36 498.33 439.80 565.40 407.49 671.70 437.79 729.90 441.11 
55 539.08 453.16 512.03 453.37 588.72 421.67 688.24 450.85 750.85 453.93 
60 550.61 468.07 526.94 467.45 607.46 435.02 706.40 465.38 769.89 466.23 
65 564.30 483.07 541.59 481.44 627.64 447.91 723.68 478.65 789.21 481.29 
70 577.57 499.33 555.06 497.92 649.00 462.71 744.29 497.33 811.28 496.75 
75 594.28 516.06 572.53 512.86 671.03 481.69 764.13 515.61 837.79 516.10 
80 615.77 528.41 590.76 529.75 693.02 504.23 794.19 535.32 863.36 534.91 
85 638.47 548.95 610.37 546.46 718.16 527.72 823.84 560.20 894.55 558.60 
90 661.71 573.15 633.90 568.48 752.52 553.18 859.14 586.31 927.81 586.13 
95 691.10 606.81 667.35 599.69 811.09 590.12 909.00 624.99 976.67 621.77 
100 798.82 727.10 797.36 734.85 994.13 726.59 1086.91 727.57 1138.52 740.61 
Note: PI is planting several varieties with different characteristics, NPI is not using PI, P2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NP2 is not using P2, MI is gathering 
market information on price forecasts and trends, NMI is not using MI, M2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NM2 is not using M2, M3 is using forward contracting, 
NM3 is not using M3. 
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Table A5.5 Fann F5 gross margin cumulative distribution data ($/ha) 
Cum·prob·M2 . ··NM2/ .....•.. M3 .. ·NM3 ..... 
(%) 
0 518.10 382.30 333.69 203.13 
5 585.36 418.12 377.17 221.30 
10 611.77 435.44 396.76 229.15 
15 632.19 449.68 412.37 235.40 
20 649.94 462.54 426.16 240.87 
25 666.05 474.59 438.81 245.95 
30 681.34 486.24 450.90 250.80 
35 695.95 497.65 462.60 255.49 
40 710.17 509.06 474.03 260.05 
45 724.29 520.54 485.51 264.65 
50 738.50 532.19 496.99 269.24 
55 752.69 544.26 508.72 273.94 
60 767.34 556.75 520.83 278.80 
65 782.66 569.95 533.49 283.82 
70 798.64 584.16 546.81 289.16 
75 815.75 599.57 561.22 294.92 
80 834.49 616.78 577.27 301.36 
85 855.97 636.99 595.45 308.68 
90 881.65 661.78 617.89 317.57 
95 916.65 696.96 648.61 330.00 
100 1027.23 825.27 765.14 374.01 
Note: PI is planting several varieties with different characteristics, NPI is not using PI, P2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NP2 is not using P2, MI is gathering 
market information on price forecasts and trends, NMI is not using MI, M2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NM2 is not using M2, M3 is using forward contracting, 
NM3 is not using M3. 
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Table A5.6 Farm F6 gross marg!n cumulative distribution data ($/ha) 
CurrrProb>P2 ··NP2 •..... ·Mt> .···NM1·>M2>NM~M~·>·· <.NI\I13········· 
(0,'01 
0 163.47 104.04 232.83 148.90 240.90 105.63 226.828 151.33 
5 271.24 202.03 382.59 238.83 341.49 247.45 355.46 243.74 
10 310.50 237.99 419.88 278.12 384.97 277.22 395.0062 275.23 
15 337.99 265.98 446.82 304.35 408.55 302.99 420.3687 301.67 
20 364.78 288.89 465.92 323.58 429.56 322.29 442.1962 321.01 
25 386.45 306.89 484.29 336.81 447.82 338.85 460.6643 339.81 
30 407.25 322.82 500.79 353.54 467.38 356.12 478.0133 354.95 
35 423.26 339.66 518.28 368.16 482.51 371.35 495.3217 368.97 
40 440.04 357.19 529.51 382.25 496.62 382.71 509.6264 382.41 
45 453.51 372.69 543.73 394.35 512.69 396.21 520.7808 396.27 
50 467.77 385.86 558.89 407.66 527.15 408.59 534.8567 408.36 
55 480.21 400.52 573.25 420.57 541.83 420.93 549.8107 420.27 
60 495.17 411.89 589.01 434.69 557.42 432.66 566.1382 431.54 
65 509.73 424.76 605.18 445.48 572.08 444.33 581.7022 444.55 
70 525.63 436.55 621.56 456.84 587.31 456.44 598.4023 457.71 
75 540.03 450.87 638.82 471.89 604.52 467.66 615.3608 469.87 
80 555.39 467.14 658.24 487.43 622.07 483.76 631.7987 484.96 
85 573.79 484.20 676.42 501.82 641.35 499.11 652.5549 500.78 
90 596.40 505.58 701.89 519.18 662.59 520.02 678.3859 519.28 
95 625.27 533.95 734.72 545.34 695.03 545.15 714.0737 544.54 
100 728.02 634.85 865.77 649.42 814.00 655.63 845.0054 668.64 
Note: PI is planting several varieties with different characteristics, NPI is not using PI, P2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NP2 is not using P2, MI is gathering 
market information on price forecasts and trends, NMI is not using MI, M2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NM2 is not using M2, M3 is using forward contracting, 
NM3 is not using M3. 
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Table AS.7 Farm F7 gross margin cumulative distribution data ($/ha) 
CumPfob...P1 ••.•.•••.••..•. NP1».>M1?·········· ... ·NM1.·····.······.·.</M2.·.·. ···········NM2·.·. 
<!o)·· 
0 40.44 -208.59 -251.33 -281.74 -176.11 -276.66 
5 120.47 -6.41 -111.51 -134.81 4.13 -141.59 
10 154.40 49.94 -37.62 -76.29 86.26 -75.91 
15 181.40 87.96 1.58 -22.83 139.28 -35.61 
20 200.01 116.53 49.10 12.38 192.17 5.64 
25 215.57 147.26 86.18 50.01 241.07 37.11 
30 233.16 171.56 117.37 74.40 276.34 66.72 
35 247.64 194.63 143.11 103.00 303.93 93.67 
40 262.28 214.91 173.20 128.89 341.36 122.53 
45 276.12 232.77 198.93 155.78 371 .. 96 145.78 
50 292.61 253.81 225.90 178.59 399.80 169.29 
55 307.75 273.35 253.80 200.30 430.52 190.77 
60 320.81 289.91 275.80 223.63 456.11 211.44 
65 332.25 310.65 294.56 242.59 481.70 229.20 
70 346.08 330.56 317.75 260.03 506.53 255.22 
75 361.63 348.28 339.93 277.99 536.99 276.00 
80 383.66 369.84 365.69 298.67 560.19 297.99 
85 405.71 392.31 397.75 326.36 587.52 321.40 
90 430.41 422.16 435.53 359.87 616.94 352.03 
95 463.61 467.45 482.77 397.80 661.96 394.06 
100 595.86 591.07 711.17 603.72 793.33 550.53 
Note: PI is planting several varieties with different characteristics, NPI is not using PI, P2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NP2 is not using P2, Ml is gathering 
market information on price forecasts and trends, NMI is not using MI, M2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NM2 is not using M2, M3 is using forward contracting, 
NM3 is not using M3. 
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Table A5.8 Fann F8 gross mardn cumulative distribution data ($/ha) 
CumProbP1····· .. ·NP1<M1NM1<M2·· ···>NM2<> 
(%) 
0 225.02 26.08 86.45 -9.57 75.10 -0.09 
5 291.21 134.56 231.13 108.27 209.03 117.63 
10 311.54 171.14 276.95 152.70 260.87 163.29 
15 329.48 203.08 309.25 184.37 301.88 197.27 
20 343.93 229.11 340.27 211.27 331.59 223.31 
25 356.20 254.20 367.49 233.89 359.30 246.30 
30 368.82 275.43 389.17 256.78 384.11 267.97 
35 379.88 291.33 412.61 278.16 407.24 287.24 
40 391.63 310.33 433.95 295.80 430.92 306.35 
45 402.86 329.61 454.40 313.03 450.94 324.32 
50 413.25 351.14 477.82 334.61 474.19 345.82 
55 425.03 370.36 499.03 351.26 498.55 363.77 
60 436.58 391.21 522.71 372.58 521.62 380.44 
65 448.41 407.00 541.41 387.61 542.13 400.89 
70 460.90 431.84 563.33 410.78 565.75 420.55 
75 474.63 457.38 589.52 440.17 589.46 444.70 
80 490.51 487.01 618.91 465.21 625.69 468.19 
85 507.13 514.52 646.40 492.77 655.48 498.40 
90 527.48 546.00 678.33 531.61 698.67 544.51 
95 568.31 589.23 731.27 590.87 758.58 591.93 
100 695.03 800.26 906.35 811.22 919.69 764.11 
Note: PI is planting several varieties with different characteristics, NFl is not using PI, P2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NP2 is not using P2, MI is gathering 
market information on price forecasts and trends, NMI is not using MI, M2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NM2 is not using M2, M3 is using forward contracting, 
NM3 is not using M3. 
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Table A5.9 Fann F9 gross margin cumulative distribution data ($/ha) 
cum.····· P1' ··NP1P2< NP2 ···J\1I1.>·NI\iI1······ M2>NI\II2·I\II~r NM3 
~~()b(Ofci) 
.' ....... . 
0 560.96 471.40 511.63 207.76 378.85 314.72 350.92 316.68 261.50 306.92 
5 613.75 568.15 571.43 349.16 521.83 415.40 527.83 420.36 451.23 416.25 
10 633.66 598.93 588.10 388.39 558.97 454.02 565.95 448.92 493.65 452.65 
15 649.00 618.63 603.04 413.00 593.05 475.27 594.43 477.81 525.27.' 477.26 
20 660.79 632.69 615.34 432.95 617.62 496.82 621.03 501.29 547.80 498.40 
25 671.29 647.77 627.44 454.16 640.35 516.38 641.05 519.43 566.04 518.34 
30 680.95 659.30 638.61 472.92 659.96 534.53 662.46 538.63 586.13 534.12 
35 690.19 670.47 649.89 488.37 678.58 551.99 679.06 550.67 603.65' 550.40 
40 697.45 681.76 659.95 503.26 695.44 565.25 692.41 565.48 617.94 564.46 
45 707.19 691.40 668.07 516.56 711.45 578.49 709.32 578.44 633.70 577.35 
50 716.35 701.68 676.95 532.28 729.48 591.11 725.00 591.88 653.84 590.21 
55 725.27 712.34 686.98 545.71 742.21 606.39 742.61 602.89 672.64 602.53 
60 733.74 721.79 696.57 558.26 756.77 620.34 758.42 617.61 688.61 615.11 
65 744.92 733.30 706.82 572.07 776.00 633.90 772.60 633.12 708.26 629.86 
70 756.37 745.07 716.87 585.16 790.27 648.17 788.12 645.68 722.33 645.16 
75 767.53 761.29 730.58 599.15 807.43 662.21 806.13 657.97 740.01 659.34 
80 781.59 776.05 743.05 612.94 827.41 677.29 823.52 674.19 760.19 675.73 
85 798.22 794.43 757.62 630.36 850.11 696.74 846.30 694.00 779.65 696.83 
90 818.60 816.76 782.91 656.50 872.83 719.05 872.13 717.74 805.39 723.22 
95 845.82 852.24 813.72 689.68 906.36 750.10 907.89 752.03 846.32 757.11 
100 924.85 967.13 911.09 819.73 1048.80 882.11 1013.86 887.53 965.87 878.00 
Note: PI is planting several varieties with different characteristics, NPI is not using PI, P2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NP2 is not using P2, MI is gathering 
market infonnation on price forecasts and trends, NMI is not using MI, M2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NM2 is not using M2, M3 is using forward contracting, 
NM3 is not using M3. 
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Table AS.lO Fann FlO gross margin cumulative distribution data ($/ha) 
&~)~~rob·· P1 . ··NP1· 
0 192.51 131.07 
5 220.03 219.23 
10 230.41 245.78 
15 238.22 264.51 
20 244.84 279.50 
25 250.75 292.53 
30 256.21 304.09 
35 261.42 314.72 
40 266.38 324.63 
45 271.25 334.06 
50 276.06 343.07 
55 280.87 351.84 
60 285.75 360.42 
65 290.73 368.97 
70 295.87 377.55 
75 301.36 386.31 
80 307.27 395.29 
85 313.86 405.01 
90 321.68 415.58 
95 331.93 428.42 
100 360.40 455.00 
Note: PI is planting several varieties with different characteristics, NPI is not using PI, P2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NP2 is not using P2, MI is gathering 
market information on price forecasts and trends, NMI is not using MI, M2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NM2 is not using M2, M3 is using forward contracting, 
NM3 is not using M3. 
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Table AS.ll Fann Fll gross margin cumulative distribution data ($lha) 
~)R1F'rObPt ···NP1 . . .. P2· ..••...•........ NP2»M3 ··NM3» 
o 224.80 149.35 198.80 150.19 230.89 145.01 
5 319.14 236.10 284.86 236.19 330.26 233.94 
10 342.33 262.50 311.41 260.13 361.34 260.07 
15 364.71 278.60 336.05 277.49 384.32 277.31 
20 379.20 292.17 350.40 291.63 403.49 292.46 
25 391.89 305.58 362.86 307.17 421.34 306.40 
30 406.71 319.22 375.94 321.48 436.73 317.37 
35 421.17 331.89 387.34 331.81 449.89 330.80 
40 432.46 341.38 397.56 344.46 464.21 342.83 
45 443.34 353.91 407.70 354.26 477.24 353.59 
50 454.06 364.54 419.48 363.88 489.73 363.69 
55 464.81 374.53 431.20 376.81 501.86 374.65 
60 478.11 385.91 442.21 388.49 513.95 387.14 
65 489.84 399.45 456.96 399.77 527.80 399.41 
70 503.14 411.61 468.17 414.17 543.52 412.16 
75 516.75 424.37 482.86 426.69 556.69 425.82 
80 530.71 440.88 498.58 441.23· 576.86 440.98 
85 549.06 456.31 516.27 455.03 596.39 457.24 
90 568.72 477.70 534.70 474.06 625.23 477.10 
95 597.01 511.24 560.55 499.98 665.57 509.15 
100 731.06 602.73 691.82 599.95 828.13 601.97 
Note: PI is planting several varieties with different characteristics, NPI is not using PI, P2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NP2 is not using P2, MI is gathering 
market information on price forecasts and trends, NMI is not using MI, M2 is using system of incentives and reward structure, NM2 is not using M2, M3 is using forward contracting, 
NM3 is not using M3. 
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